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ABSTRACT 
This project captures an attempt to politicize one aspect of Western middle class youth’s 
everyday experience growing up and living in postindustrial consumer society—the replacement 
of experiential, material, and libidinal gratification with that of ideological satisfaction. The 
dissertation takes up problematic adolescent gaming as a site to interrogate the ways and means 
of technologically-backed consumer socialization, and draw out the implications for subject-
formation and possibility of self-determination. Developing new ways to conceptualize politics 
of youth, the project re-reads existing academic research on youth and gaming. Its main goal is to 
create a theoretical framework that can sustain an understanding of the importance of 
consumerizing gadget-mediated self-self cultivation across the dimensions of political economy 
and its strict materiality, psycho-sociality and its relational concreteness, and the realm of the 
mind in which ideology meets consciousness. Under the guise of critiquing the banality of 
gaming studies, the project excavates ideas from various critical theory, phenomenological and 
psychoanalytic traditions to raise political questions of social reproduction and clarify a 
concretely political path beyond the present circumstances. 
I am interested in exploring how it is that generation after generation young people born in 
the compromised consumption-rendered centers of global capital do not revolt against the 
seemingly repressive institutions shaping their lives. In this question, there is an intergenerational 
politics, a politics in which the question of youth and their otherness is crashed into the 
structuration of political economy and social reproduction within it. This is ultimately the theme 
of my inquiry. The present work is a study of gaming as a site where we should expect to see the 
manifestations of this kind of intersection, but instead what we see is a single-minded preference 
for celebrating the gaming industry and securing the ideologically soothing reproduction. I want 
to address the politics signaled by the changing role of play in advanced consumer economy, 
where in the site of gaming, through controlled bursts of traumatization and regularization, 
prediction of subjective experience is commodified into the global capitalistic circuits.  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INTRODUCTION 
 The political thrust behind my dissertation research is supplied by a reoccurring 
observation: while gaming continues to play an increasingly normalized part in youth 
socialization in the metropoles, its critical academic literature continues to wane in the breadth of 
its scope. To this day I am shocked that there is no psycho-technological considerations of 
gaming, let alone any political readings of some such engagements between the not-yet-people 
(the minoritized, the youth ) and consumption-geared apparatuses of the capitalist political 1
economy.  This problem is further exaggerated by the fact that critical theory seems to have long 2
abandoned the project of theorizing the libidinal economy. There is no coherent, explanatory or 
even descriptive political framework for considering psycho-sociality  (as captured in discourses 3
like object relations ), socialization, and the very real, existential price of subject constitution for 4
any one person. This I will envisage as a politics of youth, where consciousness is a determinant 
central category, because I believe that without such a historical material and psycho-socially 
concrete treatment of the political-ideological-libidinal economy, we inevitably continue to be 
 Youth: Other than deeply structurally incorporated or accounted for, not yet matured, not yet extensively 1
complicit to the ways of the world.
 The Invisible Committee’s the Coming Insurrection (2009) by far comes closest to a critical politics of youth 2
under advanced capitalism.
 Psycho-social: This designation is meant to signal the consideration of the relational dimension of subject-3
object engagement.
 Object-relations: A theory of how the psychological life is constituted, the psychoanalytic theory of object 4
relations argues that the opequeness of subjective psychic constructions can be offset by attending to the relationality 
between the subject as self-constituted and self-understood and the object of fixation (which can be either imaginary 
or real). The real point is that object relations overcomes mystifications particular to the Freudian psychoanalysis by 
focusing on the most elementary analytic categories of the subject/object relation. Even more importantly this 
theoretical framework lends itself to being linked to social and political dimensions of subject formation (such as 
interpellation and commodification). The concepts such as projective identification and internalization, which stem 
from this theory, frame the dynamic relationship between subject and object in a way that lends itself to extending 
the trace of the process into higher realms of human existence.
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stuck with the surface treatment of applying critical theory to the historical materiality of the 
human condition. 
The First Day of the Hunting Season, November 2014 
 Consider the following picture as a means to situate the subject matter and the major 
moving parts. You  have spent months, numbering in the teens, in some remote part of the United 5
States, in intensive special forces sniper training school. Part of the training is internalization of 
all the necessary muscle memory and reflex reactions as well as ideological complementarity of 
libidinal repression  which invariably result when the body is disciplined by military 6
industrialization. Another part of the training is to learn to crave the mark, to desire, to fantasize 
about the target and the release of the hit.  Then, you are deployed; you spend months guarding 7
outposts, sweating in the desert, learning to manage breathing despite all the dust…without a 
single target. Then, either your tour ends and being so phantasmagorically traumatized, you call 
it quits. Or, your tour is cut short by an improvised explosive device. You spend the next year to 
three years in rehab. Then, you return to the metropole, the everyday American life—back to 
normality. 
 Now imagine two of these snipers; two prematurely retired young veterans, over-trained 
and under-valued, the pride and joy of the American special forces; two boys —two adolescents-
 The italicized “you” is meant to signify the subject-in-interpellation.5
 Repression: This concept originates in Freud's theory of psychic life, but my usage of it largely stems from 6
how critical theory has used it. Repression states that desires and fantasies, which encounter resistance and/or appear 
incompatible with the psychosocial reality of the subject, are drawn inward to prevent them from becoming directly 
expressed. Repression is thus twofold: in the first instance it is a "natural armoring" (see Reich 1965) that comes 
about during early childhood development; in the second instance, repression is the price of sociality, the direct 
consequence of historical social conditioning of the human in the process of forming a subjectivity.
 Desire: Desire stands in for the libido, Eros, and Phantasy. The intention behind a binding to an object, the 7
mobilization behind valorization. Separate but not property; me and my own otherness; me and my others, my 
futurity and my historicity. 
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at-heart, in their early thirties. After a night of reminiscing over various chemical consumption, 
they decide to turn on the Xbox 360 and play a mini-game in Call of Duty: World at War, called 
“Nazi Zombies.”  From the start the scenario invited familiar orientations—they talk as “we” in 8
the same way that they would talk as “we” in watching football, those popular sports 
interpellation  between fans and their favored teams.  9
 In this scenario multiplayer (“split screen”, meaning the television screen is divided into 
two smaller instances) first person shooter, players are on a team of soldiers (fashioned after 
American infantry from the late 1945s) fortified in a two-story building, windows and doors all 
boarded up. The objective is simple, never-changing: to survive the increasingly difficult mobs 
of Nazi zombies, who are all trying to break through the barricades and swarm you. The young 
veterans tell me they enjoy the game because it involves increasingly complicated higher 
strategizing—it is not all just about the endless slaughter. The game allows the young veterans to 
desublimate , but also to play out their fantasy of being in the director’s chair, to play the part of 10
the commanding class in their labor-libidinal economy shaped by extensive and exhaustive 
military training—it is finally their turn to command themselves! The fact that the objective is to 
kill swarms of Nazi zombies, the worst of two worlds—both forms of historically inexcusable 
 Activision. Call of Duty: World at War. Xbox 360 Platinum Hits edition. Mod. “Nazi Zombies.” 2008.8
 Interpellation: The self-self location in a historically enforced political economy; private dealing with social 9
structures deemed unmovable. Interpellation is the domain of projection and identification as well as other object-
relations with political and economic clout.
 Repressive desublimation: This is a concept developed by Marcuse (1964) to account for the ways advanced 10
capitalist society is able to infiltrate and mobilize psychic energy for its social reproductive (productive and 
consumptive) processes. The concept suggests a historical political economy in which a person is subjected not only 
to social and filial regulation (the primary scenes of socialization—repression and desublimation), but also to 
historical economic institutionalization of psychosocial processes where the psychic flow is directed not just for 
release, but for release with future-attachment potential.
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sociality and subjectivity—further motivates the immersion into the fantasy. It offers total 
vindication, purifying, authorizing what you have been trained to become.  
 This event, this playing out of a fantasy as a game, exists not only on the psycho-social 
level. It is also deeply inculcated within the circuits of postindustrial, consumer capitalism, 
especially in the realm of consumer technological gadgetry. It utilizes the likely libidinal 
registers of historical social experience to immerse users into a reduced state of consciousness in 
which their self-awareness (and the burden of it all) is traded in for rationality limited to 
problem-solving and an elaborate semiconscious or unconscious auto-stimulation (self-satisfying 
through the body) mechanism. The totality of the experience is an instance in the extent of the 
advancement of technologically supported capitalist social relations and economy that spans 
from the political material to the libidinal and emotional dimensions of subjective experience. On 
the level of auto-stimulation, the cycles of varying intensity of focus and multi-tasking simulates 
pleasure in its immersiveness. The game makes the horrifying hallmark of postindustrial 
metropolitan  life— predictability and repetition—thus enjoyable. When deep fantasies of 11
satisfaction become commodified, all that is left for anyone to do is find a way to sustain the 
feeling, to return to the source of the experience, to repeat.  12
 This vignette captures the major themes of my dissertation. The sight of the adolescent-
soldier-gamer is a more readily legible instance in the historical material situation of 
 Metropolitan: The western historical centers of capital where usually the capitalist classes reside as well as 11
the many levels of middle classes who run and live off of neo-colonialism, neo-slavery, imperialism, global 
capitalism. The innermost urban territories of the domestic sphere of the empire.
 Commodification: The life of the subject-object spans from conception to reification to instrumentalization to 12
commodification. Commodification means the appropriation or accounting for dynamics and objects that originate 
in the social world of humans and end up in the realm of capitalist economy. For this to happen, the intent has to be 
singularly exploitative.
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metropolitan adolescents , who are caught in the position of reproducing economically valuable 13
consumption all the while satisfying their material and ideological needs. In this project I will 
study adolescent gaming as a way to clarify the political issues at the intersection of social 
reproduction, capitalist political economic exploitation, psycho-social relationality, and the 
concrete (embodied) experience of libidinal economy and subject-formation. 
 This is the political economy of this consumer subjectivity. The adolescent after all is borne 
out of consumer capitalism (Tiqqun 2001). In focusing on the metropolitan youth, my project 
privileges the subject position of the young. The subject position of a person who is subjected to 
institutionalization, libidinal subjugation to the political economy, in which self-consciousness 
and autonomy, self-direction and its self-satisfying confirmation, are traded for and substituted 
by a consciousness-obliterating attentional immersion. The realm in which this process is seen as 
politically formative I call the politics of youth.  Throughout my dissertation, I explore how 14
thinking about the consumer-socialization-based political economy from a perspective of 
existential solidarity with youth opens up to a conceptualization of youth as a category that 
especially highlights what happens to the possibility of autonomy and self-consciousness as 
essential political categories . In this sense this is both a social and political theoretical project. 15
 Adolescence: Adolescence is a historically-constructed ideological conception for self-conscious human 13
beings whose agency is rationalized as being in need of limitation, regulation, repression, and direction.
 My conception of the politics of youth is based on Levinas’s (1998) concept of the face. For Levinas, 14
accepting an irreducibly self/other relationship with everything that lies beyond the cover of the conceptual surface 
is symbolically represented in the Face. This conceptual limitation of knowing also constitutes a basic ethical and 
political lesson for Adorno according to Horowitz (2008). This concept serves as the base for politicality in the case 
of youth as a subject position in the complex of social reproductive institutions and capitalist political economy.
 Ownness: The other side of the Face taken from the perspective of the subject-in-their-otherness.15
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 I am interested in exploring situatedly how it is that generation after generation young 
people born in the compromised consumption-rendered centers of global capital do not revolt 
against the seemingly repressive institutions shaping their lives. Besides the few glimmers in the 
night sky marked by the riots in Parisian suburbs and Zucotti Park, the American youth don’t 
burn the house down! What is marked as adolescent revolt, below its ideology of naturalization, 
could very well be the outcry of a newly arrived self-consciousness. In this question, there is an 
intergenerational politics, a politics in which the question of youth and their otherness is crashed 
into the structuration of political economy and social reproduction within it. This is ultimately 
the theme of my inquiry. The present work is a study of gaming as a site where we should expect 
to see the manifestations of this kind of intersection, but instead what we see is a single-minded 
preference for celebrating the gaming industry and securing the ideologically soothing 
reproduction. I want to address the politics signaled by the changing role of play in advanced 
consumer economy, where in the site of gaming, through controlled bursts of traumatization and 
regularization, prediction of subjective experience is commodified into the global capitalistic 
circuits. 
Overview of Chapters 
  
 The first chapter elaborates the theoretical and political premises. It specifies adolescence 
as a subject position, consumption-reproducing ideological subjectivity as a class position, and 
the metropolitan consumer society as a territory and economy. The chapter also explains why the 
project focuses on gaming as the consumption-friendly liberalization of what passes respectively 
as interpellation and object-relations.  
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 The second chapter takes up the massively multiplayer online role-playing games 
(popularly known as MMORPGs or MMOs for short), particularly World of Warcraft as an 
interpellative consumer apparatus. It outlines how the video game commodifies interpellation 
and subject-formation for its profit-generating intent.  
 The third chapter focuses more intensely on the materiality, the concrete experience of 
gaming. Specifically the chapter deals with consumer technology as mediative technology in the 
reign of consumer-socialization of the libidinal economy through processes of repressive 
interpellation. The chapter addresses how video games are different than older interpellative 
mechanisms, because of their gadgetized  mediation  and surplus-extractive purpose.  16 17 18
 The fourth chapter focuses directly on the nature of the repressive interpellative apparatus 
through the ideological differentiation of labor and play (as gaming) for metropolitan 
adolescents. The chapter critiques various theories of play, which the contemporary theorists of 
video games readily take up as their basic assumptions, for avoiding the question of labor. 
Returning to the discourse on immaterial labor, the chapter concludes with singling out 
 Gadgetized: Tying of psycho-sociality to technological commodities; the tying of self-relating object-16
relations to technological objects; the growing presumption of mediational neutrality of consumer technology.
 Mediation: This concept is meant to highlight the fact that activities such as reading texts, listening to music, 17
watching a film, composing an email, playing a video game, all require that the user accepts his or her experience to 
be mediated by consumer technological gadgets that, in return, reduce and represent signs, sounds, and images of 
historical sociality.
 Surplus: The left-over, the spill-over, the remainder, the unaccounted-for. The surplus, in its ephemera, gives 18
value to the dead object.
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valorization  as the psycho-social register of what passes for play or labor to raise the question 19
of what kind of surplus is being extracted in this psycho-political  economy. 20
 The fifth chapter returns to the larger theme of gaming to draw out the underlying 
economy of psychic surplus that emerges in the converge of the libidinal economy of 
adolescence, the historical material conceptualization of gadget-mediated consumer-subjectivity 
formation, and the ideological needs and apparatuses of embodying such a stance. 
 Finally, in the conclusion, I bring all of these chapters together. I return to the question of 
youth politics, and read the gaming libidinal economy and subject formation through those 
political lenses. The conclusion meditates on the changing nature of rule-breaking—the fact that 
one cannot confront the choice of whether to follow the rule or not. Video games erase this 
historical possibility by removing that possibility. The conclusion also addresses the familiar 
paradox of consumer subjectivity in which video games substitute real freedom with closed-
circuit, alienated agency. 
 My goal is to propose how youth studies can benefit from critical theory, away from 
ideological presumptions of the normative. After all, gaming is a structure of youth culture. I 
want to address the problematic assumptions in contemporary critical theory of socialization 
which institutionalization and economizing of libidinal life is viewed as inevitably natural 
 Valorization: Below the surface of activity (as in Arendt’s (1958) conception) or laboring (in Marx’s 19
conception), there is the psychosocial, object-relational dimension of valorizing an experience; the very experience 
of psychic investment.
 Psychopolitic/al: A recognition of the political dimension in the reification of descriptive concepts; that any 20
claim to a truth in the psychological realm is bound to be wrapped up in reigning and suitable ideology. Some 
historical examples of this happening are in Lacan’s (1977) gendering of most inner world, Derrida’s (1995) final 
words on the inescapability of consumption, Freud’s (1997) mechanism of cathexis and libido, Butler’s (1997) 
conclusiveness of primary identification, Marx’s (2011) fixation on labor, Marcuse’s (1974) reification of sexuality. 
The point is that in any case, the system defines value and decides the hierarchy of valuation, privileging of some 
psychic energies over others, essentially deciding on the sought after character of the not-yet-grown.
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occurrences framed by fragmented interpellative systems—gaming deploys total interpellation 
and consolidates the interests of social reproduction and political economic reproduction. 
 How is it that culture  is repurposed as capital in postindustrial, consumer society’s 21
Western (post)colonial centers—the metropoles? In the case of metropolitan youth and gaming, 
we get to study exactly this, that is, where idealism meets dialectical materialism (autonomy, 
political of consciousness in theory of subject formation). But, we also get to see how culture is 
commodified, how it gives content and shape to interpellation, and how interpellation is 
commodified as avatar-subject relationality. Further, we get to see how gaming functions as an 
interpellative apparatus which depoliticizes revolutionary potential in youth as a world-historical 
class. 
 Let’s get beyond the ideology of the immediately exploitable. This dissertation attempts to 
address a glaring lack of critical analysis in the emerging field of gaming studies. The premise is 
that gaming studies requires a framework that can handle its multidimensional interaction with 
people. Gaming is just fun so long we do not identify the subject as that of a minor. There is a 
different valance to Galloway's saying that "we love being fragmented, interlinked...enjoying 
games" (2006: 27). Simply put, how do we decide whether a repression or sublimation  is 22
repressive or not? This question strikes me as most important as we enter the age of commercial 
and industrial manipulation of object relations. Whether it is getting worse in comparison to an 
earlier time is irrelevant, the question of critiquing the means of what has passed as social 
reproduction is what is at stake.  
 Culture as social and object relations in which youth insurgency is usurped.21
 Sublimation: The redirection of a desire/drive/potential/initiative into socially manageable, innocuous, or 22
productive expressions and objects.
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CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL PREMISES: SUBJECT, CLASS, ECONOMY, TERRITORY; 
CONSCIOUSNESS, YOUTH, REPRODUCTION, POLITICS 
Psycho-politics: the Politics of Socialization 
 In this chapter I will argue that the critical arc in youth studies, and particularly subject-
object oriented studies of technology, emerges when we have emancipatory goals in mind. 
Treating gaming as a site of socialization and subject formation can challenge the existing social 
research on youth experience of advanced consumer society. The clarification as to the means 
and terms of co-optation can have the effect of propelling a dialectical response to the psycho-
social conditions that already unconsciously exist. As a more tamed goal, my thesis will conclude 
when the structures around the subject and subject-formation as cultivated in mediated relations 
of gaming become clear in terms of what is being commodified and to what end. 
 Creating critical dialectical engagement, the way we constitute the subjectivity of these 
adolescents, in terms of their socio-historical placement and their developmental relationship 
with economic exploitation, will directly affect how we construe their political subjectivity. To 
give you a sense of where this work is heading, by the end of this dissertation, I will suggest an 
alternate perspective on socialization that guards against the normalized subjugation of the 
radical newness of young people’s consciousness. The point is not to make youth studies more 
utopian. I will argue that the critical psycho-social theory of liberation requires a historically 
contextualized human subject. The metropolitan adolescent gamer is one such subject position. 
In this project I frame the case of the psychological lives of adolescents born and raised in the 
metropoles, the post-industrial market-nexuses of global capitalism. Due to the efficacy with 
which digital recording and popular self-representation have merged to document developmental 
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instances in the lives of these metropolitan youth, social theory can renew its efforts in 
understanding the social experience and relevant politics, and take advantage of the opportunity 
to think about a living, politically relevant group caught amidst economized transgenerational, 
psycho-dynamic shifts. A political critique of academic research around youth, specifically 
adolescents and adolescence, is fundamental to discipline youth studies away from ideological 
confirmation towards responding to historically-situated problems facing young subjects. 
 This chapter will lay out the central premises, themes, and questions of this project.  This 
chapter will also set out many of my basic assumptions in orienting myself to this project. I will 
argue that a politics and a notion of subjectivity as well as an ethics of theoretical conception are 
necessarily the grounds on which an engaged critical theory of consumer youth socialization and 
the political economy that surrounds that process is ultimately dependent. Here are four 
arguments you will encounter throughout this chapter that mark the premises and directions of 
the larger dissertation: 
• Critical theory must deal with the historical materiality of the subject. In my case 
I will offer the adolescent gamer already the subject of most social research as one 
such subject. 
• Socialization is a collection of structures under a larger banner of social 
reproduction; as such it is a transgenerational reproductive economy. This point 
will be important to distinguish the familial from the political economy, and thus 
to be able to use the object-relations theoretical lenses (which I believe are best 
suited for talking about the politics of interpersonal relations and self-constitution) 
appropriately according to context. 
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• There is a politics to social reproduction. It is best understood in terms of 
economy and agency, consciousness and ideology, self-determination and 
relationality. The bulk of this chapter will be spent outlining this position. 
• Means of economization (vulgarly observed in commodification) such as 
rationalization, exploitation, and co-optation that socialization as well as 
organization relies upon are forms of psycho-technologies. This point will emerge 
from the discussion on socialization. 
 This chapter is organized thematically, although the themes and concepts are most sensible 
when they are interrelated. It is meant to introduce the general theoretical concepts, ways of 
asking questions, and social and political concerns. The argument consists of two major parts. 
The first explicates the subject, defines the political parameters of its dominant discourses, and 
identifies relevant critical theoretical language for the study at hand. The second part describes 
the economy in which the political subject (as conceived in the first part) figures in.  The chapter 
concludes with foreshadowing the chapters that will come, and offers gaming as one particular 
territory where the themes intersect, and which offers us a place to contemplate its social-
political meaning. 
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Subject Location and Politics 
Locating the Subject: the Adolescents 
 Critical youth studies, which contemporarily is still mainly an amalgamation of 
disciplinary niches, has the potential to pose a political challenge to disciplinary, 
compartmentalized studies of the human condition: it can take into account the mutually-
constituting, dialectical relationship between structure and subject. My intention is to set up a 
conceptual framework that can handle: 1) the question of political subjectivity; 2) the prospect or 
the possibility of political self-consciousness; 3) and the critique of industry and ideology in the 
contexts of subjects and gaming. In order to see the structures more clearly, it is imperative to 
specify the subject across multiple institutionalized dimensions of positionality—to think about 
the political economic life of a person on the home base (that is, on the interior of the globalized 
consumer economy), and situate the qualitative experience of a typical person who resides within 
the walls of the empire to then immerse into gaming—an adolescent. In the contemporary 
political economy of the metropolis, the adolescent embodies the markers of the reigning mode 
of production—his sense of self is caught in a psycho-social machinery that supplies the larger 
economy with new value and much-needed ideological stability. He is a consumer, whose ability 
to produce value is publicly denied precisely because (in social media) it is the source of 
profitability; he is a self-conscious subject who suffers from the maladies of commodity life, yet 
he is disciplined by the culture to think himself alone in this suffering and interpellate himself 
accordingly. The very process of subject-formation for the metropolitan adolescent is laden with 
immediate political economic consequence—it is through his identity construction that the social 
structures are confirmed and reproduced. 
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 An adolescent is a specific, existing subject—a human being with a historically-situated 
consciousness and relation with other subjects in the social structure. This social category 
functions to structurally locate this person in relation to social reproduction (as well as in 
dialectically contradictory manners). In that structural groundedness, his  self-consciousness is 23
contingent on the historical materiality. His capacity for self-actualization and self-awareness 
develop out of (and during) his experiences of socialization. As such, the status of the adolescent 
subject is paradigmatic of the relation between agency and subjugation at the heart of bourgeois 
subjectivity (more so perhaps because of his social, political, and economic dependence on 
adults). Therefore, I will treat “adolescence” as a class, in the sense that Marx conceptualizes the 
proletariat, because it is the specific and historically-determined structural position of the 
adolescent which enables his unique experience of the tension inherent in bourgeois subjectivity. 
 There is a political dimension to the psycho-social study of youth, and it becomes visible 
in the authorial choices to define the subject (especially the idiosyncratic and ideological 
underpinnings of those choices). For example, Adorno (1973), who contextualizes cultural 
transmission even as he upsets normative conceptions of development and civilization by 
reminding us of the power of intergenerationality and ideology, offers the following:  under the 24
 More generally, youth is a structural position, which also intersects with other structural-identity positions 23
such as race, class, and gender. Without erasing female subjects who play WoW (and who perhaps therefore, in some 
measure, reproduce an image of “femaleness” through their role-play), more male-identified people play WoW than 
do female; thus, the next several paragraphs will deal explicitly with male subjects (Bainbridge 2010). The 
development of a theory of masculinity and masculine performance in the ideational space of WoW is necessary, but 
beyond the scope of this project. (Also see: http://kotaku.com/5598679/what-i-discovered-from-gaming-like-a-girl)
 Here is the full quote from Adorno’s Negative Dialectics (1973): 24
A child, friend of an innkeeper named Adam, watched him club the rats pouring out of holes in the 
courtyard. It was in his image that the child made its own image of the first man. That this has been 
forgotten—that we no longer know what we used to feel before the dogcatcher’s van—is both the triumph 
of culture and its failure. Culture, which keeps emulating the old Adam, cannot bear to be reminded of that 
zone, and precisely this is not to be reconciled with the conception that culture has of itself. It abhors 
stench because it stinks—because, as Brecht put it in a magnificent line, its mansion is built of dogshit 
(Adorno 1973: 366).
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guise of socialization, the child is only a subject-to-be: from the moment of birth, he will be 
subjugated, even to an idea of being a subject. But first it will begin with a shock akin to a child 
watching a grown man beat animals —a familial childhood trauma caused (in the least) by the 
incommunicability of early childhood (Adorno 1973: 366). We, too, shriek at the horrific 
possibility—that socialization is socialization always into a life of violence, but quickly 
naturalize it (cf. Freud 1997). 
The Psycho-social Framework 
 I would like to take a moment to talk about the general psycho-social approach of my 
study. By addressing psycho-social issues, I synthesize the offerings of the psychoanalytic and 
critical theory, which enables me to pick up on the way in which historical traumas and cultural 
relational shifts in object relations affect the everyday psycho-social relations and the 
development of the young person;  how intergenerational relations lead to unconscious 25
amalgamation (or the “body without organs” as Deleuze and Guatarri would have it), those 
historical residues of transgression and object-relations (the two in turn leave their mark on the 
people who fail to resolve the push for reflection and meaning-making in history). It is not my 
intention to limit the possibilities of empowerment in and working through transgenerational 
issues. Instead, I would like to think about the openings that would go beyond the historical and 
imagine the radical empowerment that comes out of a critical study of socialization and culture, 
its institutional relation to adolescent subject positions, and the terms of the transgenerational 
(cultural) order (as it is expressed in sightings of regulated engagement, administered 
 We have to keep in mind that these relations, are theoretical abstractions of particular historical materiality, 25
which as a structure and a system, is multi-tiered, hierarchized according to race, class, family, age, gender, 
sensitivity to affect, willingness to dominate/be dominated, aesthetic choices, etc.
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desublimation, complicity in social injustice across all tiers and dimensions of the historical 
hierarchy, etc.). 
 In the context of the psycho-social life of the subject, my thinking about the project 
changed dramatically when I realized that I was quite uncomfortable with the fact that the 
subject, the human, becomes less visible the more visible the extent of commodification. In other 
words, I was running into the problem of imagining the ramifications of existing theory about the 
subjective experience, precisely because existing critical theory does not center on a specific 
subject. But, tripartite concepts such as sublimation, desublimation, and repressive desublimation 
require a subject in order to gain their optimal political value. I will ground the discussion on the 
historical adolescent subject position. By doing so, I will gain a certain critical edge from the 
material contextualization and the specific terms of psycho-social and physical engagement 
between subject and society. I decided to ground the discussion in the historically material case 
of Western, metropolitan (that is, urban, post-industrial, primarily consumer) youth. Countering 
the movement of extra-human abstraction, I will situate the discussion of these complicated 
dynamics around the historical young subject who finds himself in the moment of a constant 
societal reconstitution caused by the recirculation of signs in the consumer economy. In this 
movement, what becomes evident is that the terms of the psycho-social context of the youth’s 
experience—namely, pervasive social alienation—come to the foreground as agents that contest 
the authority of prior institutionalizations (Riesman 2001).  
 With the designation the psycho-social my intention is to highlight the subordination of 
subject-formation to the vagaries of social reproduction. To call this process psycho-social and 
not psychological-and-social points up the fundamental embeddedness of the individual subject 
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in the historic conditions that have made his subjectivity possible. Immediately, we can perceive 
the overlap of three dimensions of subjectivity: the psychic, the relational, and the ideational, 
because they correspond to the dimensions of subjectivity in which ideological subjugation is 
historically substantiated. The psychic dimension corresponds to the psychological and affective 
structure of the individual. The relational corresponds to intersubjective, and the ideational 
corresponds to conscious self-conception. These three conceptual parameters delineate the 
processes through which external ideology becomes integrated into the subject. In this section, I 
will provide a series of outlining theoretical exercises on a critical theory of psycho-politics; and 
they will be carried by two orienting perspectives: Freud is a vehicle for the traditional/normative 
conception of basic repression and culturally-dictated (de)sublimation practices; and Marcuse 
provides the critical dialectical response through a critique of Freudian worldview. 
 According to psychoanalysis, under the guise of socialization the child-subject born into 
the modern society is subjugated by a familial childhood trauma that appropriates the infantile 
psychosis caused by the incommunicability of early childhood (Rank 1929; Klein 1975; Butler 
1997). This appropriation, put to instrumental ends, results in a psychology of (commodified) 
object relations (Adorno 1974). In fact, there is a close relationship between the historical 
narrative of a culture and the trauma to which children are subjected as they become members of 
the social organization (Erikson 1993). Indeed, I believe that we simply cannot think about the 
critical political importance of psycho-social dynamics between the subject and society without 
recognizing the heavy dependence of such dynamics on trauma. Trauma also brings us to the 
dialectic of sublimation as it is an experience of the unsublimated that encourages repression. 
Horowitz (1971) speaks to the societal (Culture and Law) reliance on traumatization for 
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repressive socialization. In terms of normative development, the structuring of the tripartite inner 
life is linked with the promise of avoiding trauma by accepting the terms of repression (21). This 
normative conception offers no commentary on the historical scenario that recognizes the 
resistance of the marginalized youth or the failure of the political economy to reintegrate the 
older generations’ disavowal of the social as is the case with the postwar American consumer 
society (see Riesman 2001). In turn they cling to their idealizations of the past - a time when they 
felt to be recognized authorities. Ricoeur speaks to the hallucinatory quality of a memory-
focused resistance to the present. He frames reactionary attentiveness to memory in terms of 
trauma affectation. Ricoeur states the following: “hauntedness is to collective memory what 
hallucination is to private memory, a pathological modality of the incrustation of the past at the 
heart of the present, which acts as a counterweight to the innocent habit-memory, which also 
inhibits the present, but in order to "act it”...not to haunt it or torment it (2004: 54). The 
hallucinatory living-in-the-past justifies the adults’ stubbornness to accept the terms of the 
postwar performative principle, and supports their narcissistic willingness to sacrifice the youth 
for their emotional situation. They choose inebriation on the past, and resist intergenerational 
recognition that would signal a working-through. The hauntedness closes the circle of 
intergenerationality by spiraling in and out of personal memory. This introversion directs the 
psychic surplus to the inside – effectively de-socializing desires for self-satisfaction. The psycho-
politics of the human condition are thus revealed in the realm of the discourse under which 
socialization occurs. In this way the psycho-social situation of adolescents raises questions about 
the social construction of identity, political subjectivity and the possibility of a humanizing 
revolution that proactively moves beyond the master/slave splitting of the internal universe. Here 
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I wanted to draw attention to the fact that contemporary critical theory still naturalizes the 
socially and historically constructed formative experience. For example, Butler (1997)  argues 
that the psychic life of power is necessarily dictated by the existing social relations, but Butler 
still singles out primary identification, more so the moment in which primary identification is 
coercively established by the dominant dominating the  powerless,  as the decisive moment 
subject formation that cannot be avoided or adjusted in some way (see Butler’s introduction to 
the book). From the vantage of psychoanalysis, Anna Freud as well as Jacques Lacan posited 
primary identification as the constitutive, subjective process that underpinned the development of 
a child’s own agency (Freud 1966; Lacan 1954). This primary identification is the process 
through which a child recognizes and internalizes the power of her parental unit. Because the 
unconscious is explicitly structured through the experience of language (Lacan 1954: 37-38), we 
can begin to ask what primary identification has to tell us about ideology. Under this approach to 
subjectivity, to identify as a subject is to access the self through language, which of necessity 
happens within the ideology of a dominant power structure. For example, Klein (1975) argues 
that socialization and subject-formation are co-constitutive: subjects become both themselves 
and themselves-for-others through their entanglements of guilt and attachment to their parents as 
authorities and love-objects. The point is that phenomenological experiences of early 
socialization produce the subject itself—the necessary grounds for autonomy and agency (one 
cannot have agency if one is not a subject)—even as socialization is a process of the subjugation 
of the subject to the group. 
 In fact, as I will argue shortly, there is a set of  psycho-social complications in 
transgenerational relations that occur in a consumer society and overdetermine the psycho-social 
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dynamics of social reproduction, turning the surplus-extractive spirit (the dynamo of social and 
cultural self-perpetuation) of the Oedipal against itself. This shock does not only cause a violence 
on the imaginative that results in antisocial regression, but also an emergence of self-awareness 
as memory exposes the repeating limit of historical thinking, pushing for the alternative, for 
something more. 
 Youth is meant to desire the perpetuation of the spiral of social reproduction by 
contributing their psychic surplus through participation in its rituals that further cultural 
repressive conditioning. This notion of surplus is a way for me to track the very important 
question of the accounted/unaccounted; as the cultural allocations of psychical energy naturally 
results in spill-over (let us posit one as between the inner desire for mimesis and the cultural 
space for such a desire), whether and how the culture directs the potential remainder of what it is 
not able to account for determines its hold over the psyche of the young. Precisely because there 
is a spilling over, the call of the self-reflective dialectic is to dislocate the established concepts 
which have lost their footing on the nature and social power of the surplus. After all, we create 
surplus all the time. In the psycho-political context, the significance of psychic surplus brings us 
to this simple question: who dictates where it goes? I will begin the discussion with what we 
know: things spill over the concepts that we assign them. The social reproductive tendency is 
tied to administering the expenditure of this surplus. We spill over the categories we assign 
ourselves, and the perpetual motion of cultural (familial ideology) reproduction across 
generations depends on successful regulation of this spilling over of psychic surplus.  I think 26
that Adorno's critique brings us to this precise point: the language of conceptualization is tied to 
 I will explore this concept in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, but it will return most forcefully in the conclusion of 26
the dissertation.
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the project of domination, therefore we should be critical of the categories we use to build 
imaginings of the human in terms of whether they dissect a human out of possible empowerment 
(against a defense of subjectivity). After all, the involvement youth grow into serves a psycho-
social transgenerational function. As the reality fails to meet the demands of the desiring subject, 
it conjures up rituals to promise the eventual fulfillment. In real life this process boils down to 
balancing existential anxiety with generational self-awareness. As Erikson (1963) would remind 
us, children are supposed to abide by intra-tribal codes. As a prize for their submission, they 
become increasingly incorporated into the psycho-social matrix through their personal 
negotiation between their desires and the codes, which serves to socialize their inner lives by 
legitimizing and deepening the value of the codes in their processes of sublimation and 
(increasingly repressive) desublimation (Bion 1938).  27
But youth are continually pressured to accept the secondary in place of their primary 
desires, as introduced objects pressure interjection and affect their libidinal development. The 
way that the libidinal economies of contemporary metropolitan youth operate involves the socio-
historical consideration of the 1980s, the capitalist society’s preparation of the population for the 
digital consumer markets.  This effort is marked by Western children’s consumer culture and the 28
universe of commodities tied to them (cf. Watkins 1993; Schor 2000; Barber 2005). Years later, 
this effort would prove to be the prototypical psycho-social preparation of the new generation for 
 A matter of crystallization - the talking about "something" fits the issues around the establishment of the one 27
dynamic, and the concept that stands for the dynamics:  
Philosophical thinking has for its content neither the remainder after the cancellation of space and time, 
nor general findings about what is spatio-temporal. It crystallizes in the particular, in what is determined in 
space and time. The concept of the existent pure and simple is merely the shadow of the false one of being 
(Adorno, 1964: 142).
 Reading texts belonging to the cultural studies movement enabled me to extract snapshots of instances in 28
which consumer culture met youth engagement. Particularly the works of Willis (1979), Gilroy (1984), and 
McRobbie (1992) were particularly useful for their subject-specificity.
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secondary-narcissistic consumption (see Watkins 1993). In the language of Marcuse’s (1964) 
repressive desublimation, the new performance principle (of how to function in modern society) 
rushes to fill the vacuum left by the dislocation of the transitional reality principle produced by 
economic exploitation of parental laboring patterns. In the absence of a public language to 
address private knowledge about the meaninglessness of subject-object correspondence, 
alienation becomes a quotidian experience. The widespread helplessness, loneliness, and political 
defeatism in youth culture today no doubt stem from profound dissatisfaction with the new terms 
of sublimation. I will offer the recent works of Boyd (2014) and Gardner (2013) to make this 
point in a later chapter. To those that must now live within the reign of this kind of economic 
exploitation, secondary narcissistic consumer socialization does not have the same effect as it 
does on the youngest populations of the West—in moments of lucidity, even though they seldom 
find the language to articulate their private convictions motivated by their sensuous recognition 
of their own flows of psychic surplus, what the youth express is a sense that their humanity is 
being reduced. But, their clarity and resilience, gained through painful tribulations, are dismissed 
as counter-productive and unimportant (Gardner 2013). 
 For my purposes, it is more critical to note that the momentum of commodification stems 
from a borrowed instinct, a desire to reproduce the model of authority that their parents and older 
generations represent (Horowitz 1971). The way that social reproduction utilizes psychic surplus 
is meant to guarantee a process of conditioning youth, carrying over the surplus of their 
imaginative (desiring) inner processes into ever more expanding socially-interconnected ones. I 
would like to acknowledge that under a different historical material societal reign over the young 
subjectivity, the sociality of human desire could be nurtured and allowed to grow in ways that are 
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radically different than the situation in which youth find themselves in this historical moment. In 
other words, the antisociality or at least the asociality of desire that this statement implies is 
strictly grounded in the Freudian reading of the situation, while I do wish that I had the space in 
this paper to talk about the Marcusian counterargument. The result of this process is a certain 
internalization of the common cultural experience of growing up in the world, which, although it 
captures the young subject by denying him the authority to direct his internal remainders, also 
humanizes the experiences of his predecessors in the eyes of the young. As I will argue in 
Chapter 3, the contemporary consumer society now appropriates a created situation in which the 
youth cannot find any ideals that would justify buying-in. In this way, the authority never softens 
for the psycho-socially marginalized youth; and in turn the youth are not able to perpetually 
become the compassionate witnesses to the hardening of the older generations. They instead seek 
solace for their disgruntled consciousness in consumer objects, and more specifically, what I will 
call interpellative consumer-object relations. 
Youth as Class 
 In order to politicize socialization and developmental theories, I will treat metropolitan 
adolescents as a class. Theories of socialization appear to be beyond the realm of immediately-
accessible politics, because they are theories of how human development is genealogically (that 
is, trans-generationally and historically) complimented by a reproductive (libidinal, object-
relational) economy; generationality becomes the presumed state of nature. Observed relationally 
and materially, the reality is that personalities, those bedrocks of culture, are molded by social 
relations, which in themselves are also reproduced in the subjective processes of habituation and 
conception. Such differentiation across generations also goes by the name of socialization, the 
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process which looks more like a technology, a structural means of reproduction than a natural 
event. 
 One of my questions is: what is political when we actively recognize youth on their own 
terms? I will construct a place in which we can think critically about the young person as she 
lives in this historical moment, considering the historical psycho-social as well as the political-
economic terms of his subjectivity. My argument is that academic works theorizing youth and 
youth culture must stay present to the difference between the capitalist system that must 
continually produce "victims" (in this case, youth), and actual youth, which is a subject position, 
which exists, concretely and on its own, interacting with but distinct from the structural 
conditions which situate and produce it as an effect. 
 This is because the consumer political economy fosters another level of dissent and 
psycho-political frustration that makes these youth feel inadequate, imbalanced, abnormal, and 
eventually existentially depressed and apolitical. But, this dissent is also the grounds of 
alienation. Today, as the numbers of youth dropping-out and succumbing to the failed attempts at 
the Great Refusal through transitory pleasures of illicit sedation rise, the young generations 
across the metropole seem to perform their initial responses from psycho-politics of their 
socialization: the only way to fulfillment really is to refuse to feed the machine by obeying the 
rules of the repressive order. Re-reading Kristeva (2007), this so-called “ideality syndrome" 
looks more like a protest, an attempt to hold on to the real objects of human investment. The 
politicalness of youth, even if only the mere fact that the adolescents protest commodification 
with bouts of “ideality,” requires that we focus on opening spaces beyond the ideological for 
possible utterance. In order to come to a place of such possibility, we have to begin from 
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allegiance with youth and their existential status. This is much more complicated than a 
statement about being pro-youth—acting in their interest—because it requires recognizing youth 
as class. And every class needs social space, even if only in literature, to lay out and cultivate its 
consciousness. 
 Youth have claim to the status of a political-economic class from the moment that the 
economy begins to squeeze surplus out of having subjugated him or her to social-reproduction. 
In this recognition I find the  opportunity to expose the possibility of a politics hiding beneath 
what passes for the dominant ideology of what is socially valuable. My argument is that youth 
politics necessitates a political conception of “newness”: newcomers possess the potential for 
radical social critique that is a very function of having been excluded from the prior (in this case, 
by mere fact of not having yet been born). Those of my readers who are intimate with Marx will 
recognize in this formulation a resonance with the concept of the proletariat as both the product, 
and the absolute negation (outside) of capitalism; those of my readers intimate with queer theory 
will recognize a similar rejection of the (liberal) politics of the amplification of the social as a 
corrective to exclusion (cf. Edelman 2004). If youth are seen as a class, and their subject 
formation, alas the naturalized structural processes effecting the everyday subject-economy, then 
aspects of socialization will begin to look like political economic structures. There are a set of 
questions that arise when we consider adolescents as a class. What sort of a political economy 
encapsulates their experience? What are the ideological and material forms of this experience? 
 I use class in the sense that denotes the same social, cultural, and economic positionality 
of persons, who also share the same structural positions in terms of intergenerationality (their 
place in the cycle of social reproduction) and its complimentary cultural rationalizations of 
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authority and subjugation (see Friedenberg 1970; Cooper 1971; O’Neill 1994; Young-Bruehl 
2012). In this sense youth as class has a psycho-social valiance as the similarities across subject-
positions raise questions about subject-formation and everyday interpellation as a youth as 
decisively political processes. My conception of youth as class is indebted to Marx’s (1942) 
concept of class in the German Ideology. It might appear unfitting to apply the notion of class to 
a group tied together only by their age (or more so the amount of time they have spent in the 
world). Marx found the proletariat to be a class that critiques the fundamental principles of the 
capitalist mode of (re)production in their very social positionality. In his reasoning we can see 
the grounds for considering that youth, in their general and most broadly applicable human and 
social condition, embody the same potential for critiquing contemporary capitalist processes of 
commodification of the qualitatively human. 
 Marx recognized the inherent subjugation of the human that happens in the context of 
social reproduction, but chose to ground his analysis on the more immediately contestable 
territory—that of the larger political economy. When Marx talks about the proletariat as a world-
revolutionary class, there is an opening to considering how this applies to youth politics: 
The contradiction between individuality of each separate proletarian and labour, the 
condition of life forced upon him, becomes evident to him himself, for he is sacrificed 
from youth upwards and, within his own class, has no chance of arriving at the conditions 
which would place him in the other class (1942: 78). 
 In the opening of German Ideology Marx evokes that the beginnings of the social 
constitution of division of labor originates within the family, where the children and the wife are 
slaves to the husband (1942: 21). There is a dormant critique of socialization as a political 
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constitutive process in this proposition as Marx bases his argument on the nature of property 
relations as originating from such familial alienation (22, 46). Following this logic to its 
conclusion, and sharpening it with the anti-socially-reproductive arguments of Laing, Cooper, 
Deleuze, and others, youth as class offers a timely critique of the banality of reproduction under 
consumer capitalism. Before moving onto the other points I would also like to point out that in 
Marx’s critique of labor, there is also a sign of a larger critique of political economy that harkens 
to the way I would like to use youth as class to mean a negation of the regime of work and to 
refer to work-as-play under postindustrial capitalism. Through this qualification, this analytic 
project concerning the everyday immaterial labor of postindustrial metropolitan adolescents 
adheres to the political argument in Marx’s theory of labor—that is, labor is “power over 
individuals,” “as the subjection of the individual which makes a man into a restricted town-
animal” (44). 
 Adolescents of postindustrial capital are a group that embodies the interests of all the 
other classes and cannot fight for its procurement—this holds especially in the current era of 
digital entertainment technologies that readily redirect any and all subjective means to social and 
self-recognition toward commodification (1942: 41). In Marx’s words, “the struggle to be 
waged…aims at a more decided and radical negation of the previous conditions of society than 
could all previous classes which sought to rule” (41). It is also a group whose subject position 
and life activity is commodified as in the case of the commodification of play and fantasy as well 
as self-self and self-other relations. Also, in light of infantilization of adults and the capitalist 
accounting for valorization and investment with nullifying ready-made ideologies, youth also 
represent the interests of all the other classes to critique the very mode of production in the 
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interest of their humanity, as their plight represents the internal move of capital to colonize 
interiority. In Marx’s words, youth of postindustrial capitalism constitute a class because capital 
has moved to take over the very live-activity that would have been the grounds for the alienated 
workers to recognize their alienation by commodification (68). Youth, that is children and 
adolescents in any context of social reproductive necessity are a proto-class in the principled 
Marxist sense of their subject position critiquing the whole of the capitalist system. Youth are a 
class, 
which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which, 
ousted from society, is forced into the most decided antagonism to all other class; a class 
which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the 
consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution (1942: 69). 
Youth as class fits Marx’s description the moment we realize the immensity of the problem of 
transforming postindustrial capital: the investment and complicity of adult generations in the 
reproduction of dehumanizing commodification, and the conditioning of personality and political 
consciousness that inevitably occurs under division of labor and social relationships. In light of 
these political and transgenerational issues, postindustrial youth are the only class that have no 
“particular class interest to assert against the ruling class” as their humanity stands in abject 
opposition to the so-called civilizing commodification and self-alienation requisite to the global 
capital (76). 
 Youth, definitionally, refers to prior-to-adulthood: it is a temporal designation. In fact, 
this prior always returns as the rationale for why the adult world must correct, protect, direct, 
educate, or heal youth away from their present subjectivity. Youth’s speech is regulated; they are 
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considered inept, confused, underdeveloped, self-destructively narcissistic, neurotic, impulsive, 
and melodramatic—unable to even conceive of themselves without the help of adult self-
reflection (Young-Bruehl, 2012). But even in the face of the most righteous proclamation about 
young subjects' ineptness, the possibility of youth's own politics survives in youth themselves. 
Young subjects are generally defined as between birth and adulthood, as resting in this liminal 
gulf between two definite temporal signs. The authoritative forces under which young people’s 
subject-formation unfolds are naturalized and de-temporalized (as long as these forces are 
ideologically “good enough”). As Lyotard (1988) argues, scripts are pre-formed for subjects: the 
young subject is always-already defined by markers imprinted on her body, language, and 
thinking. The opportunities for a young subject to be recognized on his own terms are scarce. 
Either he speaks (in the language provided to him by adults) or he is reduced to a number. 
Youth’s politicalness is pre-formed, because the popular political discourse recognizes only 
voices reflecting the established, race, class, and gender specific, adult values and structures. The 
question is not merely of “access” to language (e.g., who has a right to speak), but how language 
itself corresponds with certain subject-experiences (and narratives) (and not others). A subject 
who intends to communicate must do so within a symbolic system already bound to a certain 
social order; a subject who wishes her subjectivity confirmed must narrate herself appropriately, 
according to specific historic and cultural patterns. Thus self-understanding comes to correspond 
with ideology. 
 Even when theorists have recognize the historical nature of subjectivity, youth has been 
viewed as a time when false (ideological and class) self-consciousness is established (by an 
authoritarian force) and reproduced (by the self). In instances in which the constrained nature of 
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young people’s lives appear to offer a “case study” in political-economic reproduction, theorists 
seemed to presume that the “formative” aspects of youth subject-sociality are mere pieces of the 
yet-to-be-fully-formed complex that is the “subject.” Thus, youth appears as a time in which 
ideology is implanted and becomes unshakable. Youth-as-political-subjects are therefore 
rendered impossible, for youth is nothing but a time of complete and seamless ideological 
conformity. 
 Further, in an effort to preserve social-scientific and “rational” “objectivity,” these studies 
forgo a political critique of the given social circumstances. Ethnographies of young people’s 
social experience of class, race, and gender emphasized these historical-structuring external 
forces in young people’s lives. For example, Paul Willis (1981) worked with white-male-
working-class; Angela McRobbie (2000) shifted the focus onto the sacrificed fates of white-
female-working-class youth, who are tied to social reproduction through transgenerational 
ideologies of domesticity and femininity; Daniel Yon (2000) explored the radical fragmentation 
of identity-production in a contemporary high school to critique the erasure of complexity by 
multiculturalism. The dominant ideology reigning youth studies has preferred an a-historical 
mode of analysis as if the fate of youth was always already sealed—perhaps because the 
category of youth has tended to be a tool in authors’ own existential confirmations. For Willis 
(1981) and Hall (1993), class is the predictor; for Aichhorn (1935) and Freud (1966), it is the 
historical definition of delinquency and patterns in family culture; for Erikson (1993), it is the 
establishment of idealization versus ambivalent feelings towards the primary socializing parental 
authority figure. And Kristeva (2007) uses the term "ideality" as a developmental marker of 
adolescence, arguing that the primary psychological identifier of an adolescent is her belief in the 
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absolute. Thus, the study of youth undertaken by adults is prone to ideological reproduction: 
blind to qualitative generational difference, it presumes structural stability and developmental 
continuity (young people always become adults). 
Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination  
 The very notion of responsibility itself ought to be troubled. Youth are represented as 
desiring of responsibility—that young subjects both crave and need the discipline of ‘caring 
for’ (oneself, an object, or someone else) in order to become free. But to whom is obligation and 
responsibility owed? Responsibility binds young people to a social realm not of their choosing; it 
exacts a penalty even as it liberates the young into the autonomous adults of ‘responsibility’. The 
manner in which responsibility is defined also carves out its limits—those subjects, thoughts, or 
politics to whom no responsibility is due, but who owe responsibility to the normative standards 
of the given social order. As postcolonial theorists (Bhabha 1994; Chakrabarty 2000; Spivak 
1999) have done for universalism as a response to the political and strategic challenges faced by 
cultural particularism and (absolute) alterity, I think it might be useful to (carefully) rehabilitate 
‘responsibility,’ as that which is owed to and desired from young subjects in a dialectical relation 
which binds them to older generations. In other words, social theory might need to rehabilitate 
the notion of responsibility as a discourse of intergenerationality and natality in the manner that 
(some) postcolonial theorists have rehabilitated the previously-rejected modernist concept of 
universalism in their attempts to develop a relevant postcolonial politics. 
 In a “good enough” society, natality refreshens the circularity of social reproduction 
(Rustin 1991). As Arendt (1958) would argue, “the constant influx of newcomers who are born 
into the world as strangers” presents the opportunity of “beginning something anew, that is, of 
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acting” (9). The healthy society is supposed to be hospitable/tolerable to the newcomers. When 
society-wide fragmentation and commodification become the norm, the society ceases to be 
“good enough” (Rustin 1991; O’Neill 1994). Under consumer capitalism, the primitive 
accumulation reinvents its capacity for decoupling, deterritorializing, and fragmentation, and as 
such proves the inability of the law of the family and culture to provide any attainable substance 
to offset the deceit of a consumer society. Immediately social research on contemporary youth 
stands for the consciousness of transgenerational problems that arise in consumer society, 
because neither the familial/cultural tradition nor the communal law firmly hold the definitive 
authority in the psychic development in the young children’s lives. The issue here is that there is 
no special consideration for the psycho-social conditions and circumstances in the post-industrial 
metropolitan society that warrant regulation of market-oriented aesthetic and libidinally-
connected introductions, guided identifications, introjections, etc. Furthermore, it helps us to 
look at the situation through the lenses of psychic surplus extraction (to be developed throughout 
this project, but most prominently in Chapter 5), because it focuses the critique of post-industrial 
capital incursion on the psyche of the metropolitan adolescent subject. Children are left largely 
defenseless as their parents (and their grandparents) continue to be preoccupied with the 
repetition of what they experienced during the years of their own political-economically-situated 
development, and how that experience has influenced their reading of the world dialectically 
(Riesman 2001; Stiegler 2010). Children end up being raised by the consumer economy, whose 
agents have developed ways of controlling the flow of psychic surplus (which is emerging as 
precisely the remainder that orients the whole) to conditionally socialize the youth by the most 
up-to-date schemas of repressive desublimation, that is, administered secondary narcissism, 
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utilizing the young’s propensity to believe in the promise of repression without ever delivering 
that self-satisfaction or lasting empowerment (the theme of Chapter 4). 
 One of the goals of my project is to think about the contradictions within post-industrial 
consumer consciousness. In the context of politics of self-awareness and commodification under 
consumer capitalism, consciousness is trivialized—autonomy and consciousness easily become 
undesirable. An all-normalizing gust ideology of normality and banal accumulation then fills the 
deliberated vacuum of awareness without ever bringing to fore the politics of redirecting 
culturally reproduced neurosis into continually expanding chains of commodification (this will 
be the topic of Chapter 3).  
 Politics of youth, where youth is conceived of as a class that desires self-determination, 
poses a direct challenge to the historical conditions of human subjectivity, because, as politics of 
liberation qua youth, it addresses the young human before (but also on the way) to adulthood and 
incorporation. Such a theory requires a foundation; my hypothesis is that it will emerge by 
unpacking the relation between young subjectivity and history. In the relation between a young 
subject and history the question regards the power of the young subject to negotiate historicity 
and materiality (as political-economically and physically conceived). Implied in the question of 
power is a principle of self-consciousness, a claim to determine one’s own being in the world 
over one’s lifespan in the face of the imposed material and ideational limits. Like a litmus test, 
self-consciousness is politicized by an ideal of self-determination. 
 All of us are born at the mercy of people who have lived (just) long enough to carve out a 
space in the political-economy for themselves (and often at the expense of their youthful, other-
worldly desires). In our contemporary moment, this political-economy is deeply structured by 
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global capitalism, whose brutality lies in its desire for perpetuation of a fantasy of its own 
totality. In light of this time of highly structured social engagement, in light of the rationality of 
the organized society which, to function, requires the sterilization of life, which assumes the 
universality of the “longview” (the end of history), which prioritizes the institutionalized life, the 
perseverance of the society, and the political economic "chains" of adulthood in the form of 
property, predictability, stability, the political for youth amounts to, on the grounds of her 
“newness”, a complete rejection of her “future”. All phantasies of empowerment which rely upon 
the current ideology doom the child to a future not of her own making. As Marx (1948) put it, 
“the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (37). In 
yet other words, I am interested in a conception of politics indebted to Marcuse’s politico-ethical 
law of liberation. In his words, “to give freedom by freedom is the universal law. Freedom must 
give way to more freedom, the only rightful repression is one that enables freedom from 
blossoming in its heterodox, multivalent, nonidentical and unexpected ways” (Marcuse 1972: 
48). 
 Emancipation and genuine empowerment are always constrained by hidden and coercive 
domination. We cannot theorize about the empowerment of the individual in society, and also 
argue its pedagogy, through a rationale based on “knowledge” of the subject’s psychical makeup. 
As a critique of domination-rationality, the psycho-political framework is an attempt to begin a 
counter-discourse. Even in the most critical way, the dominant theoretical discourses on child 
subjectivity speak about the child-subject in a dissecting manner, where the psychical world of 
the child is laid out in front of the theorist; where the child is most commodifiable, behaviorized, 
and thus manipulatable—and by extension, not wholly human. A serious consideration for the 
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psychical empowerment of a child-subject requires us to look at the way in which the society 
interestedly engages with and takes advantage of the child’s development, its attempts to 
understand the world and to live within it. 
 Furthermore, if we do accept the call to political conceptualization of the psyche, then we 
need psycho-political concepts that will decisively speak to the agency of the adolescent-subject. 
Marcuse argues the need to regress the rationalization of the psyche to the point where the 
sensuous has as legitimate claims on the project of subjectivity as the rational one (Marcuse 
1974: 198). Seen from the outside, this is self-consciousness; and as an orienting concept, it 
allows us to theorize the notion of the adolescent-subject, without falling into the conceptual trap 
of speaking without giving the subject the sense of ownness necessary to any post-domination 
political discourse. It is also productive to speak of self-consciousness in terms of being a private 
establishment or patternization of relations: a psychical bridge between emotional relationality 
and the iconoclastic symbols of the culturally formatted unconscious. Self-consciousness is the 
realization and the structural evidence of the politically-intentioned, social formation of the 
child’s psyche. It captures the cultural and familial imprint in the principles of relationality that 
the child forms not only with future external objects but also its savored internal ones, the 
processes of socialization and socio-cultural indoctrination, while acknowledging in spatial 
material terms the agency of the child separate from the world. 
 On the spectrum of relations between youth and power, self-determination marks the 
measure as well as the ideal end point. By defining the geometric parameters of young subjects’ 
relation to existential, political consciousness, we beget a guiding principle outside of the 
dominant ideological understanding of sociality (and thus outside of the pressures of social 
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reproduction and indoctrination). We can have clarity on young subjectivity and the nature (and 
politics and ethics) of its relation to exploitation and domination in historically contingent 
society. This is a perspective on intergenerational political responsibility: we can ask whether or 
not something benefits the young subject, not in the sense of becoming healthy or productive 
(which are categories that serve ideologically conceived sociality, and the interest of something 
external to the subject), but in the sense of empowering the subject to do what he will with his 
own body, self, and existence—to realize his own multidimensional material liberation. Without 
the dramatic effect of economic exploitation on the psycho-politics of self-consciousness, the 
young could ideally make sense of the world in alternatively imagined relations. This is precisely 
what I mean by “emancipation” of self-consciousness: when the adolescent is first conscious of 
communication between parent and self, and when, secondarily, the adolescent resists the smooth 
cultural implementation of meaning, unlike his parents who were socialized smoothly in a 
‘stable’ time, the adolescent no longer accept external definitions and meanings for its private 
imaginary objects. The adolescent comes to own his own self-consciousness, tragically, in most 
cases, because he does not have the capacity on his own to deal with this reality, nor someone 
cognizant of this fact to assist him, in this process of claiming ownership over subject-formation. 
This political consideration of subjectivity goes beyond notions of rights or representation 
beyond the socioeconomic, and is able to stand the test of inter-dimensionality of human 
experience. 
 Self-consciousness embodies the limits of potential self-empowerment as the desire for 
exploration outside of the primary social relations becomes fused with the emotionally imprinted 
terms of relation. In terms of psychoanalytic object relations theory, self-consciousness captures 
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the libidinal structure in the relationships formed with internalized objects, relationships which 
secure the survival of personal historical meanings by preserving the emotional imprint of a 
given relationality to an object of attachment (Lyotard 1988).  This is an act of social 
compromise in which the trauma of early childhood socialization is soothed by that relational 
preservation (Rank 1929).  Surviving the mechanism of sublimation in which the original object 
of the nurturer is repressed while the desire itself is preserved, the phantasy-imprinted self-
consciousness becomes an expression of the meaning of that specific relationality (Klein 1963). 
Clearly there are at least two types of self-consciousness languages: an actual, progressively 
expanding capacity to symbolize objects and fragments of objects within a specific social and 
cultural matrix; and a second one, a sensuous register, a way that the emotional universe registers 
and conducts relations with objects and fragments. This distinction will be important as the 
discussion progresses, because consumer capitalism governs dually through the sensuous (or the 
affective) as well as the ideological (or the symbolic). Structurally, the way in which this 
principal relationality is established hypostatizes the desires that have been allowed to find 
expression within the matrixes of rules and priorities of culture (Horkheimer 1971). Those 
matrixes—the rules of engagement, negotiation, and satisfaction—are stable as long as there are 
not too many disjunctions between the culturally-regulated dictations for self-consciousness or 
private language development and the common experiences of the emotional everyday life. In 
fact Adorno (2001) makes a remarkably fitting point: 
To those who have had the undeserved good fortune to not be completely adjusted in 
their inner intellectual composition to the prevailing norms – a stroke of luck, which they 
often enough have to pay for in terms of their relationship to the immediate environment 
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– it is incumbent to make the moralistic and, as it were, representative effort to express 
what the majority, for whom they say it, are not capable of seeing or, to do justice to 
reality, will not allow themselves to see (51). 
Self-consciousness can put reproduction at risk, because it disturbs the limits of such experience 
and upsets the balance between the individually-internal and the outside-social status-quo 
stability. 
 Castoriadis (1987) offers a concept that helps situate the significance of self-
consciousness: what he calls the “imaginary institution of society” (imaginary meaning: in the 
psyche, in the imagination) (1987: xxxi), captures the inter-relational dynamic between society 
and the individual in a socio-historical manner: society totalizes itself inside a person’s mind 
through the complexes of socialization and familial emotional indoctrination in order to create a 
certain economic harmony between itself and the newborn subject of its agency. I want to set out 
this process Castoriadis identifies from the perspective of the adolescent-subject, imaginary 
social intrusion, meant to socialize him into the economies, is affective, emotional, libidinal, and 
aesthetic; it is qualitative, experiential. This seems to be precisely the point Marcuse (1974) 
makes when he says that the political quest is grounded in “liberation of man from inhuman 
existential conditions” (192).  As in the colonial situation, the child’s language (for the lack of a 29
better term for the substance of a relation) by which it conceives of its imaginary objects comes 
to be dominated by external definitions. For psycho-political schemas, this language defines the 
outline of the political in the libido-cognitive life. As Adorno (2001) points out:  
 Holman’s (2011) paper on Castoriadis and Marcuse was tremendously helpful in making this point. Holman 29
observes Castoriadis as essentially possessing a conservative view of political possibilities and object heterodoxy. 
He argues Marcuse to be the more capable theorist, who wrestled with the same political questions as Castoriadis.
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Yet even in the most extreme efforts to express the history congealed in the things in 
language, the words used for this remain concepts. Their precision is a surrogate of the 
selfness of the thing, never wholly present; a gap yawns between it and what it wants to 
conjure...The determinate failure of all concepts necessitates the citation of others; 
therein originate those constellations, into which alone something of the hope of the 
Name has passed...What it criticizes in words, its claim to immediate truth, is almost 
always the ideology of the positive, existing identity of the word and the thing. Even the 
insistence on the specific word and concept, as the iron gate to be unlocked, is solely a 
moment of such, though an indispensable one. In order to be cognized, that which is 
internalized, which the cognition clings to in the expression, always needs something 
external to it (62). 
 Self-consciousness is a psycho-political dynamic within the subject and is a primary 
communicative device for the subject and its own inner objects. The child’s inner “language” 
connotes not a linguistic parallel to psychic objects, but a multi-dimensional relation and feel of 
relationality to an object of desire (that is characterized in terms of its nature of stimulus - does it 
cause anxiety, what color of pleasure does it have, etc.). Every time a parental figure asserts 
dominance over the elements of the stories that give the child greater insight into the workings of 
the world or of its surroundings, whether this dominance is exclaimed through physical and 
psychological coercion or simply out of exercising their mastery over language and rhetoric, the 
child’s ability to explore the emotional weight and the corresponding language (even if it is 
entirely invented) continues to close as it ages. In this sense, the imaginary institution of society 
means the social order’s domination, and specifically in the post-industrial age, it means the 
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regulation and repressive desublimation of self-consciousness through commodification of the 
flows of psychic surplus (I will return to this point in Part Two of this chapter). 
 A psycho-political consideration of what is shared and exchanged between the public and 
the private from birth brings us to a radical political realization that self-consciousness—even the 
narrative (the terms by which or the lack thereof) of one’s understanding of one’s own 
subjectivity—is inherently political, because the terms of its formation directly influence the 
possibilities of empowerment, what Marcuse would specify as qualitative liberation, that is, 
sensuousness and imagination dictating the terms of self-awareness and self-reflexivity—and not 
economic exploitation or even reproductive consideration (Marcuse 1972). In terms of psychic 
surplus, connections between culturally-validated symbolizations and the fragments of 
imaginative cognitions allow the subject to be functional in the social realm, relegating the 
surplus, the spill-over beyond the available concepts and categories, to the realm of aesthetics 
(most of the time, this is merely folklore and kitsch). This point goes far in elaborating the 
consequences of psychodynamic changes brought about by the experience and the perspective of 
different generations. The way that any preceding generation nurtures its descendants is always 
already bound up with the socio-historical and cultural lexicon that is partly made up of its own 
inheritance and the history of its existential education (Marcuse 1974: 225). Thus this lexicon 
prepares the young for acknowledgment and fitting into the establishment, but not necessarily the 
heterodox affect of new historical experiences. 
 This kind of self-consciousness has its alliance with the libidinal, the ‘drive’ and 
‘instinctual’ underpinnings of the child’s most own conception of selfhood (i.e. the Id). As in 
psychoanalytic theory, The Ego (the conscious or the rational aspect of the psyche) actually 
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serves the purpose of socializing the private, as it filters and forces the self to either abandon its 
self-consciousness completely or to find ways to augment/substitute/translate its meanings. This 
reading compliments Marcuse’s uncovering that Freud’s treatment of the Id is at best incomplete: 
Instead of the Ego ascending to the primacy of subjectivity—as the entity in the psyche that 
knows “I”—it is the libidinally-based aspect of the psyche which appears as the kernel of 
selfhood (which, as the reader will shortly experience for themselves, is a point that also carries 
weight in the context of Althusserian conception of ideology). Adorno also has a complimentary 
thought: preserving the subjectivity of the psychical through private language formations of self-
consciousness, giving it a something, “the indissolubly ontic as the something” (2001: 140):  
No being without existents. The Something as the necessary substrate of the concept in 
thinking, also that of being, is the utmost abstraction—not to be abolished by any further 
thought-process—of what is substantive, which is not identical with thought; without the 
Something, formal logic cannot be thought…Constitutive to what is substantive for the 
form is above all the substantial experience of what is substantive. Correlatively, the pure 
concept, the function of thought, is not to be radically separated at the subjective counter- 
pole from the existent “I” (Adorno 2001: 139)  
Since it has its self-consciousness, what is signified by the Id also has its structures, its order, and 
therefore is not simply a must-be-controlled volatile substance in the mind. This development 
provides a certain reclaiming of the child’s original (Id-based) subjectivity from a ‘primitive’ or 
‘asocial’ or even ‘anti-social’ taint that it has been traditionally given in order to justify 
mistreatment and abuse.  
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 The point is that a subject always has his own representations of the external reality in its 
possession. We do not have to approach the adolescent as always already lacking in order to 
theorize about his subjectivity, instead we are enabled to consider how its adaptive and 
interpersonal processes are cultivated, manipulated, transformed, inaugurated and muted. 
Refusing the inquisitive framework that justifies socially-reproductive violence without critical 
engagement, the adolescent psyche is not a terrain that we can understand, that we have access 
into. So, what can we know? The answer to this question is grounded in the purpose of the 
inquiry. If the project is not one of domination but liberation, then the concepts through which 
we elaborate on our political and ethical convictions about the treatment of the other will be 
framed within that responsibility. The term I have relied on for this purpose is private language 
or self-consciousness: basically a sign for a dialectic process between the growing subject and 
the world, a way of symbolizing, a placeholder for the person’s narrative of meaning-making. 
Self-consciousness is meant to avoid falling into the trap of prefiguring the psychical make-up of 
a young (developing) subject that in its descriptiveness hides its constructions. Viewed strictly on 
the level of process, and never a matter of content, the appropriate concerns are critically limited 
to the notions of space, continuity, source of affectation, social-dictate, historical and material 
disruption, de-habituation, and (un)socializing disillusionment. In this way, we can theorize the 
impact of intergenerational dynamics on the child-subject without having to pretend to dissect its 
insides. 
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Economy and Territory 
Transgenerational Reproductive Economy 
In what follows, I want to deploy the political concepts that I introduced in Part I. In 
other words, I want to return to the process of socialization now that we have a way of 
politicizing its processes. In this second part of the chapter, the subject of my dissertation project 
will become fully visible.  
I would like to present a composite of the child at the center of trans-generational 
socialization schemas, inexorable socio-historical mechanism only concerned with efficiency of 
incorporation. This collage introduces the necessary theoretical categories that ground the 
psycho-political importance of commodification incurring into the domain of subject-formation 
via object-relations. The fact of the matter is that every person, as a political subject, is born at 
the mercy of a preceding generation. And the case remains even for the stable societies that the 
adult world consciously (self-interestedly) and unconsciously (reproductively, and more 
residually) chooses to engage in ideological (relational) indoctrination: to manipulate the 
formative psychic narratives of young through the implantation or omission of certain 
sensitivities and defenses in order to make up for the cues that social reality lacks and, direct the 
flow of engagement between the subject and society. 
 One of the main contributions of psychoanalytic theory is a historical-emotional 
recognition of the impact of social reproduction (on all of its levels) on the human beings 
involved. Psychoanalysis contends that people are raised towards consciousness, 
conscientiousness, and unconscious reproduction (by means of libidinal and affective 
motivations) to distinguish morally (unconsciously and emotionally) between folk and family, 
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and internalize the law of community in the form of an unconscious directive—an ideal value 
such as that of internalizing the rule of the law so much so that one feels a taboo viscerally 
(Freud 1923; Kristeva 2001). For Klein (1975) socialization and subject-formation are co-
constitutive: subjects become both themselves and themselves-for-others through their 
entanglements of guilt and attachment to their parents as authorities and love-objects. The point 
is that phenomenological experiences of early socialization produce the subject itself—the 
necessary grounds for autonomy and agency (one cannot have agency if one is not a subject)—
even as socialization is a process of the subjugation of the subject to the group. 
 Under the logic of necessity, the dialectical structure that results from the work of 
political economy and ideology prioritizes the perpetuation of the society, and every person who 
is considered a productive, functioning member of a socio-economic cultural cell, has externally-
imposed psychic agents that regulate and (re)produce communicably acceptable and meaningful 
experience in the individual subject. In Negative Dialectics as well as Eros and Civilization, the 
society produces the necessary means by which it can reproduce itself independent of human 
reason or the individual’s conscious action to contribute to the whole’s well-being. In the same 
logic, in the psychoanalytic tradition to which Otto Rank and Wilhelm Reich belong, the 
establishment of the Ego’s mastery is read in terms of the social system’s need for a dominance 
over the inner domain (see Horowitz (1971) on Reich and Rank). The terms of comprehensibility 
(or concepts by which one will ascertain to think his own self-awareness) are tied to both the 
cultural character at the center of the socialization patterns as well as the accidentally constituted 
subjective experience, which is also mediated by objects and constituted in relation to their 
affectivity. In this way, the filters and sensors for social affectation are programmed (a process 
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psychoanalysis captures as Ego-development), and the emotional memory, which supports the 
authenticity of the subject’s drive for life, is refined and developed by social experience (Freud 
1965).  
 In the modern compromise between private and public psychical interests, self-
consciousness accommodates the human subject by psychically (affectively, emotionally, 
embodyingly) preserving the consciously inaccessible emotional meaning.  The concept of self-30
consciousness embodies the Marcusian critique of ego-primacy in psycho-social theory by 
refusing to hide the libidinal basis of rational processes. In other words, the made-inaccessible 
emotional meaning is made up of emotional imprints of object relations established during 
formative moments of early childhood, which make up the unconscious, and effectively provide 
stability—not only upholding the person’s livelihood, but also the productivity of the person 
according to the socio-economic and cultural standards.  Therefore, the psychoanalytic lesson 
about socialization is that it is a process of the external redirection of narcissistic emotionality. 
This means that there is a creation and solidification of (inter-)dependence on the social-external 
in an effort to socially-organize the persona (social character) of an individual (Lacan 1954: 
22-24). By controlling the development of subjectivity, socialization functions to guide the 
development of a person’s social performativity, or how that person views himself and performs 
himself in the world (Butler 1997). Freud (1966) and Lacan (1954) (among others) posited 
primary identification as the constitutive, subjective process that underpinned the development of 
the child’s own agency. The concept captures the subjective experience of a child recognizing 
and internalizing the power of her parental unit. Lacan (1954) argues that the unconscious is 
 Marcuse’s (1974) radical reconceptualization of rationality in terms of its libidinal and sensuous basis 30
reinforces this proposition (228).
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explicitly structured through the experience of language (37-38). This relates to the question of 
ideology. Under certain approaches to subjectivity, identifying as a subject is to access the self 
through language, which of necessity happens within the ideology of a dominant power 
structure. For example, in critical theory, Horkheimer (1972) held the position that class-
consciousness was both constrained by the prevailing ideological conditions and of necessity 
would create its own ideology as its means of political articulation. 
 It is in this particular subtext that I find the kernel of the defining psycho-political 
principle, the founding possibility of liberation: the flows of psychic surplus, under the reign of 
normative socialization according to Culture and Law (only meant as referents for the structural 
relations and processes of intersubjective relationality that I just outlined), crystallize in terms of 
the child-subject’s self-consciousness. Such recognition of the pre-formation of the subject has 
caused many political theorists to situate young subjects in the processes of structural 
reproduction (cf. Arendt 1958). Although instructive for those of us seeking to understand the 
conditions under which “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please” (Marx 1948: 5), these studies have tended to be incomplete, because they left no space 
for the young subject, as something always just beyond the grip of totalizing socialization, nor 
could they conceptualize an alternative mode of socialization which was not subordinating. 
 The work of R.D. Laing (2011) and David Cooper (1971) are amongst those who viewed 
traditional institutions of socialization as ‘faulty’ precisely along these lines of reproducing 
psychic dis-agency. Long before this anarchic turn in mid-20th century, we can find glimpses of 
this line of thinking in Rousseau’s Emile, where he lays out an alternative to traditional 
socialization and education that would empower instead of fragment a person’s existential 
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prowess. Socialization secures the long term productivity and service of the person towards the 
effort of social reproduction. And, if it were not a process that guaranteed the perpetuation of a 
society, socialization would be more readily critiqued for being an institutionalized instance of 
the establishment of compulsory and repetitive projection, identification, and objectification; it 
would be seen as a process of habituation and addiction-creation (see Young-Bruehl 1996). This 
mechanism of social reproduction works with and through ideology. In other words, since the 
power disequilibrium at the center of bourgeois family relations (father at the disciplinary head, 
mother at the emotional center, siblings as primary competitors) could not be resolved, because it 
guaranteed the reproduction of necessary character types for the perpetuation of class interest, 
the only resolution came in the form of perpetual displacement of the power disequilibrium onto 
the social realms of experience beyond the threshold of the family home. In this way, the person 
on the way to being fully socialized by the political economy never attains critical consciousness 
of the biting power, because its structure is reflected by others on all walks of life, passively 
communicating itself as being natural, and thus an unavoidable occurrence after all. 
 The accomplishment of psychoanalytic theory, and object-relations theory more 
specifically, was limited to the individual ideologies of its theorists, and in its bourgeois spirit, 
disciplined away from radical conclusions by the productive ideologies of individualism and 
autonomy that reproduced that culture and economy (see Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 94, 113). 
This much is clear from a psycho-social analysis of normative socialization. In the stable, 
ideological, hallucinatory past of the social regime, there is little to no space for conceptions of 
psycho-political resistance (after all, what makes a neurotic a neurotic is his subjective 
experience of sociality delineating from the norms). Typical of the society’s appropriation of the 
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child-subject, the patterns of social reproduction presented as such leave no openings that would 
empower one’s political development (of an ongoing self-reflexivity as to defining the order of 
one’s internal objects). Without a way to actively access internal dynamics, the individual 
remains a manipulated subject of the social system. This portends the possibility of a new 
education. As Marcuse (1974) succinctly captures the sentiment: 
The distinction between rational and irrational authority, between repression and surplus-
repression, can be made and verified by the individuals themselves. That they cannot 
make this distinction now does not mean that they cannot learn to make it once they are 
given the opportunity to do so (223). 
In new educational possibilities Marcuse rereads the inevitable effect of the social-psychological 
alienation that (although remarkably pathologically if guided by profit-extracting interests alone) 
the child, who is socialized by consumer society through modes such as gaming and televisual 
mediation, experiences formatively. As an alienation, the commodification is a distancing from 
the social indoctrination processes, and becomes the first ethics in the constitution of the 
liberation to come. In Marcuse’s (1964) words: 
Massive socialization begins at home and arrests the development of consciousness and 
conscience. The attainment of autonomy demands conditions in which the repressed 
dimensions of experience can come to life again; their liberation demands repression of 
the heteronomous needs and satisfactions which organize life in this society. The more 
they have become the individual's own needs and satisfactions, the more would their 
repression appear to be an all but fatal deprivation. But precisely by virtue of this fatal 
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character, it may create the primary subjective prerequisite for qualitative change—
namely, the redefinition of needs (250). 
The perspective of ideology allows us to think this out beyond mere subjection. Socialization 
covers up the fact that with every newborn, the gears of the economy of social reproduction turn. 
In fact there is a timeless truth about the transgenerationality of political economy: the youth, the 
newly arrived weaklings, are always the scarified—they are the means to replenish the existing 
social order by providing a fresh source of surplus. After all, it is in youth that the idiosyncrasies 
of object-relationally cultivated narcissisms align with the political economic interests as 
concretized interpellations. The political economic role of youth is that they are subjected to 
authority and mediation for self-conception. In this way the terms of power relations in 
socialization (read: social-reproduction) come to mirror the patterns of relations of a given 
political economy (see Horkheimer 1972).  
 Theories of human psycho-social development and subject-formation point to the 
ideological rationalization of the subject’s progressive subjugation to dominant (familial and 
social) forces. It is at this level that the double-bind, which can be argued to be the grounds of 
youth politics, operates: every person, in seeing themselves as subjects, must also see themselves 
as workers (and various institutionalized functionaries) (Althusser 1984: 54). Therefore, when 
studying youth, families (as units of social reproduction) must be seen as functioning (with 
increasing complicity) within a system organized for material-production. In other words, we 
ought to attempt to theorize autonomy outside ideologically-reproductive conceptualizations of 
human personhood. Social reproductive interpellation in terms of filialization or hierarchization 
of people within a given community, the fact that younger people are interpellated as children or 
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adolescents while the older are licensed as adults, all of this also needs to be layered on top of the 
political economy. Socialization is already a socialized libidinal economy. My intention remains 
to situate the libidinal economy within the larger existing historical structures. In this effort, I am 
thinking of Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, as well as their 
predecessors of Marx and Freud on the question of internal economies of regulation and 
motivation, and their sense of social extension. Persons, as subjects under domination, choose 
ideology as a means to an end while they are also interpellated. This means that both 
consciousness and unconsciousness are involved in the process—there is a libidinal rationality of 
sorts; ideology enables every person to live with themselves despite inevitable limitations on 
their self-consciousness disciplined by social relations of the political economy. 
 Althusser (1999) suggests that Lacan would argue that ideology’s political economic 
value is that it reproduces common social scenarios (and their stable resolutions) arising from a 
universalized familial triangulation of the dominant and dominated (98-100). In his text on 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusser (1999) was wrestling with a realization of the nature of the 
potential radical-political latent in Freudian psychoanalysis. He had seen how a social method of 
self-conscious education had been reduced to bourgeois social reproduction, and tried to argue 
that the inkling of a different path was visible in the deconstructive steps that Lacan was taking 
in his theoretical premises. 
 I have found Althusser’s questions relevant, because they address the psychological and 
political conceptions of subjectivity and the political consequences of their assumption that the 
present manifestation of sociality is an ahistorical universal. To what extent particular concepts 
of subjectivity are biological or unchanging is up for debate, but the point stands that 
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withholding the judgment that asserts perfect knowledge of the make up of the internal universe 
will open up the critical space for unanticipated alterity. The point is not a utopian, but a 
theoretically responsible one. By forestalling the naturalization of this process, we can begin to 
reflect upon psycho-politics—that is, the politics of the psycho-social development of the human 
condition. I hold that the critical value of contemporary youth studies lies in the possibility of 
youth’s claims to critical political consciousness against a system attuned to treating the human 
as an object. But, the problem is that young subjectivity is most often talked about in terms of 
development; a trajectory established from corrective clinical motivations, such as understanding 
various pathologies, which are approached “realistically,” that is, “scientifically,” and not 
historically. The development framework owns the language around health and well-being: 
normative development schema always-already dictate the best (that is, the “only”) outcome: 
normative adulthood (in historically-contingent world capitalism). Well-being tied to 
development is limited in its scope, because it operates within the parameters that establish youth 
as a transitory subject position on the way to maturity of an adult human being (whose 
subjectivity is defined functionally as an ability to meet the minimum standards of capitalist-
oriented productivity). 
Socialization as Psychotechnological Complex 
 It is in the context of habituation that the politics of socialization as I have been trying to 
frame can finally be situated: habits of self-conception are historically grounded in culture, 
which exists within structures and institutions of political orders and economies. In this sense, 
socialization and trans-generational social reproduction (as mechanisms of habituation) are forms 
of technology that reach across the psychological and the social domains. In this sense, David 
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Riesman’s (2001) critique of American culture at the dawn of the culture industry is particularly 
attuned to noting the changing authorities over the domains of socializing institutions. While it 
remains a work of classical conservatism, Riesman’s Lonely Crowd presents an analytic 
framework which denaturalizes socialization along the lines I am currently attempting. What 
Riesman does is to abstract socialization processes down to their participants and their roles in 
order to argue that the makeup of socialization was changing as the role of socializing shifted 
from the parental circle to the peer group and consumer society. In other words, Riesman 
presents socialization as an interpersonal technology for future-social-actor training.  
 Psychoanalytic theory recognizes socialization as the reproduction of culturally-patterned 
relations between parents and their offspring, and more importantly that socialization initially 
frames and structures self-conception; it is a technology , even though, especially in the works 31
of youth-socialization oriented psychoanalytic theory (Aichhorn 1932; Erikson 1958; Freud 
1965), we can see how psychoanalysis redeploys alienation and identification as psycho-social 
technologies to redirect the affectation (or cathexis to use Freud’s (1924) term) initially framed 
by primary socialization. This alienation occurs on the level of the interpersonal. It reduces the 
proto-social experience within the family to that of an exchange-oriented performance, wherein 
the child realizes early on that the parents are not truthful (Klein 1963). More than merely 
withholding insight into the workings of the world, the parents were exposed to be unreliable for 
the task of transferring accurate information about the reality, given possibility the parents were 
not aware of their mis-projections. As the child develops its sensitivity to the parental 
 See Erikson’s (1963) work on youth, and Aichhorn’s (1935) work on youth delinquency for examples of the 31
psychoanalytic thought explicitly focused on the question of reigning in the young for the sake of social 
reproduction.
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(misconceived) psychic messages, it continues to be further alienated, and the psychic 
development of its own self-awareness and its own subjectivity taking on unexpected terms. 
Object relations theory implies that the early established and later sustained patterns of habitual 
reproduction (seeking out and fulfillment from attainment) of self-relating make up the course of 
human development: to draw a singular line from which one looks at other people as social 
authorities mirrored emotionally through the mark of his parents. Both Anna Freud (1965) and 
Erikson (1958) argue that social problems in early childhood and later adolescent development 
stem from inadequate trans-generational communication regarding the systems of power, that is, 
the coming of authority for those youth who accept to be subjugated to its reign (68; 78). In this 
sense socialization serves to (re)distribute symbolic value by ranking its participant population 
into manageable enclaves (even the children get to be recognized as on-the-way-to-power, or 
older-than-before, or attaining a higher class, marks, etc.). And I have been arguing that as far as 
has been theorized, social reproduction in capitalist society only deals with the bourgeois family 
as the normative, which is important because it explains why subject-formation and exploitation 
of object-relations subjectively and interpersonally in the family come to be treated as natural. To 
treat socialization as a technology would mean to read guilt (and the general experience of 
primary identification) as a moment when regulation is created (Butler 1997), but not lose sight 
of the fact that guilt is  formed from interpersonal social experience, and thus, in talking about 
generations and reproduction of labor, guilt becomes a manipulatable affect (in the same sense 
that awe or trauma can be conceptualized as a structure). 
 Under contemporary socialization practices, the child does not develop on her own terms 
(these terms are an impossibility): children are socialized in conformity with the needs of the 
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given reality principle (cf. Marcuse 1974). Moreover, the child’s attempts to understand and live 
within the world on his own terms are blocked; the society of necessity produces “bad 
faith” (Sartre 2001). Instrumental social ends (the conformity of the individual with his world) 
justify the reproduction of repeat intergenerational relations, with the inevitable result of a 
psychology of predetermined (and, in contemporary society, highly commodified) object 
relations (Klein 1975). In fact, there is a close relationship between the historical narrative of a 
culture and the trauma to which children are subjected as they become members of the social 
organization (Cooper 1971; Rank 1929; Reich 1983). This psychoanalytic conception of trauma 
is of an affective experience that becomes a manipulatable social object. In formative childhood, 
trauma affects object relations, affectively loading objects with meaning and attachment, and 
complicating the person’s relations to desire, secession, life and death. It is rather difficult to 
speak of the type of trauma that is genealogized as a psychotechnique of social reproduction and 
socialization. It is difficult, because the process of identifying the traumatic (i.e. stunning for the 
sake of cooptation) is interpretive. But, if trauma, as a psychodynamic developmental 
experience, boils down to being a direct experience of the real—in the least bit about the 
unsublimated—then, for any generation typically destined for social construction, trauma breaks 
the prototypical socially-reproductive self-consciousness formulas. In this sense, trauma, given 
the right socio-historical conditions can act as a force of politico-ethical transformation. 
Unfortunately, since the post-industrial society offers no progressive reconsiderations of the 
human condition, these youth become conflicted on the psycho-political level. In the 
postindustrial consumerist present the youth are disappointed to realize time and again that they 
are being sold secondary fulfillment with the promise of fulfilling the primary lack. Gardner’s 
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(2013) App Generation, Boyd’s (2014) It’s Complicated, as well as Boellstroff’s (2010) Coming 
of Age in Second Life all dance around these themes, but in the end minimize the role of digital 
consumer technology in shaping the everyday lives of adolescents, because they lack political 
lenses akin to the ones I presented in the first part of this chapter. The lack of which I speak, of 
course, is in the realm of the social relational: the desire to feel recognized and connected to the 
lives of others. Instead of therapy, consumer capitalism ‘thingifies’ relations to trauma and 
creates bonded relations. 
 Foucault instead argues that culturally and historically specific habits of self-narrativizing 
are methods for particular production of the self within an already existing political economy. 
The technology of socialization, which psychoanalytic theory could not see as such, Foucault 
(1988) terms technologies of the self as daily habits of a person’s relation with objects that frame 
the way he approaches thinking of himself (his everyday self-consciousness). In his words: 
As a context, we must understand that there are four major types of these "technologies," 
each a matrix of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to 
produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit 
us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which 
determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an 
objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform I 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality (1988: 14). 
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Foucault’s notion of self-producing technology goes as far as the formation of the habit to think 
about oneself in a particular matter. He provides a mode of understanding the ways in which 
popular historical practices of relating to one’s body and one’s sense of being a body result in 
specific conceptions of the subject. The cultural habit of journal keeping in Roman culture served 
Foucault as one of his primary examples, because this habit reinforced a notion of subjecthood 
by drawing habitual attention to the state of the body’s health. In this way the private moments of 
daily reflection were culturally habituated to be channeled to reflections on the state of the body, 
which rationalized the reduction of the possibility of self-conception to the body, that is, 
property, by the mere fact of taking up the space of another possible reflection (24). Foucault’s 
theory of how self-consciousness is socially mediated is useful as a way to draw out where the 
political economic touches the structural, the relational. Our analysis is therefore returned to 
familiar and familial objects, now with a critical edge: how does the comportment of the body 
itself become a sign (and a limit) of socialization? In some manner, the body is an effect of 
symbolic communication; under my analysis, the symbolic system is the system of socialization 
and subjectification. The body—a “private place”—is in fact laden with social meaning; 
historical power structures working in and through bodies legitimate and authorize persons as 
public (and private) subjects. 
 Adorno’s (1983) concern for the fate of the mimetic experience under the reign of the 
culture industry takes us into the realm of the idea-formation, the realm of consciousness and 
ideology. For Adorno, the concept (what becomes the commodity form as soon as it enters 
history) is in itself a historically grounded technology. As a concept, a word (or a representation) 
is a technology, because it enables a person to deal with an object in an alienated manner 
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(Adorno 1983: 37-42). The distance from the object allows for cultivation of agency. 
Subjecthood (self-awareness or consciousness) is deeply invested in the very life of the concept. 
For Adorno this concept is also a problem. Having a tendency towards perpetual colonization of 
experience, conception gets in the way of the qualitative relation to experience by merely 
continuing to serve as a representational mediator, which, in its accidentalness, (re)produces 
consciousness (79). 
 Stiegler’s (2010) concept of psycho-technology situates the politics of technology in the 
context of industrial and consumer capitalism. By focusing on attention-formation as technology 
(by which he extends a concept akin to Foucault’s notion of technology), Stiegler offers both 
reading and playing as examples of how attention-formation has a dual function in the life of the 
person: in the first instance it cultivates the person’s ability to narrativize himself, that is, to think 
of himself as a coherent subject, at the same time that it draws the person’s attention to specific 
socially-valuable (ethical or even nationalistic) narratives (10-12). And secondly, the process 
captures the immediate focus of the person, which allows for more immediately-educational 
priming (41-43). The first acts along the ways that journal-keeping operates for Foucault’s 
journal-keeping Roman, while the second act, that of playing with others, allows for smuggling 
of generational relation-formation that train the person to be an (read: "socially responsible") 
ethical social actor (18). What makes habituation into narrativizing oneself daily into journals (or 
developing the habit of following another’s line of thought line by line in a book) a technology is 
that a person’s attention is directed towards a stable goal—which until now has largely been 
presumed to be socially-valuable (12). This direction is socially valuable, if it provides social 
lessons to be smuggled into the person’s habitual mode of social operation without his explicit 
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knowledge and without the complication of his outright consent, thus preparing him to become a 
member of society that can be entrusted with (re)productive responsibility—he must reproduce 
despite his consent. 
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Towards the Role of Gaming in the Techno-Consumer Libidinal Economy 
 For the contest of the televisual, and particularly the dawn of gaming, in this chapter I 
have been building a comprehensive theoretical framework that encompasses socialization, 
subject-formation, and self-consciousness. This was an effort to prime the grounds for 
considering the role of gaming in metropolitan youth’s subject-formation; how gaming looks as a 
gadget in the contemporary consumer political economy requires material and ideological 
understanding, because fragments of present and future social and object relations of young 
people have already become valuable markets in the political economy (the topic of Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3).  
 The name of this game is fostering commercial feelings and behavior—becoming 
predictable desirers, habitual consumers, repeat costumers. Among many other such ‘gadgets,’ 
the ‘social network’ is far from being a disinterested enterprise; like the internet, it is borne of 
capitalism, which is driven in the organization of value-extractive means towards increasing 
efficiency, extracting value from life and, as an even more profitable side-effect, soliciting active 
participation in commodification. Pariser (2011) talks about the feedback loop and self-
referentiality that inevitably emerge in the commercialization of the televisual medium, in 
particular the 2008 change to Google search algorithms, which would track and collate your 
search results, radically personalizing your search results. In other words, televisual 
commercialization (as social-media and video-gaming) needs to be fully considered as an 
apparatus of socialization in order for its political structures to become visible. As Schor (2000) 
and many others have pointed out, children’s socialscape is commercial. This is partly because 
children do not have the requisite for cultural reproduction—peers who self-reflexively make 
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things for their peers. Adults have this, teens to some extent, too, but children are handed down 
their ‘equivalent’ (since in liberal consumerism, every milieu is supposed to have its own version 
of the same).  
 For a considerable portion of consumer-society youth, networked computer games, as 
sites of digital mediation, have become a means of socialization and part of their every-day. 
(Bissel 2011; Bradford 2012; Brzezinksi 2008). Therefore, contemporary critical engagement in 
youth studies needs to interrogate the sites of digital mediation. As an example, I will be offering 
the most popular massively-multiplayer, online, role-playing game (MMO) in the world—The 
World of Warcraft (WoW), but beyond WoW and role-playing games alike, I will discuss gaming 
more broadly as deploying interpellations as a kind of avatar-gamer relational container. 
 Gaming is benign when the subject is deterritorialized; the avatar and its limited in-game 
agency can appear as the signs of digitally-sponsored liberation as long as we are not reminded 
that real people (with real political economic and cultural structural positionalities) occupy 
subject-positions (but cf. Castranova 2008).  As soon as we localize the subject as a young 
person in the process of learning about the world, games can be seen as taking part in 
socialization and subject-formation. I intend to focus on the adolescent subject on the home 
front, because it strikes me that adolescence as a subject position is especially reified for the 
purpose of legitimizing particular social relations between the person and the society. Tiqqun 
(2012) argues that adolescence is created by consumer capitalism. Klein (1984), Anna Freud 
(1965), and Aicchorn (1935) individually argue that the modern society produces the necessary 
neurosis that create adolescents. 
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 Whatever we say the limits or behaviorisms (i.e. unavoidable natural developmental 
stage) of adolescents are, those limits in fact define what we as a society allow to be done to 
persons interpellated as such. We say they are prone to be immersed in fantasy, so selling them 
fantasy becomes socially acceptable. Understanding this process is critical in proposing a 
political reading of youth in idea and subjectivity. The ways in which a society totalizes itself 
inside a person’s mind (through the complexes of socialization and familial emotional 
indoctrination) shape the youth’s own experience of subjectivity. At the same time, this process 
harmonizes the subject’s self and social world, in a manner in accordance with the particular 
form of social relationality determined by social-historical and political-economic structures (cf. 
Althusser 1984). Because the adolescent person holds a subject position in the status quo of the 
dominant economy, the position must be theorized simultaneously within two economies: 1) a 
libidinal economy in which the adolescent’s psycho-social experience is crafted to facilitate the 
development of productive habits, subjugation, and exploitation; and 2) an ideological economy 
of political standardization within which a young person develops both an image of himself as a 
subject and a particular embodied orientation to his subjective experience (that is, the materiality 
of experience). Materiality as a concept is meant to suggest that if something is happening, it has 
a materiality (a qualitative content). And that materiality means that things might be occurring 
despite and outside of consciousness. The way that I have organized the discussion among the 
chapters that follow reflects the dialectical complexity. 
 At this point I would like to point towards the main question of my thesis: what is the 
nature of economic exploitation of youth socialization via media technology and programming? 
In the chapters that follow I will return to this question from a few different contexts (such as 
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from the position of labor, affective stimulation, and political consciousness). For now I would 
like to offer what I think the theory I have laid out up until this point would speculate would take 
place.  
 Most of the time what goes by the name of socialization is repetition, behavior 
modification by impulse control, and productive habit formation (that is, sublimation). For a time 
children are given treats and explicitly told to differentiate them as exotic objects. To this 
exoticized object their attention and access are externally allocated, and then gradually the treats 
are directed (or socially-valued) towards a productivity (cf. Stromberg 2009). In other words, the 
stake of social reproduction is instilled into a child despite their developing consciousness. In 
this sense the transgenerational, transhistorical political economy deals with regulation and 
limitation of consciousness for the sake of the political economy (as a sense of social 
reproduction). This line of thinking is relevant to the generational experiential difference 
amongst the subjects of technological consumerism: growing up with gadgets is different than 
having learned to used them in the course of one's lifetime (see Chapter 3). In the latter instance 
the person comes to find out that there are quicker ways of doing things, having been socialized 
according to the object-relations of their traditional psycho-social (psycho-economic) economies. 
The former, the so-called digital native, experiences simulations, the virtual, and all of its 
prosthesis as parts of its psycho-social structure of subjectivity (cf. Dunlap 2013). 
 As for the political reading of psychical violence of commodification and its 
transformation (not simply contamination—the effect is always dialectical) of cultural, and 
especially familial relations, self-consciousness takes on a particularly sharp political valiance: as 
the child is alienated from the parents, who were initially the direct suppliers of object relations 
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towards bourgeois self-consciousness, the child not only begins to observe and formulate 
concepts in a vacuum of parental (psychical) authority, the child also adopts the industrially 
prefigured object relation into his own trajectory towards a self-consciousness (cf. Klein 1984). 
For the children of consumer society, their parents supply the ideological concepts to develop 
their own internal object relations and emotional languages. Nonetheless, since the responsibility 
for the “definition”—once it has entered self-consciousness—is actually with the child, not with 
the parent, the problem of self-consciousness shows up as the apparent lack of agency of the 
child to protect or guide the formation of his object relational flows from commodification.  
 In other words, the economic exploitation of gaming in the lives of youth shows up in the 
process of socialization and indoctrination through administered processes that construct self-
consciousness of inner life. It gains a particularly critical dimension in the context of repressive 
desublimation and post-industrial capitalism. Marcuse (1964) argues that post-industrial 
consumer-orientation of capitalist surplus-extraction forestalls the individual’s ability to cope 
with the new terms of existence and preservation, and consequently cannot provide socially 
sustainable outlets for individual frustration (202).  
 Additionally, as the proverbial map always already precludes the terrain, the consumerist 
economy drives the pressure for limit-expansion of self-consciousness to the point where one is 
always already situated in a world of repressive desublimation, where the flexibility of inner 
object relations is so plastic it can mold to provide itself with repressively desublimated 
satisfaction from any number of objects, inadvertently causing the complete depoliticization of 
the subject’s private conceptions. This I call liberalization of object relations (a concept that will 
become most clearly valuable in the last two chapters): through economized mediation, 
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televisual consumer culture, and culture industry it plays a key role in the techno-consumerism 
of today. Historically the advent has been associated with the dissolution of the middle class 
family (cf. Cooper 1971; Friedenberg 1970), but I think of it as alienation of that which was 
culturally patterned to occur at certain periods in the young child’s life, which, now re-
territorialized by means of technological mediation and commodification, occur at an industrially 
chosen time. Within the interdisciplinary situating of the adolescent subject in the socialization 
process, it is not hard to imagine that in societies conditioned to regularly undergoing the process 
of object-relational reconstitution/transformation as the consequence of commodification 
(Baudrillard 1998), the commodification spills over into the familial sphere, causing 
transformation of relations in the formative scenes. The child’s sense of self develops in isolation 
from his parents as the child comes to conceive of the world not through a gradated, partial 
exposure to the world of their genealogical predecessors but traumatically on their own, in the 
comfort of commodities deemed appropriate emotional objects from afar. 
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Gaming and the Liberalization of Object-Relations 
 The starting point has to be that capitalism ought not to be assumed to stand for all of 
present human society, nor ideality for justice, nor extractive ideological indoctrination for 
socialization. A politics of youth can allow us to see that adult culture is unable to pose an 
immanent political critique of such deep commercialization. This current moment of advanced 
capitalism has brought an unprecedented level of commercially-geared repression and 
manipulation of the social circumstances of the young. We know it by names too familiar; it 
impedes aesthetic and social development by marketing military-handed-down technology as a 
‘pharmakon’ for the alienation that its own commodification of the human has caused. The larger 
point is that no authority or socialization model is ahistorical; authority always serves the 
stabilizing needs of a given political economy. Socialization, then, at best dictates the ideology of 
what is then relegated as the dominant reality principle (cf. Marcuse 1974: 218-220). Thus, rather 
than conceptualizing the new ‘consumer-techno’ socialization trends as a lack (of parental 
authority, of tradition) I will ask: what does it mobilize; what subjects does it form and promote? 
How is the adolescent incorporated in the mechanism of consumption/prosumption? 
Prosumption is a term recently deployed in marketing literature on gamification (that is, 
transforming everyday banal processes like online-banking and online-shopping into game-like 
experiences that bring about their own experiential satisfaction), and is meant to capture the fact 
that the act of consumption is the same as the bedrock of production when it comes to the kind of 
value created and extracted in circuits of social media and other online commercial contexts (see 
Bogost 2007). 
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 I propose to treat gaming (in terms of how it is tied to consumer economy) as a concrete 
agreement among the dominant industrial interests of the consumer society. Doing so exposes 
social stability as being closely tied to the the perpetuation of stability, which is historically 
situated in perpetuation of circulation, that is profit-making. In turn, profit is dependent on 
surplus extraction. In our day and age, for the metropolitan subjects, this profit extraction can be 
observed in gaming to involve the use of mediative technology to take control over object-
relational formations and thus control the formation of particular moments of subjecthood. In 
other words, I will explore how profit extraction in the specific case of the metropolitan 
consumers depends in part on the recirculation of ideological residues (those particular regimes 
of object-relations, structural identities, and interpellations) into techniques that perpetuate its 
linkage between subjects and objects—not unlike bourgeois family institutions and their 
mechanical reliance on guilt. My goal is to counter the fact that the political consequence of such 
reinstitutionalization remain only vaguely ascertained, while it is true that the intensification of 
commodity production, that inescapable reality of modern capitalism, creates an increasingly 
antisocial repressive political economy. 
 I will argue that, in its interactivity, the technique of gaming taps into repetition and 
habituation—two concepts that become central to the technique of gadget-mediated self-relation. 
Even as a mere amalgamation of psychological techniques, gaming becomes the means of 
particular social reproduction, one which also guarantees that the commodification will continue 
by having been replenished from within. But there are unforeseeable consequences to the 
commodification and alienation, a newer consciousness, a newer politics. For example, gaming 
is a capitalist enterprise, and the under-theorized fact is that this process of subject-avatar relation 
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is shaped by profit-seeking interest. But, researchers have only alluded to the implications of 
gaming impinging upon youth development (see Brzezinski 2008; Castranova 2007; Galloway 
2006). An adolescent might adopt an avatar for his own subjective purposes, but this activity 
takes place within a venture that generates profits, and arguably reflects the tendency of 
advanced capitalism to extend itself into new domains of human life: in this case, searching for 
the extraction of psychological surplus value (see also Lind 2012; Newman 2008). Because it is 
increasingly likely that activities of self- and social-development take place in this virtual world, 
it is also likely that gaming plays a decisive role in subject-formation and socialization.  
 My sense is that gaming has become an ideological, political-economic, and subject-
formative institution for youth, especially male youth, in contemporary Western society. In the 
next chapter I will specify a massively-online multiplayer role-playing game (MMO), the World 
of Warcraft (WoW), as a historical site of coalescence of the adolescents’ subjective experience, 
at which we can interrogate the reproduction of subjects. Gaming envelops historical experiences 
of the social and interactive. More specifically, MMOs are played “in real time” with other 
human subjects (cf. Ito 2009; Turkle 2012); the mode of interaction is “role-play,” meaning that 
players are engaging in performative interactions with other players (cf. Crawford 2011). In 
essence, I will argue that WoW enforces its own version of the subject. Allow me to elaborate by 
applying Althusser’s theory of ideology to WoW: interpellation works to the extent that a person 
thinks of himself as a self-directed and self-realizing subject. To be a WoW player, one must 
adopt a digital avatar, “hailing” himself as an embodied subject while simultaneously following a 
projection of “himself” on the digital screen. Preliminarily I suggest that we should posit this 
phenomenon as a second interpellation. Thus, there are two questions at the outset: (1) does 
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WoW, as an institution of socialization, differ from other modes of so-called traditional 
socialization (the family, the factory, etc.); and (2) how does interacting with virtual reality 
(re)produce forms of subjectivity? In other words, what are the political implications of reading 
the subject-avatar across the three dimensions of psycho-sociality described in the introduction 
(the psychic, the relational, and ideational), and in relation to the already-existing primary 
interpellation? It is the task of social theory to determine how this historically-specific 
ideological apparatus enforces its vision of subjectivity, and what this regime of enforcement 
means for youth. 
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CHAPTER TWO: WORLD OF WARCRAFT AS AN INTERPELLATIVE CONSUMER 
APPARATUS 
Introduction 
 Allow me to begin with a passage from Preliminary Material for the Theory of the 
Young-Girl (Tiqqun 2012): 
Among its many signs, we recognize that the new physiognomy of Capital, only an 
inkling in the interwar years, has now attained perfection. “Once its fictive character is 
generalized, the ‘anthropomophosis’ of Capital becomes a fait-accompli. Then the 
mysterious spell is revealed, thanks to which the generalized credit that rules every 
exchange (from banknotes to mortgage payments, from labor or marriage contracts to 
‘human’ and familial relations, from education and the diplomas and careers that follow, 
to the promises of all ideologies: all exchanges are now exchanges of dilatory 
appearance) strikes with the image of its uniform emptiness the ‘heart of darkness’ of 
every ‘personality’ and every ‘character.’ This is how Capital’s people increase, just when 
every ancestral distinction seems to be disappearing and every specificity of class or 
ethnicity. It’s a fact that doesn’t cease to amaze the naive, who still ‘think’ with their gaze 
lost in the past” (Giorgio Cesarano, Chronicle of a Masked Ball). The Young-Girl appears 
as the culminating point of this anthropomorphosis of Capital. The process of 
valorization, in the imperial phase, is no longer simply capitalist: IT COINCIDES WITH 
THE SOCIAL. Integration into this process, which is no longer distinct from integration 
into imperial “society” and which no longer rests on any “objective” base, requires that 
every person permanently self-valorize…Society’s final moment of socialization, Empire, 
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is thus also the moment when each person is called  upon to relate to themselves as value, 
that is, according to the central mediation of a serial of controlled abstractions. The 
Young-Girl would thus be the being that no longer has any intimacy with herself except 
as value, and whose every activity, in every detail, is directed to self-valorization. At each 
moment, she affirms herself as the sovereign subject of her own reification. The 
unquestionable character of her power, all of the crushing assurance of this flattened 
being, woven exclusively by the conventions, codes, and representations fleetingly in 
effect, all the authority that the least of her gestures incarnates, all of this is immediately 
indexed to her absolute transparency to “society”…Precisely because of her nothingness, 
each of her judgments carries the imperative weight of the entire social order, and she 
knows it (9-10). 
 With these words, the writers of Tiqqun announce that the exploitative drive of capitalism 
has realized its model of subjectivity, one which “self-valorizes” into commodification on its 
own accord. This chapter concerns the incorporative mechanisms used by the contemporary 
consumer economy to create the suitable subjectivities that are also necessary for capitalism’s 
ongoing reproduction. Being a political project to understand capitalism from the vantage point 
of the people deemed consumers, the question is: if a person reacts to the political structures of 
his world by imagining a subjecthood, then of what consequence is the subject, which is 
produced to consume? I will argue that video games (particularly in this chapter, the massively 
multiplayer online role-playing games (MMOs)) are a particular site of subject-production in 
contemporary capitalism. The MMO is a site of intentional subject-creation to socialize a 
particular orientation towards consumption. Starting from a peculiar resemblance between the 
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model neoliberal subject and the gamer, I will focus on the relation between the person and the 
game as a consumer capitalist extractive mechanism. What is popularly known as 
ludocapitalism, I want to treat as a mechanism that conceptualizes the existence of massively 
popular digital gaming industry within contemporary global capitalism and its relation to modern 
modes of labor and value. Ludocapitalism is the term used by contemporary critical gaming 
theorists to signify the kind of capitalist social relations in which one plays a game for work. I 
would like to spend a moment and note the difference between a few of these theorists: Savat 
(2013), Boutang (2011), Stiegler (2010), and Baudrillard (1970): For Savat, a Deleuzian 
framework is most useful. For Boutang it is one by Hardt and Negri. For Stiegler it is 
Heiddegger and Simondon. And for Baudrillard it is a structural Marxist one of Debord and 
Althusser. In other words, the notion of ludocapitalism shifts according to the theoretical 
framework in which it is brought up (see Lopes 2008). Put rather bluntly, according to 
ludocapitalist analysis, as Galloway (2006) put it in a remarkably representative tone, “We are all 
players now.” I will show that surprisingly it is not commonly held that ludocapitalism poses a 
new theoretical challenge to the study of capitalism, even though theories of consumption in 
capitalist political economy are still highly contested. 
 The concept of ideology is central for this chapter, because it offers a refreshing way into 
consumerizing technics. Capitalism as a political economy sustains an ideology—thus a notion 
of a culture and a subjecthood—a notion of the person and his sense of self, which together work 
for and within the economic system. Ideology surfaces whenever individual persons think of 
themselves and narrate their place in the world or rationalize the larger power structures 
operating in the society. In other words, ideology, studied as a structure and a materiality, is a 
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symbiotic relationship (or at least a compossibility) between the larger system and a person’s 
self-constitution. I have singled out Althusser’s theory of interpellation, because it offers a useful 
way into the psycho-social dimension of subject-formation—the emotional and symbolic  32
symbiosis between the person and the political economy. The existing literature on the MMO 
phenomenon (and the so-called digital culture more generally) focuses on “psychological” 
categories like motivation and addiction (the topic of the following chapter). But, it fails to offer 
any substantive meditation on the political consequences of the phenomenon under observation. 
Both motivation and addiction are emotional involvements, and as such, when read through the 
lens of interpellation-for-extraction, the phenomena are exposed as having a role in perpetuating 
‘voluntary’ participation within the extractive and consumptive mechanisms. The very process of 
ideology can be operationalized to train a person to self-commodify. 
Exploitation of Subjectivity under Ludocapitalism  
 Dyer-Witherford and de Peuter (2009) present us with a comprehensive materialist 
situating of commercial gaming, its many relational dimensions of materiality such as the 
workers and labor involved, the consoles mass-produced, industries that govern, and the global 
political economy that encompasses it. The authors employ the critique of capital as supplied by 
Hardt and Negri’s work on immaterial labor, Foucault’s notion of biopower and governmentality, 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s mechanic subjectivities. In their words, 
The game industry has pioneered methods of accumulation based on intellectual property 
rights, cognitive exploitation, cultural hybridization, transcontinentally subcontracted 
 Throughout the paper I use the term “symbolic” to signify the terms through which the historical economic 32
processes solidify themselves into codes and rules for the individual to follow. As Althusser (1968), Lacan (1973) 
and Lyotard (1974) all argue, the symbolic processes are structural processes that make themselves apparent in the 
nature of the operative (ideological) rationality.
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dirty work, and world-marketed commodities. Game making blurs the lines between 
work and play, production and consumption, voluntary activity and precarious 
exploitation, in a way that typifies the boundless exercise of biopower (xxix). 
 I found Games of Empire to be a very useful introduction to the sites where gaming is 
seen to procure new reterritorializations for postindustrial capital. The authors offer a critique of 
the Italian autonomists’ conception of immaterial labor with their own consideration of gaming 
labor (2009: 18-20); they argue that “the video game console was part of the ‘grand offensive,’ 
the perfect latchkey-kid-care techno-device for the world of working women, double-income 
families, and single-parent households” (19). But, at the same time, the authors draw a limit on 
their critique by drawing a circle around gaming as the “mechanization of unpaid domestic 
labor” (19). Furthermore, even in considering the way gamers have participated in the creation of 
new “mods” of their favorite titles (“mods” are modified scenarios within specific game 
engines), the authors merely cite the way that gamers participate in such reproduction, but do not 
consider the reasons for their investment in so-called “playbor” (25, 221). 
 The most glaring consequence of this strict definition of what activity constitutes labor 
comes up in the chapter on World of Warcraft, where the authors recognize only the gold-farmers 
as laborers, because they are directly employed in the circuits of turning in-game gold into real 
world exchange value (142-144). In dismissing what the supposedly Western gamers do as 
“futuristic accumulation” (126), what the authors miss is an opportunity to consider how the 
terms of gaming biopower-governmentality that has to keep to certain simulation of the real 
!73
political economic logic of scarcity not only disciplines the potential global workers in its 
economy but also convinces the paying gamers to valorize their labor as play.  33
 Most interesting for my research was the authors’ use of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of 
the human-machine assemblages. In the authors’ words: 
Guided by Deleuze and Guattari’s machine studies, we open up the Xbox and its console 
rivals as state-of-the-art technical machines made of chips and circuits; as components of 
giant corporate machines; as time machine for profitably using up software and other 
virtual commodities; as generators of mechanic subjects, mobilizing the passions and 
practices of hard-core gamers; as contenders in the competitive machine wars of video 
game capital, but also at the same time of the transgressive, subversive war machines of 
nomadic gamer hacking and piracy; and last, through all these preceding machine 
moments, as part of the global biopolitical machine of Empire (71). 
Dyer-Witherford and de Peuter recognize the assemblage of “player-console-television” (72). 
They also note that Microsoft pioneered the deterritorialization of gaming as a countercultural 
activity of the military-industrial-complex workers of the computer age and reterritorialization of 
gaming’s allure within its console (74-75). They even recognize the fact that Empire requires the 
socialization of its subject masses to “endure and endorse…banalized war” (100). In their 
chapter on Full Spectrum Warrior, Dyer-Witherford and Peuter also mention Massumi’s affective 
circulation, but, in my opinion, miss the opportunity to integrate the weight of that point about 
the libidinal economy into their discussion about the political economic value of a military 
 Dyer-Witherford and de Peuter note: 33
Corporate publishers must stimulate player activity from below, for this is precisely what gives the game life, 
makes it interesting, and bestows the “persistence” or longevity vital to commercial success…But publishes 
must also ensure that players’ biopolitical production of game life does not transgress the limits of profit 
maximization, disciplining and interdicting all sorts of demands, desires and infractions (2009: 127).
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simulator doubling as a consumer gaming product when they reduce it to mere identification 
with the soldier one is to play in the military scenario (2009: 106, 112, 118). The fact that 
networked play has to be paid for, they consider the grounds for “machinic subjection” (78), and 
build on that by explaining how Microsoft engages in surplus extraction by requiring increasing 
amounts of micro transactions to improve scores in games (79). They even recognize that gaming 
employs some specific kind of “desiring machination” (80). But, this is where they draw the line 
as their theorizing does not go beyond their stating that “hard-core players identify with a 
specific subject position: the man of action” (81). Here they simply conclude: 
By affirming that a machine for youthful male players should be a black box with a huge, 
complex controller, providing a virtual imaginary of racing cars and cyborg warriors, 
embedded in aggressive put-downs and trash talk, Microsoft circularly corroborated 
presuppositions about youth, masculinity, and digital play: it reproduced hard-core 
subjects (84). 
 What the work lacks is consideration of subjective experience as a constitutive part in 
understanding why gaming works, how it motivates the gamer to continue to participate within 
its many circuits of surplus-extraction.  In other words the work does not apply the traditional 34
concepts of political economy to the more complex processes of gaming, but reserves discussion 
to the conventionally recognized. Games of Empire is a great introduction to the lay of the land, 
but needs to be critiqued for not recognizing what happens within games as labor activity, and 
does not think of the surplus extraction that comes from within. My sense is that without the 
 At one point, the authors talk about pleasure and its usurpation within the circuits of gaming, but seemingly 34
dismiss the obstetric moment by saying that “to say that consoles are enslaving is not to deny that they are 
pleasurable; it is to say that pleasure itself channels power” (2009: 92).
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consideration of the subjective and more specifically subject formation we cannot see what 
exactly is happening when persons begin working to construct their own sense of ideological 
syncing by holding up gaming subjectivities. 
 Stallabrass’s (1993) “Just Gaming: Allegory and Economy in Computer Games” offers a 
few useful starting points that raise the incorporation of ideology in gaming. Conceptualizing 
what gaming represents as allegory, he alludes to the importance of considering the subjective 
experience of gaming in situating the whole apparatus within the historical political economy by 
offering a reading of gaming as fitting within Benjamin’s theory of the arcades and 
phantasmagoria and as constituting the basis of Adorno’s critique of culture industry. In his 
words, “the distinctiveness of games lies in interaction: the passivity of cinema and television is 
replaced by an environment in which the player’s actions have a direct, immediate consequence 
on the world depicted” (1993: 1). Stallabrass points out that the objective of the game is 
chimerical, that is, “in most games there is a striving towards ever greater illusion and the 
envelopment of the player to provide an immediate, visceral experience…[in which] one plays at 
being a self” (1).  
 Stallabrass argues that games build their affective palpability on constructing an 
identification between the avatar on screen and the player (2) just as in cinema the audience is 
immersed into the action of the film by identifying with the protagonist. In his words: 
The computer game enforces on players a mechanization of the body in which their 
movements and their self-image as alter-ego provide both a physical and a simulated 
picture of the fragmented, allegorized and reified self under the conditions of capital (3). 
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But, Stallabrass draws a line between the kind of labor that the gamer engages in to identify with 
the on-screen alter-ego, as the game is only considered an allegory of the larger political 
economy: “the labour forced on the player is not real, the instrumentalism not really 
consequential, nothing (except time) is really consumed” (4). For Stallabrass what happens in the 
realm of gaming is nothing but a simulation of production that harkens back to the real-world 
circuits of capital.  
 Furthermore, Stallabrass captures some of the important questions that I will return to in 
my own study of gaming in light of the lives of postindustrial adolescents. He talks about the 
ideal, Utopian space created within game fantasies where exchange value and use value once 
again come together (4). He also talks about the way in which the plot of a game camouflages 
the base similarity of all actions within its realm, and even offers the affective self-stimulation 
that gamers reproduce as a means to misrecognize repetition as pleasurable (5). Stallabrass sees 
the computer game as a simulation of work under postmodern terms of capitalism: 
Computer games perform simulated acts of reification where slices of immaterial code 
act as living beings arranged and treated as objects. Even the brutal simplification of 
digital figures is a register of objectification (6). 
 Most exciting for me was discovering Stallabrass’s consideration of Benjamin’s gambler, 
who roams the labyrinthian arcades (7), and for whom, the ability to empathize with the betting 
parallels his empathy with the exchange value (12). In his words, “Especially with arcade games, 
the computer produces in the player a simulacrum of industrial work: the autonomy of each 
action, its repetition, precise timing and rare completion are all reminiscent of Benjamin’s 
analysis of the gambler’s action” (7). He acknowledges that “the emotional attachment to the 
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game is established through labour,” but concludes that “the activity is entirely 
unproductive” (8). My sense is that this is possibly because Stallabrass does not have an 
operative theory of subject-formation in his analysis, without which one is unable to see that 
what is being produced is a subjectivity, an affectively-constructed sense of self. This is perhaps 
because Stallabrass has a rather simple conception of desire, or the libidinal economy that 
operates with/in the gaming apparatus. In his words:  
The operation of desire in these games is simply an acute form of the normal procedure 
of the market in fashion-driven culture: there is always a sense of something beyond the 
present experience, of some unused potential within the machine, of a task never quite 
finished, of a realism not quite complete (11). 
Gaming accomplishes “mental conformity” by enabling the real-world worker to entertain a real 
fantasy of the ideal, Utopian version of political economy (13). 
 Games of Empire offers a survey of the major themes in critical gaming studies. It looks 
at the notion of being a gaming worker, that is a person working in the industry directly or by 
extension. It looks at the gaming companies and their hold on global capital, as monopolies and 
vested interests. It also considers the consequences of the collusion between gaming and the 
military-industrial complex. And it also looks at gaming as an allegory such as in the case of 
Grand Theft Auto series. But, in this sense, the work also presents the endemic limits of gaming 
studies. Stallabrass’s work serves as a fitting compliment to Games of Empire as it brings us 
closer to the more complex questions about the psycho-social incursions of the gaming 
apparatus. But, much like the work of Dyer-Witherford and de Peuter, “Just Gaming” also suffers 
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from an endemic limitation: the work is limited by its lack of precise definition when it comes to 
the subject who games in the circuits of postmodernity. 
 A person’s experience with video games exists in a world already saturated by an 
ideology of consumer entertainment. And in order for the notion of “new-media entertainment” 
to make sense, we would have to assume that there is nothing alarming about deriving 
satisfaction from images and sounds without concrete materiality. In the background of digital 
technology and contemporary ludocapitalism, there is the pretext of televisual mediation, which 
marks an important assumption in drawing a line between pleasure and semiotics: deriving 
pleasure (or another kind of affect) from an event (or an object) no longer needs to have a 
concrete stimulant. Take Pavlov's classical conditioning as a technological discovery: pleasure 
can come from a tailored repetition, that is, a mere satisfactory illusion of attainment (Bernays 
1952; Cialdini 1993). Thus, it can be simulated, which means that the subjective reproduction of 
libidinal attachments to symbols and images, those societally arranged concepts of meaning, still 
takes place. People are placated to terms of the political economic “game” through a process, in 
which they involve themselves with simulations of historically established ways of desiring and 
satisfaction—ways of psycho-social valuation that fit familiar formulas of correspondence 
between intensity of work and the pleasure of attainment (Deleuze and Guatarri 1972; Lyotard 
1974; Armenti 2013; Whitson 2013; Vanderhoef 2013).  In theories of audience labor, 35
identification as a vehicle for guided-interpellation has long served as the bedrock of 
commodification (see Chapter 4). Take for example the role of commercial music in consumer 
spaces: the tune bypasses the consciousness and interacts with the listener’s affective situation; 
 In the following chapters, I will go into this notion of libidinal economy and valorization in depth.35
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identification with the lyrics, the "I" or "we" or "you, “ happens in hearing in an uttering a 
familiar emotional statement (see Negri 1999). Geared for identification, commercial music 
prepares the person for the smuggling of commodification that is to come—it is purposeful 
symbiosis of commercialized affect, which says, ‘now that you identify, you are safe at home, so 
draw down your defenses and buy that something that says you’re worth it.’ The capacity to 
manipulate the psycho-social ties, like the ever-present "I"-identification in commercial media, is 
a form of technology.  
 Interpellation enables us to dig below the surface distinction between the social, the 
economic, and the psychological—beyond the libidinal and the symbolic—into the fuzzy terrain 
of the psycho-social. In Althusser's reading, interpellation synchronizes the needs of the 
individual with the political economy. It has a structural function in the psychosocial historical 
and existential reality of being a person in a society. This is how Althusser explains the co-
existence of guiding interpellation and self-determination:  
The interpellation of the individual as subject, which makes him an ideological subject, is 
realized not on the basis of a single ideology, but of several ideologies at once, under 
which the individual lives and acts his practice…What results is a play and a space of 
multiple interpellations in which the subject is caught up, but which (as contradictory 
play and as space) constitutes the ‘freedom’ of the individual subject, who is 
simultaneously interpellated by several ideologies that are neither of the same kind nor at 
the same level; this multiplicity explains the ‘free’ development of the positions adopted 
by the subject-individual. Thus the individual has at his disposal a ‘play of maneouvre’ 
between several positions, between which he can ‘develop,’ or even, if you insist, 
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‘choose,’ determine his course, although this determination is itself determined, but in the 
play of the plurality of interpellations (2006: 242). 
In this framework, ideology is reproduced actively (and compulsively) by state apparatuses (that 
is, the functionary structures of social institutions) and the political economy. But, there is a 
historical particularity, which hinges on unconscious processes, to this view of ideology: it is a 
reaction to a historical situation of subjection and domination.  
 In For Marx and Ideological State Apparatus, Althusser is concerned with technology 
only in the way that it intersects with industrial production. Most notably in the Philosophy of the 
Encounter, Althusser’s concern for technology is relegated to the capitalist mode of production 
and the basic exploitation of the proletariat. In other words, Althusser does not contemplate the 
existence of mass-communication technologies in his theory. Had he one, his theory of ideology 
would have led to a theory of the technological apparatus that guarantees the interactivity 
between the symbolic and the libidinal—a psycho-social corollary to political economic 
structures.  
 The Frankfurt School could only speculate on the historical consequences of the merging 
of power and technology in industrial capitalism as it was restructuring itself and consolidating 
power in the wake of the Second World War. But, Marcuse’s repressive desublimation (1964) 
still rings true: originating from a regime of modern capitalism where monopoly capital develops 
state controls and perpetuates an increasingly monopolized experience of humanity in which 
something previously accessible to more people is replaced by a simulation of a controlled 
dosage of the original. There is a hidden territory of desire-commodification in approaching 
interpellation as a psycho-technological mechanism: it is the person himself who subconsciously 
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identifies with pieces of interpellation and (re)constructs an ideological subject in his own mind. 
As Althusser (1999) says, “In order for the individual to be constituted as an interpellated 
subject, it must recognize itself as a subject in ideological discourse, must figure in it: whence a 
first speculary relation, thanks to which the interpellated subject can see itself in the discourse of 
interpellation” (52). In this way the subject on the inside comes to be synchronized with the 
dominant subject model. And the way by which the subject is built determines the way that the 
subject is to be replenished.  
 The concept of psycho-technology enables us to theorize the consumerist appropriation 
of interpellation: the exploitative apparatus relies on technology-enabled, micro-management of 
ideas and the quality of experience. Psycho-technology is developed by Stiegler (2010), who 
uses it to represent micro-regulation of attention, which he observes in the consumerization of 
intergenerational habitus and the replacement of intergenerational relations (in instances such as 
imitation and facilitation of sublimation and anxiety-tolerance) by televisual guidance. In the 
early 1980s, Foucault (1984) used the term “technologies of the self” to suggest something very 
similar—although, characteristic of Foucault’s approach, his interlocuting subject matter was 
Greek and Roman cultural practices of writing about one’s self. More importantly, Foucault’s 
conceptual limitation is the fact that he focuses on the middle-ground, the governmentality in 
which both the political economy and the subject participate in shaping the situation. The theory 
of psycho-technology points to techniques that regulate the qualitative experience of people 
relying on popular technology for social and economic mediation. Because it affects the attention 
processes in the structural (unconscious) dimension of the psyche, the theory questions the 
qualitative impact of psycho-pharmacological and attention-management processes of being 
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‘plugged-in.’ In other words, the concept offers a framework to incorporate the psycho-social 
realm of experience—the grounds of socialization and social-reproductive processes, which have 
traditionally been outside the theoretical scope of capitalist extraction. 
 I would like to additionally propose that Deleuze and Guattari (1972) can facilitate the 
conceptual situating of psycho-technology. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) work exemplifies the 
way in which a libidinal-economic understanding of the historical-material human condition can 
enable immanent critique of capitalist society. I see my thesis as contributing to their 
consideration of human desire as the source of production (instead of accepting the assumption 
of an ‘orienting-lack’ (Lacan, 1977)), as I argue that the psycho-social is becoming employed 
towards extraction prior to finding its way into material representations. For a specific class of 
the contemporary global capitalist structure, the digital medium led to the mimetic re-coding and 
transplantation of consciousness and social knowledge. 
 The works of Deleuze and Guattari (1983) and Foucault (1988) suggest that the political-
economic incorporation of the subject requires the standardization of signification and 
identification practices. To offer a contemporary example: the scenario of an adolescent person’s 
anticipation of what is new on the frontage of Facebook, as a substantive experience or a 
hallucination of an expected experience on Facebook, expands on this point: this hallucination or 
mental image is a mimetic object, which is summoned by an object, a consumer-technology 
object, in the external world. As socially-constructed mimesis, theory would suggest that it is 
repressive in character, because representation is not only bound to the activity of the imaginary, 
but also to the selective-operationalization on the part of the societal (Adorno, 1998; Marcuse, 
1964; Baudrillard, 1998). The crucial pivot-point is that the socialized imaginary (Castoriadis, 
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1987) is the psychical agent of incorporation that serves economizing and ideological functions 
(Horkheimer, 1972; Althusser, 1984). 
 Baudrillard (1998) argues that the economy of consumption secures circulation by 
employing misrecognition, which underlies ideology and the distance between representations 
and their consummating intent. This notion of necessary misrecognition for the circulation of 
commodification of the psychological (or the imaginary), in the case of video games and social 
media, suggests that the emotional anticipation of new images tunes the psychic to expecting the 
formatted images from those sites of production. Stiegler (2010) suggests this much, but 
arguably this is only a speculation. Nonetheless, there are signs in contemporary research, at least 
on the side of consumer research, that this idea has already been employed: for example, Cottrell 
and Rajecki (1974) offer a theory of the profit-potential in users’ emotional investment in 
performance of repetitive, “irrelevant” tasks; Zwick (2006), on the other hand, directly theorizes 
the commercial application of Bionian object-relations theory (1963) in his conception of post-
consumption object relations. 
This has been a roundabout way to arrive at the following question: how does psycho-
technology (the development of increasingly interactive televisual media) figure into the process 
of ideological interpellation?  While, in general, it is not hard to point to ideology (after all the 
Church still exists!), where can it be observed in concrete experience of daily life under 
consumer capitalism?  
In order to find a viable answer to this question, we need to turn to terms usually 
deployed to make sense of how persons become entangled in the formation and sustainment of 
each others' lives. The so-called “object-relations” have an explicit function in operationalizing a 
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given ideology as conditioning the inner life of a person to suit the political economy. Put in the 
context of consumer experience, identifying with movie characters (people and ideas popularly 
celebrated as being powerful) is a form of a kind of consumer-socialization by interpellation. 
Commercials as commodified film (the now-classic example of televisually transmitted affect-
technology) is what critical theory worried about (in terms of what it does for ideology becoming 
more directed, intentionalized) (Adorno and Horkheimer 1995; Fromm 1960; Marcuse 1968). In 
the experience of watching films, the audience enjoys as long as the film can capture a proximal 
signal to what its producers intended to convey. Now we have video games that allow role-
playing in scenarios from those films—in first-person shooter games like Battlefront players re-
enact the most cathartic scenes of Hollywood war cinema (namely Saving Private Ryan and the 
Band of Brothers) by having their view, range of motion, and capacity for self-help vulgarly 
predetermined to bridge the experience of being a film audience to being a gamer. 
 If ideology is framed in reaction to subjection to power, then under the terms of 
“digitized” capitalism, agency can become a commodity. And in ludocapitalism, that 
commodification surfaces in the relation between the ideological subject and the in-game avatar, 
where the psycho-social processes from prior forms of socialization (ideology to integrate the 
family, the community, and the state) are appropriated for newer forms of socialization (ideology 
to perpetuate consumption). There is an economy of believability governing interpellation in film 
and video games. I find that Bakhtin (1991), in his analysis of Dostoyevsky's prose, captures the 
key to this when he suggests that the success of a work of fiction rests in how well the author can 
simulate each character as having their own autonomous subjectivity, which for Bakhtin means, 
the sole access to their own particular, self-confirming ideology. The more opaque the better a 
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character can simulate multi-dimensionality, the more self-explaining that it contain, the more 
‘desirable’ it will becomes, warranting an interpellation. In other words, ideology can become a 
tool of technology. I am using technology in the sense that Heiddegger (2008) and Simondon 
(1969) used it, that is, a technique, an enabling of control over a domain of life that did not exist 
beforehand. I think that these authors ultimately have an apolitical conception of technology, 
which creates more problems than resolves them. Therefore, I only define technology in their 
terms at onset, but problematize its social history from that point onwards, because, after all, 
technology in consumer society emerges from the industrial militarization. Consumer technology 
can appropriate the ideology-production mechanism in the effort to make the person feel in 
control while directing its subjectivity towards exploitation (by offering up an avatar for 
interpellation, a simulation of an empowered subjectivity). 
  From their scenario to their rules and basic engineering, video games rely on ideology to 
create their play. What a game demands from players to win, what kind labor its code values are 
decisions which stem from (al)ready-made ideological assumptions. Aupers (2011) argues that 
the gaming industry relies on commodified agency to secure its ongoing profits from consumers’ 
participation:  
To accomplish its goals of keeping gamers playing, the game industry directs much of its 
production budget and its technical expertise towards the engineering of ‘immersion’. 
Immersion entails amnesia: it makes gamers forget the offline social, technological and 
commodified environment of the game and makes them identify with the game 
world...They have experiences of being in the virtual world, living their virtual lives as 
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heroes, whereas they forget about real life and the technological, commodified nature of 
the game (67).  
The game scenario might ask that one accept a subject-position of a colonial settler on the way to 
the New World (like in the Real Time Strategy game Empire: Total War), or a newly minted 
human “paladin” (game-speak for a religious knight) with self-righteousness reminiscent of the 
Christian crusaders (as in the MMO the World of Warcraft). In the context of the game, these 
interpellations are justified axiomatically. After all, the player, as the subject in the game, must 
be justified in the actions he must take to win no matter how unethical the premise of the game's 
scenario might be ( see also Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2007).  
 But, for the current exploration, it is the technique of subjection, rather than the 
implications of such content-based depoliticization, which is of interest. According to Althusser, 
part of the process of interpellation is the imposition of the ideological context which the person 
reads and constitutes in his head in the process of imagining his own subjection (1970: 56). 
Whereas real-time strategy and first-person shooter games are only partially realized worlds and 
so only partially-realize ideology, massively multiplayer online games make interpellation a 
more complete process, because they possess more of the characteristics of whole-worlds. With 
no ability to cheat the total system, all player action abides by the programmed discipline of how 
long a task will take, and how that in-game action will be valued. In these “worlds,” a person can 
“live” through an avatar provided that it accept the rules of the game through which it is hailed as 
a subject in/to the game. This time/value economy in an MMO operates in compliance to its lore 
(its ideology) that sustains the rational consumer interest in the game to perform within its 
created economy (Castranova 2005; Dyer-Witheford 2007; Yee 2005). 
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 Allow me to present a basic primer of the experience of playing an MMO game. At the 
very beginning of the game, a player is instructed to create an avatar, which will be its conduit in 
the game for the remainder of the time. This avatar is full-bodied—it has all the characteristics of 
what a person might look like, and the player can customize the shape of the avatar’s features 
from a catalogue of variation. After the initial choosing of avatar’s race and gender, the player 
must choose the avatar’s in-game “fighting” class, that is, whether this character will prefer 
hand-to-hand over distance combat, armor and steel over magic, etc. At the beginning of the 
game, the avatar is dropped in at the common location of new-player-insertion (every race has its 
own starting-location). From that point onward, the player interacts with the avatar by means of 
his keyboard and mouse, where he will literally follow the avatar on screen, directing its actions, 
which are predetermined by the game-engine. As for how the game is organized, the game-
engine values the player’s kills (as experience points), which continually add up to level up the 
avatar’s in-game standing. This standing in turn enables the player to have access to a larger part 
of a predetermined catalogue of fighting capabilities and in-game commodities for his avatar. 
The game progresses as the avatar-player travels from place to place and picks up missions from 
non-player entities (Non-Playable Characters or NPCs). He may choose to do the missions with 
other avatar-players. These missions educate the player of the game-world’s lore, and act at first 
as training missions, and later as means to experience the arc of the game’s larger storyline, 
which in the least serve to justify repetitive activities (see Bissel 2011 for an in-depth discussion 
of the importance of the game tutorial). 
 By and large, the social research dealing with the subjective experience of an MMO 
approaches its subject matter rather uncritically. Some research focuses on the nature of 
!88
attention-formation in MMOs, but fails to realize any relevance of deeper consequence—it 
fixates on the findings’ relevance to institutionalized educational concerns (see Formsma 2013; 
Fromme and Unger 2012; Khoo 2012). Other research focuses on the question of addiction, 
positing that addiction to MMO-play is related to psycho-social histories, and that it results in 
weakening social relations. But this research only extends its concern to the way in which more 
time in the game takes away from the traditional social investments (see Antonius et al. 2010; 
Beranuy et al. 2013; Herodotou et al. 2012; Yee 2006). Still other research looks at the nature of 
diverse participant motivation and behavior in an MMO, such as what motivates them to stay, 
why and how they participate, and what this means for identity formation (see Cheong and Grey 
2011; Gotterbarn 2013; Kowert et al. 2012; Li et al. 2011; Papastylianou 2013; Steinkuehler and 
Williams 2006). But, as in the other two groups, these researchers limit their conclusions to 
observations of heterogeneity as a phenomenon to be documented and described. Take for 
example what Yee (2007) has called the “Proteus effect” of immersing oneself in an MMO (see 
also Fox et al. 2013). Yee suggests that the creation of an avatar with certain characteristics can 
change the behavior and self-perceptions of the individual. This article and the literature which 
follows in its path often fixate on allegedly positive psycho-social impacts such as empowerment 
through gender selection and increased self-confidence through the creation of a desired 3D body 
(Corneiliussen and Rettberg 2008). All of these approaches assume an uncritical liberal 
relativism towards the subject of their analysis. More importantly, they accept consumer 
technology as playing the part of an uninterested mediator. 
 It remains to be acknowledged that such empowering effects of identifying with an avatar 
still operate in a capitalist economy, where both the technical means of mediation and the 
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program underwriting the avatar-subject identification are both implicated in an exploitative 
business enterprise. Deeper concerns over the nature of the mediation and its effects on the 
popular trends in subject-formation are absented from the discussion. And this absence might be 
explained by the fact that such deeper concerns would question the nature of subjectivity or 
consciousness sustained and promoted by the MMO environment. Because such line of thinking 
would mean asking for a psycho-political discourse on the MMO, it would, in turn, bring up the 
structurally “dangerous” questions on the reality of the “colonization of experience”  by and for 36
commodification and exploitation. In Marcuse’s words: 
Massive socialization begins at home and arrests the development of consciousness and 
conscience. The attainment of autonomy demands conditions in which the repressed 
dimensions of experience can come to life again; their liberation demands repression of 
the heteronomous needs and satisfactions which organize life in this society. The more 
they have become the individual's own needs and satisfactions, the more would their 
repression appear to be an all but fatal deprivation. But precisely by virtue of this fatal 
character, it may create the primary subjective prerequisite for qualitative change—
namely, the redefinition of needs” (2001: 250).  
The discourse with consumer technology is still in its infancy, because technology still remains 
idealized (this is a point I will take up explicitly in Chapter 3); when technology makes a 
showing in public discourse, it is in its sanitized, future-oriented form that distracts away from 
any signs of its present profit-extracting utility, because the capitalist interest is assumed to be 
ever-present and unchanging. The point is not that scholars are prevented from having politics, 
 This is a  phrase Jerry Mander uses for the phenomenon from Four Arguments For The Elimination Of 36
Television (2001).
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but that they do not have them because they, too, are ideologically-constituted subject. In this 
light I would like to ask: what sorts of psycho-social consequences results from game-mechanics’ 
design choices? 
Mechanism of Interpellation in the Context of MMOs 
 Considering the role of ideology in technology-mediated subject-formation can greatly 
deepen the discourse. By recognizing a psycho-social process (that of interpellation), we can turn 
to locating what it is of socially-reproductive mechanisms that consumerization commodifies. 
Interestingly enough even in many instances in which social  theory touches upon the concept of 
technology, the concept is idealized, or in the least, a sense in which the technology exists 
outside of its historical political economy is preserved. But here I am explicitly thinking about 
two instances in popular game studies, which seem to ignore the ideology within which they 
operate. Castranova’s Exodus to the Virtual World (2007) and Bainbridge’s the World of Warcraft 
Civilization (2010) individually attempt to theorize the social future in which socialization is 
wholly transplanted into the digital realm. While Castranova entertained a semblance of critical 
engagement in his earlier work (2005), in this later work, he admits to be engaging in 
“speculative nonfiction” (xi). Bainbridge’s work, on the other hand, does not venture out of 
logical positivism, with the consistent result of attending to arguments which merely read WoW 
as a phenomenon to be read and rationalized as a given. Let us begin from the argument that the 
process of commodification is repressive. Baudrillard (1998) argues that the economy of 
consumption sacrifices the quality of experience, because it derives its symbols from a finite, 
historical culture, and therefore, must recycle its symbols over the course of perpetual circulation 
of production and consumption (24-25). Commodifying reduction is repressive, because it is an 
!91
experience limited to what can be televisually captured, affectively loaded, and then transmitted 
through the medium (see Mander 1976). In this sense the televisual becomes the filter—the 
regular affective participant in the definition of the experience. It is repressive, because that 
which cannot be qualitatively translated into a televisual form from the real experience is either 
cast aside to be forgotten, or, in the more likely scenario, transformed to a reduced form fitting 
the televisual’s, in this case, an MMO’s, operational common denominator—the reduction of 
experience to what can be technologically reproducible (by code and corresponding keystrokes). 
Reproducibility is also a central factor in the tailoring of the MMO experience because of its 
considerable atomic weight in the capitalist economy. Reproducibility normalizes equalization, 
regulation, and horizontalization of experience. It qualifies the folly of reductive mediation, 
which is repressive because it defines the parameters and quality of social relations in the interest 
of (not societal)  capitalist exploitation.  
 As for the capitalist logic, Marcuse (1968), in his conception of surplus repression , adds 37
that this repression acts as a container that enables “thingification” or commodification of human 
activity and the very pieces of object-valorization (see Chapter 4). I think we can find the lasting 
relevance of these speculations in the MMO-play process. For example, if we track the aesthetics 
of the experience of coming to relate to an avatar as a MMO gamer and the course of changes 
and its patterns in the longer course of avatar-development in the World of Warcraft (WoW), 
what we will encounter is a drawn-out, tedious process of habituating the gamer to a specific 
form of commodity-fetishism: fetishizing very small differences in televisually symbolized and 
 Marcuse (1968) differentiates between primary and secondary repression. In the primary instance, repression 37
is unavoidable as it primes the young subject for the process of socialization. In the case of surplus repression, this is 
repression that does not have to exist, but does so for the sake of exploitation in the political economy (81).
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wholly-created value (see also Bergqvist 2013). The repetition and regularity are not limited to 
the game’s beginning and end; all of the interactive features within the MMO environment are 
regulated; they repeat beyond the semblance of their aesthetic forms, which, in turn, fosters 
repetition, which is also repurposed and circulated (see Carroll, 1999; Christou 2013). The MMO 
is a consumer technological response to the need to perpetuate demand-creation. It utilizes the 
“magic” of habituation to create the habits for the fetishizing of small aesthetic differences 
necessary for continued symbolic consumption, and represents an industrial effort to control the 
flow of consumer demand and immersion. 
 It is no surprise that many scholars have picked up on the fact that nationalism, racism, 
and sexism, to point out a few historical violent patterns of social interaction and affectation, are 
reproduced in the MMO environment (Turkle 2002; Dyer-Witherford 2010; Hartmann 2011; 
Jockel et al. 2012). On the surface, an MMO relies on emulating scenarios of popular historical 
experience to create its lasting “consumer interest.” But, because of the essential reductivism of 
(mediative) technology it relies upon, the MMO also replaces and homogenizes, and redirects 
(directs and controls) the quality of the experience.  For this much more complicated task, an 38
MMO operationalizes the psycho-social mechanism of ideology, that is, interpellation. 
Interpellation takes on a more visible form when we realize that projective identification, that is, 
the subjective identification based on an emotional situation, which a person immersed in MMO-
gaming experience involuntarily experiences (Yee 2006; 2008), is also a form of interpellation. 
In fact my claim is that all processes involving the conversion (and  unavoidable reduction) of 
the qualitative by way of signs, symbols, or representations (such as sublimating an affect and 
 What Adorno would call the qualitatively non-identitarian as opposed to “subjectless rationality” or 38
“perpetual sameness” (2005: 41)—the experience which was not yet digested and translated into the digital realm.
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then releasing it through a counter-act) are shapes ideological interpellation takes in the concrete 
experience of a person's subjection. 
 The problem with the existing literature on MMO-experience lies dormant in the 
researchers’ operating assumptions. Whether genocidal, racist or sexist, blatantly entertaining 
any other kind of reactionary violence, they treat fantasy as being harmlessly without 
consequence (maybe even therapeutic). As technology studies continue to wallow in the crevices 
of the consumer economy, the primary consequence is that fantasy-commodification goes 
unexposed in its already ideologically purified form; participating in the game is then merely the 
continuation of the modern streams of consumption (electricity, computer products, software, in-
game objects, subscription, labor economy, domestic economy, gender politics, race and class 
politics, object-relations and scarcity, etc.). But what if the role of consumerizing of desire is to 
(affectively) allow the interpellated person to have a deterritorialized experience of the social—
to get as close to reality as possible without its being the real world of repercussions and 
consequences (Deleuze and Guattari 1972; Savat 2010). Online discussion forums on popular 
computer games are riddled with fitting examples. Most recently I came across a set of 
screenshots of a person playing the latest Grand Theft Auto V game, which this person titled 
“selfies in GTA V” (a selfie is a photo of oneself that a person takes using their cell phone 
camera). In the first screenshot, the player’s avatar is standing by a computer-controlled avatar 
taking a selfie, and in the second screenshot, the player has apparently shot the selfie-taking 
other;  a realm of action without consequence, where one can finally kill that person engaging in 39
the most annoying social taboo. To state it directly, my intention is to explore the connection 
 See the anonymously posted image on the social media site, Imgur: http://i.imgur.com/24mOPlx.jpg39
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between modern consumer capitalism and the dawn of the game-subjects. Considering the MMO 
in the context of ideology and political subjugation is fitting, because the capitalist economy of 
commodity consumption requires not merely efficient and cost-effective production, but 
anticipation, cultivation, and prolonging the demand for its commodities. In fact Forbes 
magazine quoted Larry Summers (one of the chief architects of contemporary capitalist 
economy) as saying that “[the U.S. production] "lacks demand" sufficient enough for consumers 
to drive the economic growth at a faster pace” (Sept. 15, 2013). 
Interpellation and Subject-Formation in World of Warcraft 
World of Warcraft (WoW) has been one of the most popular MMO games in the world 
since its creation in 2003. Additionally, WoW in particular has been the subject of a large body of 
social research as a phenomenon of “new sociality” (see generally Bainbridge 2010; Castranova 
2007; Nardi 2010). But, contrary to popular perception, my contention is that WoW does not 
offer a new world, but instead distorts and reorganizes the already existing, familiar historical-
political reality in order to seduce the attentiveness of the players. In WoW, every gamer is 
simply a neoliberal subject; neoliberalism offers consumerism (that is, choice of commodities) in 
place of qualitatively personal ways to social life, and it relies on a technological apparatus to 
monitor and analyze the worth of individuals. In turn, individuals, now reduced to apolitical 
interpellation of being consumers, find refuge in WoW’s “world,” where the basic neoliberal 
contradiction between structure (that is, predictability) and personal freedom are virtually 
resolved (Houtmann and Aupers 2011). WoW designers deploy a characterology of the capitalist 
subject most briskly captured in the image of the Ayn-Randian hero: a subject that embodies a 
self-interestedness of the most strictly economic nature, whose self-interestedness stands at the 
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nexus of his existential matrix —essentially defining it entirely by its vacuous but ideological 40
gravity (see Dolgov 2014). In fact the only remaining and still-growing section of WoW-related 
literature is solely dedicated to tales of fame and riches gathered in the game, self-help and how-
to guides to accumulating the most loot and turning it into real-world money (see Dibbel 2006). 
If WoW, as an instance of a much-wider MMO paradigm, is viewed as a psycho-
technological apparatus, then, because ideology serves to satisfy the person in their inescapable 
subjugation to the political economy, so can WoW be seen to operate on the level of players’ 
fantasy and desire. How does WoW, as a commodity and an experience of simulation, relate to 
ideology and socialization? What does it mean for critical theory that an ideologically-bound 
subject might enter another sphere of economic performativity (as yet another subject)? Is there a 
social and political importance to this avatar-subject relation?  
In WoW, interpellation performs in the background as the player thinks itself a self-
directed and self-realizing subject. To be a WoW player, one must adopt a digital avatar, 
“hailing” itself as an embodied subject while simultaneously following a projection of “itself” on 
the digital screen. I posit this phenomenon as a second interpellation, because this is (at least 
initially) an intentional effort in the life of the person who already interpellates himself as an 
amalgam of political-economically reconciled subjects. Mirroring the foundations of the first, the 
success of this secondary interpellation rests on the indesctructibility of the avatar’s existence; 
this avatar-subject will always be there, and it does not need to be thought of in order to exist 
(unlike self-consciousness, which is emotionally exhaustive). Furthermore, if a person allows 
 Young-Bruehl (1996) offers a psycho-social theory of the way in which historical trends in neurosis and 40
psychosis correlate with the dominant political economic history.
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himself  to be immersed in an MMO experience, then it fundamentally means he has accepted 41
the terms of the structural mediation. That is, he has accepted to operate within an in-game 
economy of attention. He has also accepted the unquestionable prescription of value-defining 
objective; he has accepted that his in-game time will be more valuable if he puts care into what 
he is doing in the game in every moment. But most importantly, by submitting his attention and 
care to the same mediated experience, he has accepted to build emotional bonds to the televisual 
objects in the experience. As Boellstorff (2008) observes, there is a point at which the player 
begins to orient his choices based on what is best for the game avatar-subject and its in-game 
record, and it is at this moment that secondary interpellation can be seen. This is where self-
consciousness (beyond the limits of the avatar-subject) only gets in the way of performing the 
tasks needed to efficiently keep up with the avatar-subject's needs.  
The operating interpellation begins to surface at the moment that the avatar character 
gains its own integrity.  In this schema, one spends time developing a character; all the players 
one meets know that person solely through and because of this character and its standing in the 
game. Those other players express gratitude (or even merely recognize the player) solely because 
of the status (the achieved in-game level and power), the grandeur, of that character—how 
powerful it is in the game and what it can do to help other players achieve in return; in-game 
sociality boils down to means-ends rationality shared across individual player’s singular 
goals. Since the social activity exists in WoW in a wholly intentional enterprise, only what is 
intentionally communicated is acknowledged and possibly responded to by other game 
participants. What the coding of WoW does not account for simply does not make it to the realm 
 A note on the gendered pronoun: consumer research, and media studies alike, contends that the “hard core” 41
of the global gaming population is made up of 16-35 year old males (Beranuy et al. 2013; Crogan 2011).
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of players’ interaction. Therefore there evolves also a false sense of stability and continuity, 
because the player might have his difficult feelings of reacting to the endless repetition and 
repression all to himself, but others will only interact with his avatar, which communicates its 
own integrity despite the player’s actual feelings.  
In every facet of the in-game experience, a player is behaviorally conditioned to identify 
with the avatar: the longer one plays, the more invested in the character one becomes, partly 
because of the time and effort needed to spend in the game (the avatar becomes an embodied 
virtual record of that inescapability), but partly also because of the small jolts of satisfaction 
gained from surprises of attaining an unanticipated achievement or valuable loot in a post-
skirmish gamble or a new "skill" (see Denegri-Knott and Molesworth 2013). The better one is 
able to technically understand and mechanically act according to his avatar-subject’s place in the 
game economy, the better that one can timely perform the micro-economic actions that will have 
a rewarding result. The game is tailored to fostering this kind of close-attentiveness—the 
production-orientation to the in-game experience can mean spending a lot more time on the less-
desirable “mining” tasks such as gathering ingredients for a craft, or the more likely, never-
ceasing activity of participating in virtual genocide of NPCs to gather more experience (see also 
Alloway and Gilbert 1998). The more the player monitors where he “belongs” at his avatar-
subject’s level, the more that he prioritizes developing the skills “belonging” to his class of 
avatar-subjects, the quicker and stronger the avatar-subject he has invested his efforts into 
becomes.  
Gaining the experience to level up his character takes a lot of time. Over the course of 90 
levels, the amount of time spent gathering experience through repetitive tasks (only differentiated 
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by their aesthetic) grows exponentially to where in the last quarter of the leveling, one is 
spending anywhere from three days to a week’s time accumulating experience (which the gamers 
have appropriately terms “grinding”) (see also Yee 2006; Gamevault 2013). The gameplay is 
surprisingly boring. Hirsh, Mayeda, and McIver (2013) have even noted that the WoW players 
find it to be boring, but they failed to provide a deeper analysis beyond merely offering that the 
boredom stems from social factors, the challenging nature of the game, and its repetition (9). 
Moreover, over the years, hackers (who, interestingly, want to be a part of the MMO play despite 
their digital-technology prowess) have invented modifying software (mods) that can 
automatically perform any one of the myriad of required tasks in the upkeep of the avatar-subject 
(see Trammell 2013). In fact, Blizzard-Activision, paid a record setting €650,000 to a freelance 
programmer (self-described “hacker”) to stop sales of a bot in Germany (Ubergizmo 2013), 
which would allow players to hand over the task of the repetitive actions to a computer program. 
In the words of the article’s author: “Some games like WoW require you to farm and spend many 
hours trying to find specific items that can be sold. It is tedious and boring, so many gamers use 
bots to do it. However, for many games, the use of bots is against the terms of use and companies 
like Blizzard have banned accounts for using bots” (Ubergizmo 2013). Immediately, there are 
contextually related questions: why do WoW players tolerate a boring game? And, why would 
WoW-makers pay such a high price to outlaw the only way for the players to get around the play 
becoming another site of labor?  
It might well be the case that Blizzard-Activision knows that the players tolerate the 
mindless repetition, because of the emotional value of their labor: in their emotional economies, 
work has an affective “atomic” weight—its valorization requires no consciousness to make itself 
!99
meaningful. And it is this mechanism of valorization, which propels the players towards ever 
deeper identification with the avatar-subject the longer that they submit to the in-game regime of 
work. In a world where “cheating” is bought off, the only course of action for a player is that he 
religiously abides by the call of the avatar-subject’s in-game position. The player becomes only 
the supplier of the body, which presses all the right keys in all the right combinations, and goes 
through the motions determined by the game. In such a strict economy of attentiveness, time is 
the central conduit of valorization in the player’s interpellation with the avatar-subject. 
This is where the literature on addiction connects well (a point I will discuss in some 
detail in the next chapter), because the interpellation is strictly habitual, emotional in nature. Put 
rather shortly, developing on Marcuse’s secondary narcissism and repressive desublimation 
arguments (the way they are jointly co-opted by consumer capitalism), secondary interpellation 
commodifies those mechanisms’ repressiveness by channeling it into its own notions of 
productivity.  I contend that this explains why addiction is seen wherever there are users of 
avatar-subjects (see also Cheong 2013). The capture of commodified interpellation is in the 
identification with an object. An object is one-dimensional; an object, in stasis, has no memory, 
no feelings, no depth, no qualities of being a subject. And as long as the emotional fixation is 
sustained, as long as the perspective of the person is fixed, the subject feeds on the fixed assured 
stance of the object-subject, and can thus ignore the shaky foundations of his own subjectivity. In 
this way the subject chooses to ignore the concrete reality, for the always-fleeting object-subject. 
This is at once the allure and the addictive core of the interpellated object(subject): it needs to be 
fed, refreshed and repeated, in order to sustain its ‘life’ in the subject's attention and imagination. 
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 In this fashion, attending to the avatar-subject becomes a job in a virtual economy 
(Castranova 2005; Galloway 2012). In this economy, some players are self-conscious of their 
job-subjecthood (Dibbell 2006)—they mine the most sought-after in-game materials and sell 
them on the in-game market for coins, which they then turn into dollars and euros in secondary 
currency exchange markets (see generally Castranova 2005). Others take the laboring as an 
inescapable given, and approach the in-game economy as any good ideologue would—they 
justify it on its merits as a disciplining mechanism (Bombace 2013). Still others blindly 
reproduce their proletarian subjection by nature of their ongoing position as subjects in the 
economy (Nardi 2010). The diversity of perspectives on the in-game economy goes to 
underscore the way in which the virtual labor supplies the consumer capitalist economy by 
reproducing the players' necessary ideological consciousness as subjects. Obviously, it is the 
game designers and the makers of the games who materially profit from the players' ongoing 
dedication to the game. But, in this equation, the players have to keep each other interested and 
convince themselves that their time is well spent—and that in fact they are having a good time, 
that their time and their attention spent is well worth it (Nardi 2010). This, in turn, guarantees 
that the political economy of class relations is reproduced in the game. Interestingly enough, as 
long as the players act in their interest, they all continue to stay plugged-in; they will accept the 
terms of in-game habituation and continue to pay the monthly fees, which will supply the game 
makers with the present and future profits.  In some cases, most notably in WoW, the game-42
makers will enact “quality control” mechanisms in the game that surveil the players' 
communications for potential dissenting disgruntlement against the game-engine. In a growing 
 I intend to discuss the psychic valorization of labor in Chapter 4.42
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trend, they have hired social scientists to do that research for them. In fact one of the first 
researchers to take on the interactive trends on WoW, Nick Yee, was hired by Blizzard-
Activision, the gaming industry giant which own WoW, in 2010 to continue doing what he had 
done as an academic researcher in the years prior (Yee 2007). WoW, as an exploitative enterprise, 
is cognizant of its interests, and the steps its makers take in sustaining its exploitative rationality 
lead to a feedback mechanism that perpetuates circulation and reproduction under the guise of 
protecting the system's longevity (see generally Pariser 2009). 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATIVE TECHNOLOGY IN THE REIGN OF 
REPRESSIVE INTERPELLATION 
Introduction 
 As Baudrillard puts it, the challenge for consumer techno-capitalism is the exploitation of 
the process of desiring, one of those elemental ways in which ideological unconsciousness of 
social reproduction serves an economic function.  
It is necessary to overcome the ideological understanding of consumption as a process of 
craving and pleasure, as an extended metaphor on the digestive functions—where the 
whole issue is naturalized according to the primary scheme of the oral drive. It is 
necessary to surpass this powerful imaginary preconception in order to define 
consumption not only structurally as a system of exchange and of signs, but strategically 
as a mechanism of power. Now, the question of consumption is not clarified by the 
concept of needs, nor by theories of their qualitative transformation, or their massive 
extension: these phenomena are no more than the characteristic effect, at the individual 
level, of a certain monopolistic productivity, of a totalitarian economy (capitalist or 
socialist) driven to conjuring up leisure, comfort, luxury, etc.; briefly, they are the 
ultimate realization of the private individual as a productive force. The system of needs 
must wring liberty and pleasure from him as so many functional elements of the 
reproduction of the system of production and the relations of power that sanction it. It 
gives rise to these private functions according to the same principle of abstraction and 
radical “alienation” that was formerly (and still today) the case for his labor power. In 
this system, the “liberation” of needs, of consumers, of women, of the young, the body, 
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etc., is always really the mobilization of needs, consumers, the body...it is never an 
explosive liberation, but a controlled emancipation, a mobilization whose end is 
competitive exploitation (Baudrillard 1998: 85, italics in the original). 
The subject position of the person living within the home fortress advanced capital shares in the 
reproduction of the system by being a consumer—a person who would ideologically or 
habitually reproduce himself as always already middle-class-aspiring materialists, who wants 
nothing more than to go through life raising a family, working on a career, and enjoying a drip of 
foretold (recycled) satisfaction. Real life is disappointing for him, in the least bit because of 
finality and temporality, but games are not, and as such, they offer therapeutic-equivalent bursts 
of self-direction and determination (which, in the consumerist matrix, double as a political 
economic institution). Gaming opens up a very interesting way of looking at the global Western 
(psycho-social dimension of) political economy. This is the terrain where capital disciplines 
ideologically despite the possibility of consciousness. It disciplines the libidinal economy by 
manufacturing and prefiguring the objects of its attachment, by appropriating the means for 
object relations. Its approach is figured by its technology: interpellation. The constructed 
amalgam of an avatar-subject serves as a carrier container for the necessary (re)orienting of 
subjectness. 
 Gaming begets its own institutionalizing socialization as ideology-as-an-apparatus draws 
its power from the motion in subject formation. The ideologue is thus tasked with embodying the 
subject as a gamer—someone who confides himself to the limited self-awareness of a gamer 
(always proportionate to maximizing the pleasures within the boundaries of the game). Wark 
(2007) offers a theory of the subject as gamer in Gamer Theory. Wark’s work is politically 
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motivated—to provide a dialectical response to the emergence of the gamer subject. In his book, 
the gamer is a subject who lives his life with a mentality of a gamer—not only does he think of 
himself as a gamer, he treats himself as a gaming character, conceiving of his own ideology in 
terms of a game. Wark offers reflections on how bits and pieces of this understanding are picked 
up along the way of experiencing various video game genres—a first person shooter teaches 
something different than a real-time strategy game. In the end I found that the text lacked a 
systematic, thorough analysis to tie the individual vignettes together under a theory of 
subjectivity under gaming. Fantasy-role playing games in which the player is assigned an avatar 
can be viewed as training grounds for people to internalize the subjects necessary to fit the 
modes of relations under the reigning capital models. In fact there are many instances in popular 
culture where we can see avatarization as training technology. Across the board, such 
consumerist profitability links with the historical experience of computerization in the sense that 
the interaction has been gradually shifting from the directly conscious to the increasingly more 
complex and unconscious. It is in the unconsciousness, in the assumption of the platform’s 
disinterested mediation, in its habituation, that the opportunity for smuggling and exploitation 
emerge.  
 In fact, consumer technology is not a disinterested affair of interfacing (see generally 
Nusselder 2009). Contrary to the popular assumptions (see Cohen and Schmidt 2013), this 
technology cannot pass for a mediator of already-existing needs, because it functions as an 
apparatus of interpellation, which imposes its own standards to be reproduced. In this frame the 
process is not a transhistorical fact of social reproduction, but a specific form of subject 
production in an instance of the historical political economy. In other words there is a psycho-
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social compromise stricken by the consumer society to appease its subjects—which it also 
creates—and it appears to be rather sinister. Operating on a psychic level where basic processes 
of object-relations (those of psychology of valorization) take place, the consumerizing 
interpellation offers an immersive libidinal economy of lack and a complimenting political 
economy of indebtedness (this will be the topic of the last two chapters).   In such a project the 43
populations of the home fronts of global capital are subject to observable ideological exploitation 
of their libidinal lives. Because, after all, the terms of their subjectivity, object relations are social 
in origin, and whoever controls the likely points of origins has some power to predict the likely 
flow and how to exploit its predictability. In this chapter, I intend to break down the notion that 
object-relations are liberalized or deterritorialized as a result of commodification through 
interpellative relations with consumer technology gadgets. I will argue that this specific 
gadgetized deployment of object-relations liberalization leads to desiring lack, a form of 
commodified alienation. 
 One site where this discussion can be said to crystallize in a form of popular culture is the 
short-lived TV show called Video Game High School (VGHS), which was geared to Canadian 
teens, and ran for two seasons in 2009.   The producers of the show could have merely intended 44
to update the familiar high school sitcom format for contemporary “digital native” audiences.  45
But, the show reveals ideological fantasies that help normalize the digital mediative regiment. 
This is what Shaviro (2010) was picking up on in reflecting on the audience engagement with the 
 After all, the generation gamer and the generation liquid-credit are one and the same.43
 “VGHS.” Television show. 2009-2011. Canada.44
 This much the production team says in the documentary released about the making of the show (see The 45
Making of VGHS—Behind the Scenes 2010).
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film Gamer (Chapter 5). In this chapter Shaviro contemplates how the film Gamer captures a 
political critique of consumer technology, particularly the dawn of Second Life and the 
normalization of MMOs as a lifestyle. According to Shaviro, it is the fact that Gamer is a film, 
and not a video game, which allows it to efface a critique of technological mediation, asking 
questions about what kind of a world sits in the background of such deliberate immersion. In the 
future-present VGHS universe, the high school is an elite educational institution. The world in 
which it exists is organized by the popularity of video games so much so that professional video 
game players, who “earn millions,” have long become icons of intramural competition. There is a 
sense in which the ideology of competition justifies and promotes immersion in the many 
mediations in the hallways of the VGHS: it is by total dedication that one gets to win; it is how 
you get to make millions and move up the class chain—all perfectly symbolized by shots of an 
actual scoreboard. No matter the chosen path, competition is a given, and it is unavoidable—you 
are expelled if your overall score falls beneath a certain level.  
 In the introductory scenes of the series’ pilot episode, news television shows have 
become gaming review shows, which merely provide updates about the never-ending 
competition—the anchorman informs the audience of an ongoing first-person-shooter (FPS) 
battle in a generically war-torn Middle-East scenario. In this world the culture seemingly 
whimsically defines the objectives of social-reproductive institutions; the gaming industry runs 
the school, and seems to have directly produced the curricula. Therefore, there is no observable 
contradiction in consumption being readily presented as the only incentive in tolerating 
instruction and examination. Otherwise the Althusserian state or any such social institution does 
not exist (neither does parenthood for that matter). Interestingly enough even in this context 
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transgenerationality shows up as the perspectival difference between adults and teens. The 
parents are represented as either nihilistic and misanthropic, addicted to MMOs (it is implied that 
this is a result of their not being “natives” to the technological regime), or crazed by a lifetime of 
competition. There is no mathematics, no humanities or fine arts courses. The school work is still 
repetitive, but the rewards are immediately social, because good grades is good gaming, which is 
‘cool;’ and when it is not, gaming is still justified with future economic value—the peer-driven 
social justifies the laboring in either case (after all the adults might be watching, and it is obvious 
to the interpellated that games are valuable because they are fun, a point that needs no 
embellishment). From the beginning students are portrayed as totally immersed in various genres 
of gaming (and if they are not, they are identified with characterological goals and personas). 
The various gaming genres seem to naturally correspond to the existing character types of the 
students (which, I presume, the clique-nature of institutionalized education guarantees). The 
geeks are into strategy games, the spastic into fighting and racing, and the ‘cool’ kids, whose 
lives provide the main narrative thrust in the series, are into first person shooters (FPSs).  
 There is more that situating the classic experience of the televisual can tell us about the 
psycho-social and subject-formative economy, especially in the instances when mediation comes 
in the form of multiple gadgets. For example, sitcoms deploy the basic identification by social 
relational familiarity (see Hearn 2010). The guided interpellation keeps audiences away from 
questioning the formulaic repetition situated at the center of the whole apparatus—the fact that 
the world of the sitcom cannot fall apart, those friends have to always be there, and the only 
variables in question are the periodized challenges that are assumed to be resolvable in the 
course of an episode or a few. This is an important point to consider, because of the fact that at 
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the beginning of the 2000s, researchers were dumbfounded by the allegations from the younger 
generations at the time that they were “multitaskers” (see Gu et al. 2010; Mantymki and Riemer 
2014). By the mid 2000s, researchers also realized that what was going by the name of 
successful multitasking was in fact a deriving of pleasure from immersion (see generally Yee 
2006).  
 The extension and folding of audience labor into gaming has already grown into popular 
phenomena observable in internet culture—YouTube has many monetized channels for viewers 
to watch someone else (that is, a professional gamer) play a video game.  The popularity of 46
passive audiencing of gameplay is not surprising. It reflects the continuation of an already 
established interpellation, which in passivity, becomes relaxing as opposed to the immersive 
demands of a game world (see McIlwraith 1998). In watching someone else play a video game, 
the passive interpellation works as a vehicle for auto-stimulation. What is of central importance 
is that the audience experiences this fluidity between the traditionally televisual experience as 
pleasurable in the downtime of one’s own gaming—in those moment when the gamer is perhaps 
cognitively exhausted. In this way labor is can be doubled as simulation, thus replaying as 
satisfaction. I will discuss this concept of auto-stimulation in the following pages. For now, it is 
merely important to define this concept as differentiating between social and psychical 
stimulation, the fact that there is a difference between stimulation in which the thrust of affect 
stems from the external world in contrast to regimes of televisual affectation in which a subject 
participates in stimulating himself by participating in the internalization and identification with 
 On the topic of the YouTube gameplay video economy, academic research is still in its infancy, but I was able 46
to find enough evidence from various internet forums on the topic. For instance, there is a “Reddit AMA” discussion 
on one such person who regularly participates in the monetization of audiences on YouTube from March 4th, 2014 
(see http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1zitdw/im_a_full_time_youtuber_ama/).
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the symbolically represented on-screen stimuli (see generally Mander 2001). Since the game-
playing subject is behind the veil of the avatar, it is easy for the audiencing subject (who is 
otherwise also a gamer) to identify with the gameplay of another. In this way watching the 
gameplay becomes a way of extending the moment in which one is present, passively watching 
oneself continue to partake in a task interpellated as satisfying.  
 There is another confluence that seems to mirror this process, and as such offer us a way 
into the psycho-social construction of audience and gaming mediations. Take for example the 
role of identification in the audience reproducing itself as an audience of a reality-TV 
competition show, and specifically how this process of pleasurable identification is nurtured by 
all the parties involved in the production of the show (see also Alison 2011). Hailing itself as 
‘reality,’ there is a presumption that a social event is being documented (with only slight edits for 
the sake of narrativizing) (see Baudrillard 2011). In reality, the gaze of the viewer is fixed via the 
camera, hence any representation can at best be understandable. Similarly, the competition is 
work not only for the producers and the actors, but also for the audiences. In this instance, the 
audience, the participants, and the production team work together to reproduce a direct link 
between the reigning ideology of competition and that of personal, embodied habits of 
identification and object-relation. In the show, the participants are self-selected as competitors—
each one of them wants to ‘win.’ As such, they are willing to perform themselves knowing that 
their chances of winning not only lie in their trade-skills, but also in their identificatory value as 
actors in a relation with the audience. The audience, then, converts this projective identification 
into libidinal value, that is, being entertained. The question I would like to entertain in this 
chapter is this: can we imagine the effect that occurs when this reality-TV show becomes a 
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regular substitute for socializing for the presumed-to-be-entertained audiences on the home front 
of the gadget-mediated economic relation? In other words, can we think about social 
reproduction more meaningfully as a process resting on subject formation as a technology, and 
what happens when capitalism commodifies its interpersonal and intrapersonal processes across 
subject positions and class? After all, the televisual dampens the violence of exploitation by 
reproducing domination in ideology. In the way that the audience identifies with the competitors 
of a competition show, what is promoted is the formation of the subject away from 
consciousness-encouraging positionality towards stimulating-but-deterritorialized cross-
identification. As such the interpellation that the technology provides applies to persons 
according to the political economic (and psycho-social) positioning of a given subjecthood. 
Technology and Mediation 
In the case of Adorno (1974) and Marcuse (1974), the passivity propagated by televisual 
technology is historically operationalized by a nation-state-bound, industrial capitalism of the 
postwar era. The television is an object of consumer technology that has played a role in shaping 
the phenomenological experience of that political economy, because its televisual mediation 
psychologically and ideologically supported the economically necessary alteration of the 
collective quality of subjectivity (see Marcuse 1964; McLuhan 1970). Similarly for our 
generation, I read the digital “social” media in the way that postwar psychoanalytic and critical 
theory read the emerging consumer culture and the television: as constitutive forces in common 
subject-formation, and ideological collaborators of capitalist power. 
 In contemporary Western society, technology is (mostly) a concept that functions within 
the ideological confines of consumer capitalism. On the surface, technology is the guarantor of 
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increasing efficiency and productivity; it is presumed to be pure, its value only dependent on 
how and by whom it is used. But, as tasked within political economy, technology defines how a 
society reproduces itself, how it guarantees its own perpetuation. It enables the access to 
otherwise uncontrollable realms of private experience for commodification.  In this section, I 
would like to trace a lineage of thinking about technology as a (re)mediative capacity. My goal is 
to overcome the separation of social-economic and psychological treatments of technology, and 
offer an alternative reading of technology that enhances the legibility of the impact of 
consumerization across those realms of experience. 
 Preceding definitions of technology waver between the technology of language, its 
impact on the psychological, and the technology of industry. This lineage originates with Husserl 
and Heidegger. It almost entirely fixates on the phenomenological experience in pursuit of 
‘objective’ knowledge, which means that the immanent political critique is deferred. Evident in 
the political views of mid-century theorists, best represented in my opinion by Arendt’s (1958) 
work, this group held that technology is intimately involved in reproduction of consciousness 
and subjectivity. Arendt’s distinction between labor and activity in the initial chapters of the 
Human Condition has the effect of naturalizing otherwise social and political relations between 
individuals, particularly through the way that Arendt treats the question of industrial technology 
in the molding of the productive social relation. That being said, they presumed a similar 
neutrality of history marked by a certain scientific-stripping of historically residual affect. The 
problematic unintended consequence of this lineage of analysis was that it contributed to the 
commodification-friendly eroding of the human (and its potential politics) in the process (see 
Marcuse 1955; Lyotard 1993; Deleuze and Guattari 2003).  
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 While this lineage has contributed greatly to the modern theory of existential 
phenomenology, the lesson I drew from the authors’ consistent historical limiting of politics is 
this: in a context in which the goal is to do a political analysis of psycho-social trends taken as 
both descriptive and normative, science or philosophy without political considerations becomes 
vulnerable to being solely directed by the dominant economic powers. In other words, a theory 
of technology devoid of most far-fetched political considerations  (its possible repercussions on a 
subject and subjects) is prone to serving the reproduction of the historical economic interests, 
whether those be in service to or against the interest of its subject humanity. What happens to the 
human as it is led through the chronologically overlaid domains of socialization? What is the 
effect of standardization on the nature of subjectivity? What happens in the particular context of 
consumer capitalism when the individual is ever more so systematically contained that he is 
increasingly more predictable and thus controllable? An unpoliticized theory of technology 
cannot offer an answer to any one of these questions, because it views technology as only a tool 
of humanity where humanity is historically relative, but essentially unchanging. In the sense I 
would like to use it, technology is a mediation, which means that it enables the manipulation of 
historically inaccessible (psychological and social) processes. Unlike the mediation by the 
human body (that is, the fact that the body is also a mediator between the person as self-
constituted and the world), gadgetized mediation is between the person and the structures of the 
political economy. 
 More specifically, technology enables economic redirection of ideological processes. 
Technology can serve the consumer capitalist political economy by manipulating already-
existing historical processes toward extraction of value-creative substance from individual 
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consumers. There is an immediate political consequence to the fact that consumer capitalism 
utilizes technology to ‘befriend’ psycho-social processes (meant for social-reproduction) towards 
furthering its need for deepening consumption. How we decide to frame this psychology of 
ideology has deeply political consequences: the extent of the “engineering of consent,” the 
possibility of the technological co-optation of socialization, or the mere prospect of individual 
autonomy. Ideology, conceived as a mitigating apparatus procuring continual (re)production of 
subject-position, opens up to a notion of the political in the psycho-social and psychologically-
constitutive dimension. This notion of the political is necessary to distinguish between 
socialization and commodification within the reign of a capitalist political economy—a point 
meant to clarify the stakes in social scientific research on ludocapitalism. 
 The psycho-social dimensions of experience of gameplay involves an avatar-subject 
relation. This fact needs to be treated in light of the fact that the gameplay experience also exists 
within a business indebted both to digital technological development and commodification. 
Video games are a means for vulgar profit-extraction under consumer capitalism as well as 
ideological-subject (and ways of commodity-desiring) reproduction under techno-liberalism. As 
extractive apparati video games appropriate social laboring from traditional socialization, and 
commodify the social in an effort to fight against the tendency of their profitability to fall (cf. 
Sweezy 1942).  I am going to suggest that video games (and interactive digital mediation writ 47
more broadly) enable the commodification of psycho-sociality: the modification of object 
relations through new technologies for habit-formation of ‘prosumptive’ or self-commodifying 
and predictably consumptive behavior.  
 Here I was struck by a parallel between Sweezey’s falling rate of profit theory and the fact that gaming 47
companies cannot justify pricing an expansion the way they would a brand new game.
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 These are two psycho-social concepts, which I use to capture the psychological realm 
over which gaming commodification takes place. As primarily discussed in Chapter One, object 
relations as a concept and theory originates in the British school of psychoanalysis with the work 
of Klein (1975; 1984) and Bion (1963; 1970), who posited that a person develops emotional 
relations with internalized representations of real (both emotionally real and concrete) objects. 
The person proceeds to then construct a sense of being in the world through relating to those 
objects, and relating to the world through those mental relations to idealized objects.  
 Habituation, on the other hand, signals to a more ‘Pavlovian,’ basic psychological 
process. With habituation, I mean to draw attention to the oldest psycho-technology of habit-
formation by repetition, and its ‘atomic-weight’ in terms of desire/affect intensity (see Hartmann 
and Vorderer 2012). Throughout the chapter I use these concepts as coordinates to locate the 
commodification of social relations in terms of securing future (habitual) consumption-
orientation at the point of contact between the way in which the makers decide to prolong the 
players’ immersion in the game and the how that affects the already existing psycho-social 
structures they mobilize for their cause. In other words, I am interested in focusing on the 
tightening effect of this televisual commodification: with the decrease in obvious means of 
profiting, I argue capital has crystallized gaming as an emerging means of exploiting the ways in 
which persons relate to objects in their lives—a process that goes by different names, but is 
generally distinguished as belonging to the realm of ideology (that is, the story people tell 
themselves in order to tolerate the world they have to live in) or socialization (how they are 
trained to reproduce the social). Thus, a video game is an instance of a particular model of 
interpellation for consumption; it is only one aspect of a much larger structural trend in consumer 
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capitalism in which televisual mediation and its technical interactivity take center stage in the 
perpetuation of the consumer-side of the global political economy. 
 In other words, we can uncover a common ground in which no matter what the intended 
dimension of experience (whether that be social or psychological) or the direction or intent of 
mediation (exploitation or cultivation), we can treat technology as that which enables a particular 
(ideologically-constituted, productive) syncing of the subjective with the economic structures of 
social production and reproduction. In this sense, technology is not uninterested; it is intimately 
interconnected with the processes of the dominant historical political economy whether or not its 
interconnection (and dependency) are conscious. In other words, we need to look at technology 
as a tool for manipulation and psychological molding in a way that acknowledges that education 
and socialization are both forms of social technology for reproduction and direction of human 
development towards fulfilling the needs of a given historical society (cf. Marx 1970; Riesman 
2001; Reich 1983). 
Interpellation as Mediative Technology 
 Consumer technology is generally celebrated as the harbinger of a “new digital age,” 
promising a new historical era of efficiency of information collection and dissemination, ease, 
and connectivity. While technology is celebrated as heralding a new age of peace and 
cooperation (see Schmidt and Cohen 2013; Castranova 2007), only when young persons’ 
interaction with the consumer-disseminated technology is placed in focus does the discourse 
recognize contradictions between consumer-technological-mediation and psycho-sociality. When 
addressing adolescents and their ‘problematic’ relationship with sociality and attention, video 
games are talked about as creating regimes of addiction, transforming what it means to be and 
!116
interact socially—to be socialized as a consumer who thinks only towards how to best consume. 
In other words, it is only in the particular case of the adolescent that a semblance of critical 
engagement with gadgetized mediation receives a spotlight in popular discourses on the topic. 
 Socialization also always plays a central role in the reproduction of the adolescent in the 
political economy. That much is not contested. What I argue is that the method of reproduction, 
particularly those identifiable social-relational or psycho-structural processes (that coalesce into 
identification, sublimation, and interpellation) offer a point where we can observe the various 
social and economic systems reproducing themselves around the same point that the social and 
historical institutions are also reproducing themselves. And all of it turns around the fate of the 
subject already formed and perpetually being (re)formed. In this present instance, consumerizing 
takes away even more from the self-determination realizable under the pre-digital historical 
sociality, because it competes with the historically existing (residual) social reproductive 
institution. Because, even though the mechanisms of social reproduction on their own have no 
preference for the quality for the person either—since they are not living things but structures, 
concretizations, regularizations by way of transgenerational transmission of repetition and 
object-relation—nonetheless they coalesce around the idea of sociality, intersubjectivity, and 
interdependent self-conception.  
 Mediative technology and its consumer cultural appropriation of historically existing 
ideology enable game-makers to appropriate processes of incorporation and standardization that 
would otherwise have fallen under the banner of socialization. What gaming accesses in order to 
create gamer motivation is not a borrowing, but in fact a transformation of the historical 
structures of psycho-social institutionalization (see generally Stiegler 2010). The consumer 
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apparatus does not fill in a vacuum. Its recipe for fueling the cathectic costs of attention-capture 
rests on already structured psychical territory—one in which ideology, that is, the colonized 
interiority  or the socialized self, functions to (re)territorialize a person’s existential capacity to 48
the given historical political economy. The language of territorialization harkens back to Deleuze 
and Guattari, where in Anti-Oedipus (1983) they argued that capitalism “liberates” affect from its 
carrier-object, meaning that the function of object-relations as cultivated in the bourgeois family 
are lifted from this original context and transcribed onto the capitalist political economic 
dominion (99-104). The game-engine has to qualitatively replace ways of being in the world, 
which can only be achieved if the game-makers tune their in-game designs to the qualitative 
standards to which the person, who already thinks of himself as some political economic 
amalgam of a subject, is already accustomed. In other words, it is not enough that the MMO 
succeeds in accounting for the potential desires of motion and expression, the game-engine also 
has to make sure that the participant’s agency is simulated in proportion to how he might value 
his agency in his wider historical political economic subjecthood. 
 Interpellation is what enables this exploitation. It is the source of surplus (discussed in the 
following two chapters), which by its transience, defines profit and capital after the fact (see 
Kordela 2012).  Treated as such, we have to address the fact that in gaming the motivation is 49
much more complicated than just a matter of attention cultivation or negative dissociation, 
because the mechanism of surplus-extraction performs its functions on the back of interpellation, 
 Contemporary critical theory offers critiques of consumer capitalism through this concept of interiority (see 48
Binkley 2011), which interestingly enough, refuses to acknowledge the construction of subjecthood or that of the 
structures of ideology.
 Kordela (2012) discusses the power of surplus to act as a semiological locator of capitalist extraction—it 49
defines the territory.
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the process of the person effectively losing self-consciousness. After all, why does one play 
video games? What motivates a person to identify as a gamer? The question of motivation brings 
up the question of social environment (habitus, and thus socialization). But even deeper than 
that, motivation raises the question of the libidinal/psycho-social economy existing beneath the 
surface. The televisual regime historically amounted to unconsciousness of affective 
reproduction of already existing political economic subject positionalities. In the next section I 
will explain this further. The way the consumer culture has normalized and extended the 
mediation through consumer-grade gadgets gives rise to the possibility that the once opaque 
processes such as interpellation, believed to be beyond manipulation of class relations , have in 50
fact become tools of reproducing regimes of commodification. 
 I want to focus on the terms of auto-stimulation that come to rise as the dominant form of 
object relations because of the establishment of televisual mediation (as the mode of subject/
object-relation production). In Chapter Two I argued that when the theory of interpellation can be 
productively applied to the metropolitan adolescent focused study of gaming—that gaming 
incorporates young people’s attention and investment by offering small gusts of psycho-social 
satisfaction, via technological capture of psychological processes of interpellation. By the end of 
this chapter, I will argue that the commodification-orientation in the production of the mediation 
gadget technology (what I call its technicity) is repressive in character (see Marcuse 1964). The 
televisual is a political economic technology (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002; Stiegler 2010). I 
want to look at the grounds of its technicity, that is, its relationship to the subject and how that is 
mediated via the technical organization of the medium. My sense is that what is political about 
 This I mean in the sense that both psychoanalytic and phenomenological traditions (Lacan and Heidegger’s 50
students) found it important to center the place of interjection somewhere else besides the political.
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the technicity of the televisual can come into focus by connecting the ideological to the psycho-
social.  
 The concrete gadget mediates the relation between a person and his construction of 
subjectivity on the screen. As a mediator, the gadget directs and shapes the relation. And as a 
commodity within the circuits of consumer capitalism, the gadget comes to secure the 
commodification and profitability in the process of representation. Interpellation is reduced when 
mediated by gadgets. And it is this reduction of ideology, which I will argue in the final section 
of this chapter that is the domain of affective auto-stimulation. Then, repressive interpellation is 
the technological redirection of what had passed as ideology and its subject formative role to 
create consumer socialization for the purpose of socializing consumer subjectivity. Its repressive 
character stems from its reduction of iconographic identification with social authority (as 
traditional interpellation) in the process of commodification: reducing consciousness to attention 
for immersion and other-directed attention-formation, and reducing satisfaction to bodily-
affected sensation. 
 The digital-apparatus provides the necessary technology of mediation for the kind of 
consumer interpellation (read: the form of contemporary socialization primary to the global 
West) cultivated in gaming. This apparatus works in concert with gaming’s deployment of a 
psycho-social technology of enabling the modification of behavior towards industrial ends. Take 
for example the basics of televisual mediation and the reduction of experience in the process of 
qualitative translation: when a computer-mediated MMO acts as a mediator for socializing 
experience, no matter how advanced, its mediation rests on a reductive platform. This medium is 
engineered, and in order to successfully account for social desires, it has to map out potential 
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desired activities onto its own medium. If a person wants to run in a virtual forest set in WoW, he 
thinks of his desire to run, visualizes it (already within the existing game-space), but then uses 
the assigned keys on his computer keyboard to make the action happen on the monitor’s screen. 
This mapping-out defines the initial commodification of player’s fantasies by the game-engine. 
The more activities that the game-engine can account for, the more likely it is that the player will 
continue to invest his time and effort into the game, the better the outcome for the goal of 
deepening the interpellating dynamic between the player and the avatar-subject, which will 
translate in continual subscriptions and continued reproduction of secondary markets (auction 
websites, in-game currency exchanges, and game-related forums). 
 Gaming needs to be an indispensable site of analysis of contemporary capitalism, because 
it relies on the historically existing social valuation mechanism employed by the rest of 
consumer capitalism. These mechanisms tie the personal to the political economy. The MMO 
game’s structuring of experience abides by an internal (ideological) logic, which means that even 
though gaming is supposed to be a readily available escape from reality, it nonetheless must 
reproduce the ways one valorizes his experiences in the existing political economy (see also 
Chapter Four): the person has to keep his finger on the arrow-key for as long as he wants to see 
his avatar running (or it might be the case that he has to hold down a combination of keys in 
order to make this action happen on the screen)—there has to be a realistic correlation between 
time and action. In this way the MMO mechanism of incorporation exploits the already existing 
psychological value of labor in order to create its televisual and identificatory impetus for 
participant-immersion.  The modification works beneath consciousness, and molds agency to get 
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the desired result: getting the subject to act predictably, in sync with the needs of the larger 
system of consumption (cf. Baudrillard 1998).  
 In the final section of this chapter I would like to talk about the affective terms of 
repressive interpellation in the context of gaming. 
Repressive Interpellation and Affective Control 
“I think that what we’ll look back on now in Second Life will have been the beginning of 
a proof…that…Things are real because they're there with us, and we believe in them…
and if they’re simulated on a digital computer versus sort of simulated by atoms and 
molecules, it doesn’t make any difference to us.” (A quote from the founder of 
Lindenlabs, the company behind Second Life, Shroeder 2009) 
 Blizzard-Activision, the company behind the World of Warcraft (WoW), has periodically 
released expansion packs that add new content to the original game. These expansions represent 
the company’s attempt to extend the game's profitability, which often means incorporating more 
of the historically existing popular culture into its game content (Pressnell 2013). The first of the 
two expansions to WoW in 2013 featured the addition of a new in-game territory called Pandaria, 
which introduced playable panda-like character-types.  These avatar types embody all Western 51
stereotypes of the ‘Oriental’ or the ‘Asiatic’—Pandarians practice Kung-Fu, engage in Chi- and 
Tao-speak, and wear Kimonos. This content expansion marks only the surface, the visual bits, of 
the larger campaign to prolong the players’ immersive play. The marketing move represents a 
popular trend in the way the gaming industry approaches the endless need for commodification 
 There were two expansions to the game in the 2013, which for Blizzard-Activision is historically an 51
unprecedented move. The change-up of the content release comes at a time of record subscription losses (Makuch 
2013).
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of satisfaction in the digital consumer economy. It is an example of contemporary capitalist 
reflex: subjects-as-players-as-consumers need to propel the sustainment of social and psycho-
social relations that reproduce the circulation of consumption by perpetually identifying with the 
chosen relics of the real in the virtual.  
 The motivation is what gets a person to identify with an objectified and idealized subject. 
And the contents of this motivation is that which offers ideological satisfaction (even if it is 
ultimately Pavlovian, that is, affective, in nature). I contend that the satisfaction is strictly 
ideological, because of the nature of televisual (re)presentation and simulation. The 
consumerizing interpellative mechanism, observed as functioning in the player-avatar relation in 
an MMO, reappropriates an already existing psycho-social mechanism of valorization. The 
MMO’s immersiveness depends on its technology of valuation, and whether it is comparable in 
effect to its psycho-social predecessors’ (that is the television, the radio, or the printed text’s) 
accomplishments in alienation, commodification, and recirculation (cf. Nusselder 2009). The 
MMO affectively (qualitatively) replaces the original fantasy (which is most likely a familially 
internalized one), offering its own objectified and reproducible version. Commodified 
interpellation works by employing the socialized desire for satisfaction to create the motivation 
for the continuation of engagement in the process consumption, which, after a period of initial 
runs, comes to be seen as a structure of production on its own to warrant being called productive 
consumption or “prosumption.” 
 From one perspective, immersive gaming in MMOs invites a praxis of fetishizing small 
aesthetic differences. For Fromm (1994) and Marcuse (1964) respectively, first commodity 
fetishism, and then fetishism of small difference, is a symptom of a person’s internalization of 
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the reigns of commodification. Both of these authors think that the foreclosure of self-determined 
qualitative definition of social experience is met by such a praxis. The game-expansions mirror 
the economic necessity of the game-engine to perpetually keep the player working, or “leveling 
up” in game-speak. The game accomplishes this by creating sustained interest whether through 
strength of televisual affect or what comes of habituation. On the level of the gamer’s 
experience, the change in content interjects where a player is most likely to begin losing interest 
in the game. Gaming culture research points out that the areas where players begin to lose 
interest are the ones that are turned into spaces of domesticity in the virtual world such as the 
unchanging spawning pools, the market places, the look-and-feel of the interface. In all these 
instances it is the aesthetics of the game that always need a new facelift (see Horodotou 2012; 
Kirby, Jones and Copello 2013; Snodgras et. al 2013). This proposal also fits the (re)marketing 
models of many other successful gaming industry ventures such as the WoW predecessor 
Everquest, and Grand Theft Auto. In the latter’s case, there have been fifteen expansions since 
the original release of the game title. And while the game-engine has remained virtually the 
same, it is the expansion of the in-game catalogue of objects ready for manipulation that has 
justified calling each new expansion a new game in the eyes of the players. 
 Newness thus becomes a commodity in this market, because in the course of the game-
play, as a player is surely desensitized to the encounters with in-game objects, scenarios and 
environments, a player’s attention is slowly shifted to tracking the small aesthetic variations in 
environments and characters. The affecting begins with the noticeable changes in the aesthetic 
refinement of one’s own avatar. On the lower levels of the gameplay, the colors of the items (or 
gear) accessible to the avatar-subject are more crudely textured, less colorful, and lacking in 
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refined detail. Substantively within the in-game economy these items are less valuable (both in 
terms of the in-game experience and the in-game marketplace). And, they are not “cool” looking, 
as in, the gear does not recall a strong cultural attachment (Boellstroff 2010). In contrast, on the 
higher levels, the players can acquire items for their avatar-subjects that make it look stronger 
(for example, bulkier gear with flames and spikes—in fact much of the aesthetic-progression is 
attuned to pop-culture identifications), and add to the avatar-subjects’ abilities and in-game 
attributes such as strength and agility. 
 Repressive interpellation offers a regiment of affective satisfaction, which ties subject 
formation to enjoyment (cf. Aurel and Griffiths 2013). The player is satisfied by interpellating 
the feelings corresponding to what would culturally valorize the time and attention. He reacts 
pleasurably to the minute changes interspersed in a landscape of repetitive (boring!) labor. As a 
player continues to invest his time and attention into gathering the experience necessary to reach 
higher levels, the game-engine rewards his effort by unlocking more enticing gear for his avatar-
subject. The actual avatar never changes (he is forever young), but the aesthetics attached on it 
change in microscopically noticeably ways, which in the process prolong the immersive 
affecting. A player becomes increasingly accustomed to anticipating the planned aesthetic 
changes, and relies on that projection to mobilize his in-game work (see Snodgras 2013; Xu, Ofir 
and Yufei 2013; Yee 2006). What is important to note is that the game-engine does not reward 
the player for working and leveling up by giving him the items so desired. No, as an ideological 
consumer apparatus, it only enables the player to buy these items by giving him access to the 
sources of experience and coins, which he can accumulate through his in-game labor anew. In 
this way the player enacts his own avatar-aestheticization, and that gratification distracts him 
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away from the reality that the endless repetition of the same basic gameplay hides covered by the 
false awakening of cosmetic changes. 
 Interpellation is an especially important process for the reproduction of the political 
economy in the postcolonial metropols, because capitalism mitigates the problem of the falling 
rate of profit with increasing reliance on mediative technologies to guarantee re-consumption (or 
“prosumption”). And in contemporary society, we see how interpellation technology makes sense 
as playing a role in the reproduction of the necessary subject of a consumer society, that of the 
most suitable consumer—the one who self-commodifies, and nulls himself with televisually 
triggered auto-stimulation. Platforming mediation is about reproducing the consumer: the person, 
who will seek consumption, internalize its real historical regime, and reproduce by his regiment 
of self-valorizing—in this particular case, by accepting to play in fantasy according to the 
political economy of consumption (within the totality of the reigning order). Fantasy is 
traditionally the realm of the unsublimated or the ‘return of the repressed,’ but as such it is 
already the realm of ideology. In classical theory, ideological apparatuses serve the function of 
reproducing the relations of domination. And if gaming has a function in the political economy 
of consumer capitalism, it is an ideological function. Interpellation is a technology of political 
economic socialization, the reproduction of historically necessary subjects. In the consumer 
society, repressive interpellation enables the profit-extracting to continue by recapture of 
otherwise irrelevant social relational processes. Video games cannot supply the physical 
component of an experience of touch, sight, and sound beyond the scope of its gadgets. Instead 
they have to rely on feeling and affect. First, the affect hails in the subject that this is the feeling 
(through televisual location and interpellation). And then the person embodyingly reproduces 
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stress or relief (at the prospect or because of lacking anticipated actions). The consumer 
commodity wins just by repetition potential. 
 There is yet another way of talking about the difference between affect as traditionally 
conceived and the televisually generated affect that interpellates a person into gaming 
satisfaction. Originating within confines of the global order of capitalist accumulation, gaming is 
indebted to the historical “amusement” industry (see generally Brown 1996).  I believe in that 
containment is the limit of the utopian capacity of gaming (Castranova 2006). Proponents of the 
gaming culture dismiss critique on the grounds that gaming is caught in the parallel contradiction 
of postindustrial bourgeois subjectivity—it offers a bit of gambling and a little role-playing of 
the historically material political economy. But, the truth of the matter is that rewards in a game 
are nothing like sweepstakes and gambling in real life. The whole endeavor is set up within a 
predictable framework. Therefore, beyond the chance desublimation, rewards have a repressive 
function, a regulative function in the game of libidinal economization. It is this systemic 
accounting that I want to take up seriously.  
 From gambling studies one conclusion is that the risk fulfills an existential yearning (see 
Auer and Griffiths 2013). Each one of the extractions is not comprehensive on its own. This is 
why a subject can remain socially-recognizable as a historical subject; he is not fragmented 
absolutely, but aspects of his self-awareness are traded-in for bits of ideological satisfaction in 
consumptive exchanges. Such a control of interpellation by means of mediation allows the 
creation and proliferation of compatible and complicit libidinal economies to sustain and 
perpetuate the existing political economy, which effectively neutralize the possibility of 
diverging (pre)consciousness (see Chapter Five).  
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 Losing oneself is not new, but it has been commodified and accounted for in the 
reproduction of consumer political economy. In relating with the gadget in front of him, one 
ceases to be able to notice the world around him. This is not a good or bad determinant. I am 
very much sympathetic towards the reading of games as allowing people even if only momentary 
escape from reality, a soothing libidinal compromise. But that's not what is going on here in these 
games. This withdrawal (looking into one's own lap) is ultimately political. To put it another 
way, the subject, cultivated as a nomad, craves non-presence—a desire for immersion and loss of 
consciousness. I decided to stick with the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari even though the 
way I am deploying “nomadism” is not in line with their speculation on the future of capitalism 
(see Deleuze and Guattari 1986). While Deleuze and Guattari view nomadism as a liberation, a 
kind of postmodern anarchism, I am treating their once-liberatory deterritorialization as only 
that, a divorcing from any single territory or referent-loyalty. In fact the nomad subject is not 
interested in liberation; he is a gambler, dependent on the system of reproduction for the 
instances of auto-stimulation that comfort by repetition. 
 Video games are there to provide emotional and affective stabilization by a 
predetermined reasoning, where all roads lead to predictability and affective responsiveness. 
There is an immersive effect of what happens when the gratifying points of repressive 
interpellation of each intersect or overlap with another. It leads to experience of non-presence of 
subjecthood, a deliberate de-conscious-ing comparable in libidinal economic weight with that of 
subjectivity (weight based on libidinal affective value). Gaming historically begins from 
gambling theorists in the amusement industry (see generally Ashton 1988), tied to their 
ideological preoccupation and participatory creation of exploitative immersiveness. And it seems 
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that gaming fulfills its historical ideological role through its capacity for reproducing immersion: 
gaming perpetuates domination by creating the means for subjectification at the cost of self-
determination. After all, to perpetuate itself, capitalism must recycle itself. And it does this 
around the reproduction of the secondary-narcissistic ego, which is too bound to the dominant 
regime of valorization—the people of the home front metropolis give up self-determination on 
the level of mimesis, simulation, and reduction, in exchange for the "gambler's high.” The 
traditionally social is denied as no longer stimulating enough to keep up the dynamo of the 
psyche at the same time that the people living on the home front have been relegated to the role 
of ideological, semiological, and affective reproduction of capitalism. 
 The fact that players become addicted to the game is a mark of the constructs’ power to 
(re)train persons to identify with its structural order and libidinal economy (see Schull 2012). 
The gambler, the most widely deployed persona of addiction studies (King, Ejova and Delfabbro 
2012) is marked by a nomadic desire of “returning” to a time before alienation from repetition. 
In fact, chance is an example of the regularizing effect of commodification in digital: digital luck 
is algorithmized, and people still perceive it as random, fulfilling their gambler's high. But in fact 
it is predicated on profitability. A desire to return to a timelessness, a loss of consciousness, is 
also a time of singularity and losing oneself in the play (Russell 2008). This is a desire that gets 
kindled by mimesis as well as repetition. 
 Repetition libidinally offers a way to get lost in the repetitive task, to lose sense of time. 
In this sense repetition is a key psycho-technological tool. It plays a significant role in the 
desirability of the gameplay. Often, the question emerges as to why players continue to play 
when the gameplay is so repetitive (see generally Czerny, Koenig and Turner 2008; King, Ejova 
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and Delfabbro 2012), but this question overlooks the possibility that the repetition itself is part of 
the libidinal economy at play. Repetition and libidinal satisfaction are tied in commodification, 
as commodification territorializes conception and libidinally loads it (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 
1983; Lyotard 1993). Because affect overtakes consciousness by the level of its immersiveness 
(see Massumi 2002), it signals a retreat from consciousness, which is enabled through 
interpellation (which allows the syncronization of libidinal to symbolic via televisual, resulting 
in auto-stimulation). 
 Reduction of consciousness to (anticipatory) reaction formation is the goal of gaming as 
sought after by the ideological subjects seeking entertainment. Gamification turns the body into a 
vessel, within an ideology of timeless repetition. And because it works within a system of 
problem solutions, it deploys rationality, attention (the will!) without consciousness. Awareness 
of gameplay as gameplay ultimately does not benefit the gamer in his attempt to find a way to 
game the game. It satisfies in micro-transactions which never allow for a constitutive 
regathering, thus sidestepping the critical consciousness potential in every consumer (see 
generally van Drumpt 2013). The historical content of non-presence (under the sign of the goal 
of the political economy for the consumer subject) results in the reduction of consciousness to 
moment-based interpretation of symbols into affect. Immersion into games can be alternatively 
viewed as a translocation of consciousness. In gaming it is the content for which the player is 
paying. He is paying to ideologically substitute for his political economic quality of life; he is 
paying not to be there in the real world. 
 Political economic reproduction comes with an ideological component, the habit formed 
libidinal cathexitation (momentary territorialization), which makes self-conscious response 
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impossible to arise. This technological relation does not allow people to attain more autonomous 
or self-serving agency, but instead fragments experience, and attempts to sell ways around the 
terms of in-game reality principle back to the player. In gaming, there is a political economic 
capture of subject (re)formation that takes place between the following two affective states: auto-
stimulation and loss of consciousness. Repetition creates a regiment of auto-stimulation by 
promoting identificatory immersion, which satisfies by creating timeless (transcendent) egoism. 
It is here that a politics and economy of presence (that is, self-consciousness) emerges. The 
problem arises when auto-stimulation (as affective-preoccupation and immersion into non-
presence) becomes habituated and normalized to be sought after in the course of the everyday. It 
leads to something other than political subjectivity because it is privatizing and individualizing. 
Ideology and products of the ideal and unreal do not pleasure or satisfy. Instead they invite auto-
stimulation, which is the loss of awareness of subjectivity amidst repetition. On the level of the 
state and such social structures, only meaningful time is that of habit-formation, because social 
control is realized when the originally occurring is tricked into replaying itself within the 
exploitative confines (controlled environment). As far as social research has been able to 
catalogue, what the repetition engine captures is the desire to grow (to change, to surprise oneself 
with new bouts of subjectivity), which is the auto-stimulation pleasure that arises from the 
experience of thriving—this is something that video games in their gameness simulate. But, as it 
is only a simulation, gamers are enslaved to reproduce conditions, motions, stats, which will 
trigger the stimulation.  
 In the next chapter I will turn to the political economy of in-game laboring. I will be 
looking at the in-game mediated relation from the perspective of the labor theory of value. Doing 
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so will enable me to draw out the distinction between the traditional notion of labor and what is 
going on in-game for a gamer. I will argue that repressive interpellation points to a different 
version of immaterial labor that does not align well with the existing theoretical concepts. The 
notion of surplus will enable me to make that differentiation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE REPRESSIVE INTERPELLATIVE APPARATUS, LABOR AND 
ADOLESCENT GAMING 
Introduction 
 At the dawn of the culture industry consolidating fascist tendencies in capitalism with the 
dominant postwar ideology, critical social theorists argued that the future value of 
commodification was already consumed in the present, and particularly that this was of most 
consequence to the fate of bourgeois subjectivity (see Adorno 1974; Marcuse 1972). But what 
exactly has been the lasting effect of the culture industry on how we think of labor in 
postindustrial society? In the preceding chapters, my goal has been to elaborate a theoretical 
perspective capable of reading video games, and more generally televisual technology, as playing 
a structural role in social reproduction (this is necessary for the political economy domestic to 
the global North). This chapter is dedicated to situating the primary questions of my project in 
terms of the general categories of political economy. My focus has been on what can be called 
the social technologies of transgenerational reproduction and subject-formation. In this chapter I 
want to situate that discussion in the context of consumer capitalism as a way to position the 
metropolitan adolescent as a historical instance of subjectivity in relation to a particular global 
capitalist class, and its encapsulating structures of commodifying social relations, subject-
formation, and object relations. 
 This argument will begin from the grounds that commodification moves to exploit 
ideology and object relations. I will present the instance of video game playing that doubles as a 
site of directly economic labor to isolate valorization as the basic process in the psychology of 
labor and play. In the later sections of the chapter I will argue that interpellation once again 
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appears as an explanatory category, and enables us to identify self-investment in interpellation as 
a developing form of labor, with its corollary of interpellation-engendered surplus (the topic of 
the next chapter). 
Beginning in Commodification… 
 Consumer capitalism (and its complimentary, the consumer society) offers a specific 
instance of the expansive search for commodification; globalization of capital leads to 
consolidation and reclassification of the domestic political economy of the home base of capital 
(that is, what I will simply call the metropole). Since the perpetual search for profits is tied to the 
history of the deterritorialization of labor (beginning with de-nationalization) (see Harvey 2010). 
In other words, when the industries of mass production left the shores of the United States, the 
increasing primary role of the imperial domestic political economy and its subject population 
became reproducing the most-widely-employable ideology and most stable consumption (see 
Molesworth 2009). When the globe is mapped, commodification retraces to move inward 
(Sloterdjik 2013); ideology becomes a more pronounced, more vulgar presence in the political 
economy; it is further commodified even though it always exists in the organized structure of 
social relations, historical culture, identificatory inheritance, and other second natures. The more 
the system succeeds in perpetuating itself, the more one group is tasked with consuming and 
producing perpetual consumptive orientation to sociality, while others are relegated to the task of 
reproducing the means for the continual gadgetized mediation and commodity-fetishism. 
 In the context of the capitalist historical complicity, the home base populations and their 
ideology of the middle class consumerism have a special role in the political economy. After all, 
the ideological promise imbedded in middle class ideology is the same as that of consumer 
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ideology; in Marcuse’s words, consumerism allows for repressive desublimation, the reconciled 
(denatured) satisfaction under the reign of class society, at the expense of fulfilling the 
technological capacity to create human autonomy and self-determination (Marcuse 1964; 
Baudrillard 1998). Marcuse’s theory of repressive desublimation comes from his critique of 
Freud’s theory of repression, where Marcuse argues that Freud does not apply the same primary/
secondary leveling to his theory of sublimation—i.e. that sublimation also has a primary and 
secondary instantiation (see Marcuse 1964). Secondary sublimation is the sublimation 
undertaken over the course of the everyday, in the process of moving between new and old 
internal objects. Repressive desublimation is the shape secondary desublimation takes in the 
consumer society; it is the desublimation on the way to releasing the regulatively internalized 
commercial affects that the cycle completes itself and the subject returns the surplus into 
circulation at the same time that he returns to the well for another go. This is the realm of 
televisual “culture” and video games. They represent an effort at political economic 
consolidation that also serves as a dialectical solution to the problem at the center of the liberal 
capitalist order—that of (re)creating agency for citizenry on the home front without giving rise to 
the sensibility for autonomy and self-determination.  
 Baudrillard (1998) argues that the economy of consumption sacrifices the quality of 
experience, because it derives its symbols from a finite, historical culture, and therefore, can only 
recycle its symbols. In other words, it matters that conception happens in a commodified 
environment, because from that point onward the commodification means that the drive/
directive/energy can be directed, manipulated towards attachment to control symbols, or symbols 
already floating in greater political economy. Adorno and Horkheimer (1945) argue that this 
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process, which defines the parameters and quality of social relations, is a repressive one, also 
because its interest is not of societal origin but one of capitalist exploitation. Under the capitalist 
logic, Marcuse (1968), in his conception of surplus repression, adds that this repression acts as a 
container that enables thingification or commodification of human activity and the very pieces of 
object-valorization. The repetition and regularity are not limited to the points of access; all the 
interactive features within the commercial environment become regulated, fostering repetition, 
which in turn effectuates alienation, which is also then repurposed and circulated. 
Specificity of Metropolitan Adolescent Subject Position 
 The home front population is reclassified as consumers (or agents tasked with conjuring 
up new ways of prolonging consumption) by continual ideological repositioning, which is 
carried out on subjects’ own volition via personalizing technology of self-discipline (see Pariser 
2011). The fantasy of the creative industry covers over the grimy consumer lay of the land (see 
Florida 2002)—that in a high-tech economy (which is still liberal capitalist) remedial work 
would be replaced by intelligent (yet unavoidably repetitive) labor such as programming and 
designing in an otherwise networked and gamified society. One could site two decades worth of 
celebratory uncritical texts that fit this mold. Most interesting are the texts that deal with the 
“blessing” of becoming networked: cognitive surplus, some sort of singularized meta-
consciousness able to consolidate individuation without effect on the individual. Where the norm 
is service and entertainment, creative industry is the best fantasy consumer technology can offer; 
the creative industry, the making of software and software platforms, the using of technology as 
a means of cognitivization of labor are all fantasies that justify the normalization of mediative 
and extractive objectification of everyday life for the whole of society—particularly those who 
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cannot dream of becoming a programmer, a software designer, a professional gamer, or a 
professional YouTube personality. I mention these particular emerging occupations, because 
ideologically confirming literature readily conjures them (see Boyd 2014; Gardner 2013). 
 What the emergent system needs from the home front is mere consumption of the 
material and reproduction of the economic traffic for continued exploitation. Computerization 
and its extensions through digitization come to secure social mediation via gamification to 
achieve ideological control of the way the world is perceived, and what the materiality is thought 
of being (ideology is in the historical materiality of consciousness).  In this way, the people of 52
the metropole (those key cities in the political economy of the US) come to substantiate their 
relations under a dominant ideology and social-organization through commodities. Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s (2002) famous thesis on the culture industry under capitalist monopoly is once 
again useful here as it points to the immaterial power structure in the form of industry-serving 
ideology, which comes to mediate the relation of the subject to his world and thus mediates 
processes of subject-formation and self-consciousness. In turn, this mediation stabilizes 
structural tendencies in the circulation by tying production to consumption of value (Marcuse 
1968; Adorno 1974).  
 My thinking in this chapter relies heavily on Marcuse (1941; 1968), Mandel (1975), and 
Baudrillard (1998), along with a number of contemporary theorists, for a conception of advanced 
capitalism, in which the industrial base of the capitalist mode of production sustains itself 
through an economy of commodity-consumption—commodification of the ‘qualitatively 
human’. Mandel offers financial capital as a case of parasitic capitalist extraction, to which 
 See technicity in Chapter Three as well as the following section on valorization.52
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Marcuse contributes a general theory of qualitative transformation of personhood as extraction 
feeds on the remaining ‘untapped’ humanity for the surplus. The resulting ‘feedback-loop’ is 
situated by Baudrillard, who asserts that the consumption economy appears in advanced 
capitalism as a way of extracting surplus from processes that historically served to further social 
and cultural reproduction; Marcuse focuses on the psycho-dynamic, Baudrillard considers the 
symbolic and semiotic homogenization of quality. In this chapter I intend to interrogate a new 
elusive vestige of advanced capitalism in this historical moment: the psycho-social economy of 
consumer society as it manifests itself in political view of the lives of metropolitan youth. As I 
previously discuss in Chapter One and Three, from object-relations theory, I define the psycho-
social as sociality (Klein, 1963; Bion, 1967), self- and other-relations (or self-reflexivity) (Bion, 
1963; Freud, 1997; Laing, 1968), and intergenerational responsibility and politics (Klein, 1984; 
Erikson, 1963). I will argue that the consideration of young subjects’ experience advances the 
critical theory of contemporary society, because it challenges the assumptions about the 
substance of life-quality under advanced capitalism. 
Now let us turn to the adolescent specificity. As theory speculates, if adolescents are in 
fact sold commodified pieces of their own imaginations, then the substance of their 
subjectivity , which is defined by years of dramatic growth and socialization, is caught in 53
circuits of surplus-extraction and regulation (by psycho-technological means). To tie back to the 
discussion in Chapter One: psycho-technology is a term Stiegler (2010) uses to represent micro-
regulation of attention, which he observes in the consumerization of intergenerational habitus or 
the replacement of intergenerational relations (imitation and facilitation of sublimation and 
 Stiegler (2010) argues that this ‘something qualitative’ is the substance of intergenerational transmission of 53
processes and forms of valorization.
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anxiety-tolerance) by televisual guidance. In the early 1980s, Foucault (1988) used the term to 
suggest something very similar—although, characteristically Foucaltian, the direct subject matter 
is Greek and Roman cultural practices of writing about one’s self. The existing critical theory 
also speculates that the ready-made takes the place of idiosyncratic conception by means of 
‘applied’ mimesis. The works of Deleuze and Guattari (1983) and Foucault (1988) suggest that 
the political-economic incorporation of the subject requires the standardization of signification 
and identification practices. But, research in this area is sparse and disjointed; the ethnographic 
research that does exist only offers general (moralistic) critiques of ‘digital culture’ (see 
Jamaludin 2011; Thompson 2010; John 2006; Marlin 2009). In fact, it tends to rely on Hardt and 
Negri’s (2004) affective labor and digital capitalism theories (discussed in a later section of this 
chapter), which seems incapable of addressing the incorporation of the psycho-social dimension
—in my reading, because their focus is general and social, Hardt and Negri’s theory cannot 
recognize the unique case of adolescents caught in these circuits.   
As I have argued previously, the special nature of adolescent consumer interpellation is 
that it relies on affective incorporation. For Baudrillard (1998), the economy of consumption 
secures circulation by employing misrecognition, which underlies ideology (Althusser, 1984) 
and the distance between representations and their consummating intent. This notion of 
necessary misrecognition for the circulation of commodification of the psychological (or the 
imaginary), in the case of Facebook, suggests that the emotional anticipation of new messages 
(exaggerated by social and semiotic misrecognition, which is enhanced by the sheer force of 
external definition of the container-symbols) tunes the psychic to the format of the site (see Cote 
and Pybus 2010). Nonetheless, there are signs in contemporary research, at least on the side of 
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consumer research, that this idea has already been employed: for example, Cottrell and Rajecki 
(1974) theorized the profit-potential in users’ emotional investment in performance of repetitive, 
“irrelevant” tasks; Zwick (2006), on the other hand, directly theorizes the commercial application 
of Bionian object-relations theory (1963) in his conception of a consumer-object theory. 
The scenario of an adolescent person’s anticipation of what might be news on the 
Facebook front page, as a substantive experience or a hallucination of an expected experience on 
Facebook, says something on this point: this hallucination or mental image is a mimetic object, 
which is summoned by a consumer-technology object in the external world. As mimesis, theory 
would suggest that it is repressive in character, because representation is not only bound to the 
activity of the imaginary, but also to the selective-operationalization on the part of the social 
object (Adorno 1998; Marcuse 1964; Baudrillard, 1998). The crucial pivot-point is that the 
socialized imaginary is the psychical (not only structural in the sense of drives or mechanics, but 
the sensuous-being agent of incorporation that serves economizing and ideological functions (cf. 
Castoriadis 1987; Horkheimer 1972; Althusser 1984). It remains to be explored how, beyond 
marketing and consumerism, this laborious activity-which-is-also-socialization syncs with 
adolescent subject position. More specifically, what is the substance of adolescent subjectivity 
that is commodified as commercialization enters their socialization? 
I hope to show that considering the concrete case of young persons’ lives brings a new 
focus to these critical problems. Theirs is a psycho-social experience increasingly regulated by 
the markets for consumption while also being socially treated as a stage for complex psycho-
social formation. The subject-conditions of the metropole’s adolescents is what enables the focus 
of my research. Adolescence is a structural identification of a human being (see Butler 1990; 
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Hall, 1993). As such, it is determined by a subject’s relation to group-defined social roles such as 
“age grades” in societies organized on kinship relations; it is defined from the outside, which 
implicates ideological and material definition of value, and, by extension, the structures of the 
dominant socially-productive exploitation. I will argue that the political nature of the psycho-
social becomes visible in the case of youth, because their subjectivity is already subjected to 
documentation (or dissection); development and socialization (as structural identity of youth-
subjectivity) are outside the historical experience of youth, and as such they carry a qualitative 
critique to historical standards. For adolescents, as they are ‘growing into their own,’ the future 
(as becoming) is part of their structural identity. They are required to embody this futurity, 
because the future of the social organization itself rests upon the incorporation of the young (see 
Erikson 1963; Edelman 2004). My hypothesis is that this element of futurity is connected to this 
new psycho-social incorporation under advanced capitalism. 
New Forms of Adolescent Labor 
 In the consumer society (that is, the society within the confines of the historical capitalist 
metropoles), the commodity competes with social-reality for psycho-social attention. Like 
reality, the MMO works to find a way to be taken seriously (affectively). To be effective, it must 
be immersive; to be so, it must be affective, even if only momentarily. WoW has to make the 
player work for the development of his avatar’s agency, not simply in an effort to perpetuate its 
capture of the participant’s attention (and thus its domain over the player's behavioral habits) (see 
Van Looy 2012). The in-game labor-value economy is not explained away merely by its role in 
the extractive intentions of the game-makers, because the gaming logic of an MMO is imbedded 
in the larger all-encompassing political economy that ideologically never gives away agency. 
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This is the weakness of analyses of contemporary capitalism that draw current from Hardt and 
Negri. While much work has been done in the realm of mapping out the abstraction of labor 
under increasingly digitized capitalist flows, cognitive labor has not been successfully 
consolidated with the traditionally under-thought realm, that of the domestic (see generally 
Peters and Bulut 2011; Boutang and Emery 2011; Galloway 2006; Manovich 2013). While such 
oversight historically might have been criticized as merely anti-feminist, presently the oversight 
is a giant blind spot in terms of perceiving consumer capitalism’s operation in the global West. 
The role of subject-formation, or that of the subject, in the political economy remains a fog. 
 In 2007, McKenzie Funk, a reporter for Harper’s magazine, traveled to South Korea and 
China to document the public concern over internet addiction amongst adolescents (Funk 2007). 
In a memorable scene, he observed Chinese youth, packed in overcrowded internet-cafes, 
immersed in MMOs in pursuit of real-life income. They spent working-day equivalent amount of 
hours engaging in repetitive keystrokes, completing mindless in-game tasks that would earn 
them the in-game coins and goods, which they could then sell to their Western counterparts (see 
also Cao 2007). Funk’s description is not the only sighting of this phenomenon. In fact, by 
current standards, all MMOs have internal markets, where players can use real-life currency to 
buy in-game currency from either the other players or the game-providers in exchange for 
putting in the time and attention to perform the repetitive tasks, which would otherwise amount 
to amassing in-game money (see Cao 2007; Dyer-Witherford 2009; Melinda 2006). This in-game 
currency is then used to purchase in-game commodities and utilities for the players’ in-game 
characters. Aside from the internal market that exists within these games, the mirroring of the 
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capitalist technological organization is also visible in the time-expenditure/game-advancement/
monthly-subscription-fee accounting of the whole game structure (see Samuel 2011).  
 The extent of vertical alignment of social and economic dynamics glimpsed in this 
example is a key characteristic of the landscape of the advanced capitalism under investigation. 
But, it is the irony of this play-to-work site, which offers a glimpse of the emerging political 
economic conditions for youth living under advanced capitalism: the Chinese youth are working
—the repetitive labor of mouse-clicks and keystrokes is kept up for hours under exhaustive hand-
eye coordination that would rival those of a work-day, and their ‘play’ generates in-game 
exchange-value. Then, youth, largely from the US, purchase this game-money with US currency 
(Melinda 2006; Samuel 2011). Interpellated as players, the American youth play the same 
repetitive game—performing the same tasks as their Chinese counterparts. But, in a contradiction 
that exposes the political economy tying the two groups, the Chinese youth are working and the 
American youth are playing, even though both are doing exactly the same thing. To distinguish 
my own approach, it is useful to note the work of Hall (1993) and Willis (1981), which links play 
with “learning to work” under capitalism. My idea in this chapter, on the other hand, is to 
attempt to theorize play not as preparation for work, but play as it becomes its substitute; or 
rather, as work substitutes play. 
My focus is on the American youth of this twisted political economy. As exploited 
activity turned into labor, the case seems qualitatively different in contrast to the historically 
studied types; these young American ‘laborers’ (except the Chinese game players) are not 
laboring for the ‘universal equivalent’ (money or the exchange-value), they are laboring for a 
use-value, i.e. they are hoping to consume what they produce (Marlin 2009). Are use-values 
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themselves becoming alienated in this digital dimension of advanced capitalism? The classic use-
value/exchange-value distinction (Marx 1990) allows me to theorize the use-value of WoW and 
Facebook for its users (whether in Marcuse's (1968) sense of satisfying a socially-produced, 
consumerist need or in a more psychoanalytic conception of mimesis (Lacan 1977) and identity 
formation (Freud 1966; Kristeva 2009)), alongside the “exchange value” of the “commodity” 
being produced (Jim 2006) (which is somehow also the individual himself, in digital form 
(Sunden, 2002)). The point is: labor produces both. 
‘Social media’ illustrates the other crucial dimension of this kind of labor, because it 
seems to employ the affective habits of young users in its processes (see Pybus 2011). My 
working definition of this kind of labor is psychic labor, which is a synthetic one; it attempts to 
address thinking and self-reflexivity as the target of commodification, the substance which 
becomes commercialized through commercial mediation (such as Facebook). Labor, in this 
sense, is an activity of value-creation on the way to circulation. Contemporary research on this 
kind of labor has primarily attended to the alienating effect of its repetition (see generally 
Rangan 2011). The more cycles of extraction, the more regular and more particularly defined the 
labor; its repetitiveness is defined by the capitalist extractors, who become increasingly 
specialized in the particular substance of their extraction over the lifespan of the ‘social 
media’ (see Dyer-Whiteford 1999; Kerr 2003; Zwick 2006; Peters 2010). 
 An elaborating example is found in the news that Facebook planned to buy a software 
development company because of its hold on a user base through its free-to-use application, 
whatsapp (see Curwen 2014). As parts of the financial circulation of surplus value, persons as 
users of social media are already parceled and traded between corporations of the emergent 
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social relational markets (see Flath 2014). In this example, Facebook, having become a publicly 
traded firm, must keep growing to survive, and thus it must prove it is growing by doing more of 
what made it seem monetizable (valuable): increase its user base. Thus, the prospect of the 
falling profits is swept under the carpet by expanding and immediately subsuming the projected 
future surplus into maintaining the order of the present.  It already seems to be the accepted case 
that the value of the self-reproductive consumer already crudely figures into the price (in terms 
of markets and financialization). The fact of the matter is that an adolescent user accessing her 
Facebook account has to accept the commercial backdrop of the medium; the prospect of any 
socializing is behind the log-in and always on a ‘page.’ For critical and commercial theorists 
alike, the dawn of Facebook as ‘social media’ (or web 2.0) signals a period of capitalism in 
which a solution to capitalism’s crisis, or that of an exciting new market, is found in new 
dimensions of psycho-social integration by digital technological mediation (see generally Dyer-
Witheford 2001; Hubert 2001; Fuchs 2008). When this capitalist-controlled social medium 
provides the grounds for the everyday-socialization for adolescents (the activity of social-
relation, social-recognition, and self-narration), the commercial format mediates social-
relationality. If Facebook is an adolescent person’s primary medium for socialization (following 
the after-hours of the traditionally institutional form) (Boyd 2014; Gardner 2013), then the mere 
fact that the medium is a glorified website already comes to impose experiential limits on the 
scope of the mediated interaction and its quality. Some theorists have argued that those social 
conditions change the quality of being a human being—socialized and developing sense of self 
not through familial alienation attuned to the historical culture (Arendt 1958), but 
commodification (Marcuse 1968; Stiegler 2010; Caraway 2011). But, that is not all; if the 
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venture is profitable, and all indicators point to the affirmative (see Cote 2010; Jon 2011), the 
investors would continue to demand profitability. The net result is a continuing increase of 
pressure for higher affective incorporation, which, for the young subject, means more repression 
in the form of increasingly aggressive extraction. 
Personal data, social interactions, and cognitive labor are increasingly subject to 
commodification. But, as the medium shapes the social experience, young people are also subject 
to extractive regulation, because the format establishes and guides social behavior as commercial 
intent directs the mediated experience of imagining the social through symbolic representation 
(see Michaela 2006; Micky 2011). This scenario’s importance to social theory is that it returns us 
to the familiar concerns about autonomy—the quality of subjective experience: for the 
adolescents, the future is always a matter of political empowerment; because the structure 
identifies youth by their developing bodies, the future also represents the concrete quality of that 
empowerment. In this sense futurity captures the discourse at the intersection of socialization, 
extraction, and development. I have wondered if this futurity can ground a study of historical 
valorization as it connects to concrete (yet still psycho-social) relationality and the 
intergenerational historicity of those relations (cf. Freud 1966; Fanon 1991; Stiegler 2010). My 
central question is this: what of young people’s life-activity becomes this new labor—the source 
of value and surplus? What is the nature of the surplus extracted in this economy; what is the 
substance of this surplus futures, imagination, or the capacity to define value based on non-
commodified social relations? (The latter question will be explored in the following chapter.) 
There are some dated ideas in response to the question, but what has survived the test of 
history is the clue that it is something ‘qualitative,’ in which imagination and identification, 
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future and predictability engage in dialectical relationships. Nietzsche (1967) offers the 
aristocratic political autonomy; Bataille (1944) suggests that the answer is in the rupture and its 
risk at the center of affectation; Freud (1963) and Lacan (1977) argue that the difference is in the 
nature of the psycho-dynamic structuring of the lack; Marcuse (1964), Adorno (1974), and 
Horkheimer (1972) argue that the answer is connected to the disappearance of sublimation 
practices which underpin historical culture; Deleuze and Guattari (1983; 1988) find their answers 
in the interconnections between internal and external processes. Then, what does this extraction
—mean in terms of contemporary technologies of power?  
 What I think remains to be theorized is this psychological and relational dimension; for 
the adolescent, who engages in labor unconsciously (in the process of this mediated 
‘socializing’), WoW or Facebook seems to fine-tune the mechanisms that keep the adolescent’s 
experience of their own subjectivity within its circulation to prolong and maximize extraction 
(Pariser 2011). Extraction is the concrete historical process by which value is reified and 
appropriated as the qualitative substance of surplus-power for the circulation of capital (Marx, 
1973; Marx, 1975). I intend to explore how this relationship manifests itself in the specific case 
of laboring and one’s sense of his labor: how a sense of psycho-social dependency is tailored by 
the televisual mediating apparatus and also inferred by the adolescent; whether the format 
produces and perpetuates self-conceptual identification; and, most critically what the 
developmental and social-relational implications are of these commercial ventures securing 
profits by conditioning behavior that not only underpins the consumption but also substantiates 
teen-life. 
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Critique of Materiality in Immaterial Labor 
 I would like to distance my work from "physicalist" interpretations of labor, which I 
would argue come out of reductive readings of Marx. In Grundrisse, Marx (1973) points to a 
social interpretation of labor/production beyond the making of commodities. When it comes to 
the traces of this spirit, the most exciting theoretical work I have been able to uncover is a recent 
edited volume by Peters and Bulut (2011), because the volume synthesizes the various traditions 
of immaterial labor and advanced capitalism—even considering the implications of Facebook (or 
web 2.0). But, it identifies with Foucaultian biopower (1973) and Hardt and Negri’s affective 
labor (2000) to conceptualize digital capitalism and digital labor; in doing so, it mirrors the limits 
of their progenitors; there is a physicality to the conception of labor, where even a psychic 
process like cognition is an activity conceived under the rubric of physical (manual) labor—
psychological and psycho-social (relational) implications are not explored. 
 There are a number of qualified conceptions of immaterial labor, but, in all of these 
instances, the theory of labor is limited to a notion grounded in manual (physical) labor. This 
critique extends to the more recent theories, which reproduce the commodity-fixation of the 
originating theoretical works by Smythe (1980) and Hochschild (1978) in this area: emotional 
labor is what people in the service industry must do (Tonkens 2012); cognitive labor is the 
immaterial labor done when crunching numbers, researching, or writing on the computer (Atzert 
2006; Boutang 2011; Dale 2000; Peters 2011); affective labor is the corollary to cognitive labor 
on Internet 2.0 (‘social media’), where users must narrate their own affective characteristics to 
participate in social networks (Hochschild 2003; Hardt 2001); ethical labor is what happens to 
the social-relational activity when it is translated into the digital medium (O’Neill 1991; Stiegler 
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2010); domestic labor is the labor done by women and children in the household;  performativity 
is necessary social labor to counterbalance historical ideology (Butler 1991; Gerard 2004); 
audience labor is the work that persons consuming televisual media do in the activity of viewing 
as well as in reacting to advertising (Smythe 1998; Bauman 2002). 
 Without a consideration of psychological theory, immaterial labor is inadequate to grasp 
the quality of the youth-labor’s immateriality, where the immaterial is not extra-material, but 
psychic. It is not a thing like information (Peters 2011) or the tailoring of an affective response 
(Hardt and Negri 2004), but an instance in the process of object-relations (Bion 1963), the 
shaping of internal diversification (Lacan 1977) and the experiential quality of social relations 
(Laing 1968). Audience labor (Adorno 1998; Caraway 2011) and affective labor theories 
(Hochschild 2003; Hardt and Negri 2004) are the closest historical materialist conception of 
capitalist-extraction. Yet they seem unable to adequately address the development of the second-
worldly digital consumer medium, let alone the prevalence of large portions of the public living 
with a dimension of social interaction within digital capitalist ventures. It is my sense that the 
historical limitation of this theoretical work rests in its fixity on the material definition of labor, 
in which the human activity that is converted into labor has a basic physical or bodily substance
—whether that might be the work one does when watching television or the cognition one 
employs in working on the computer. A second limitation seems to come about in the scarce 
instances in which digital capitalism theory touches upon the intergenerational dimension; the 
tendency is a loss of sight of the concrete politics by becoming distracted by moralizing and 
valorizing of the past (Baumann 2000; Gregg 2004; Stiegler 2010). 
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 I postulate that the theory’s limited scope for new kinds of extraction is tied to a 
historically limited conception of value; the case of adolescents could propel beyond this 
conception by shifting focus onto the psycho-social ‘derivatives’ on their own—the relational as 
substance. Existing theoretical work seems to be limited by a ‘vulgar materiality’, partly because 
it rests on an ambiguous conception of a person as an individual or a worker. Individual implies 
acceptance of atomism; an individual might have a gender (as in the case of the invisibility of 
domestic labor (Fortunati 2011; Evelien 2012) or the misconception of performativity (Irigaray 
2004; Butler 2009), but no structurally locatable subjective (or experiential) personhood that 
could be situated historically. Aside from this social dimension, there is also the political-
economic situation of the person and the person in light of the political economy. Partly, because 
its conception of human activity turned into labor is limited to a physicality, which focuses on 
‘who owns’ the body (see O’Neill 1991). The contemporary psycho-social theory of subjectivity 
seems to concern only the substitution in which the role previously occupied by generational 
object-relations is taken over by consumerizing interest (cf. Arendt 1958; Cote 2007; Cvijanovic 
2010; Stiegler 2010). But, the critical point remains; the political economic situation of young 
people in the metropole of advanced capitalism employs their experience in its circuits, shaping 
their ways of valuing in mediated spaces created by and for extractive purposes (Boyd 2006; 
Caraway 2011). The possibility of the quality of psychological experience or the psycho-social 
process of valorization (or valuing, or value-adding) becoming the substance that enters 
circulation thus remains invisible. 
 Apparent even in the classical critique by reification (Marx 1967; Marcuse 1968) and 
mimesis (Marcuse 1964; Adorno 2001), society requires the incorporation, the employment of 
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persons’ energies—a kind of exploitation, in which something originally and authentically 
human is specified, reified, and regulated into predictability to be sold-off  (cf. Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983; Foucault 1988; Butler 1990; Stiegler 2010). If the qualitative can be auctioned 
off, in terms of regulating development towards maximizing future-profitability, then this is 
basically a ‘futures’ market. In the first instance, and until the subject protests, this resembles the 
structure of the period of primitive accumulation (Marx 1990)—taking all and leaving nothing—
when capital painfully learns that diminishing returns (Caraway 2011) and proneness to 
speculative crisis have to be dampened by making extraction sustainable—to at least allow for 
the time of regeneration. For example, in one of the consumer-research articles (Zwick 2006), the 
authors theorize how to direct the micro-socially cultivated desire for praise or punishment, 
through sites and conceptual frames, towards extraction. 
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Whatever Happened to Play? 
 Before I turn to the question of existing theories of immaterial labor, I want to address the 
ideological treatment of play in gaming research. Play is an important category in the study of 
gaming, because gaming often shares the basic assumptions of modern theories of why humans 
play. In all the instances the theorists were citing the same theory of play as one of their 
grounding basic assumptions. This is Huizinga’s (1955) famous theory of play, which posits an 
absolute difference between work and play (interestingly paralleling Arendt’s similar distinction 
between labor and activity, which she posited around the same time). Huizinga makes this 
distinction on the basis of play’s libidinal engagement. From there he goes on to study the 
structures of play and their many anthropological and sociological characteristics without 
revisiting his primary assumption. 
 Let us also consider the work of Wark (2004; 2007; 2012), because his work not only 
plays out the problems with Huizinga’s beginnings, but also exemplifies the kind of conceptual 
political problems gaming-as-play theorists have run across. The major problem with Wark, 
reflected in the larger postmodern tradition of media studies to which he belongs, is that he does 
not specify the subject, and therefore, reproduces the lack of historical materiality of his theory. 
This is an understandable move, since it makes for ideologically friendly academe. But, Wark 
(2007) also focuses on the utopian, and directs his critical inquiry towards strictly universal and 
existential questions. But, most problematic of all is Wark’s (2012) treatment of the idea of play, 
because he uncritically equates video games to social historical concepts of play. Like Huizinga, 
Wark argues that play is elemental; games are systems that incorporate or run on play, with the 
worst that can happen being the commodification of play into repetition (Wark 2012: 92-94).  
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 I want to go back to the critical interjection of Situationism, their critique of 
consumerization-geared technological manipulation of object relations, tailoring of experience to 
produce new ways of consumption and thus immersion. Therefore, I want to emphasize the 
importance of the fact that the video game’s play is mediated by a gaming console; the fact that 
the play also occurs within games as particular instances of console-mediation; and lastly, the 
fact that each of these mediations is economically tailored. The problem is not with the game, but 
the social and historical circumstance in which gaming is taking place. When games are situated 
in a consumerist context, they become tools of standardization and manipulation. Gamification 
seems to be more of reimagining of laboring by engineering of experience. 
 MMOs and sandbox games  demonstrate this principle. Investment into games leads to 54
forcing oneself to reproduce immersion. Take the regular activity of a player in Minecraft for 
example. A player is thrust into a wild (read imperial definition of empty) world, with the action 
of digging as his only tool. Using this tool, the player accumulates various samples of elements 
(tree, dirt, stone, silver, etc.) with which he builds (recreates) a world. Now, if he wants to 
experiment with importing more of the traditionally social into the game (that is, parts of his 
reality principle that stick around as affective residues), he has to do the in-game laboring that 
the game requires—creation, even in the game, costs effort. In other words, a player is dropped 
into an empty world reminiscent of the state of nature which he then populates with his 
constructions, but, what is telling about the psycho-social apparatus of the game is this: while a 
player can choose to turn off the onslaught of monsters which come at the end of every in-game 
day, he cannot avoid the block-by-block construction that constitutes the basic mode of game-
 Sandbox games could be defined as games in which the player is given a relative free-reign over an 54
environment and a set of object.
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play in Minecraft. It is the repetition, the habituation of repetition, that secures the on-going 
valorization—the player’s continued investment in staying in the game. This is precisely because 
its apparatus is an ideological one; Minecraft must make itself pleasurable according to the 
already existing psycho-social economy of valorization. In sandbox games, a player has to labor 
to play. 
 Play seems to remain a largely unexplored territory for the critiques of contemporary 
political economy, because the reigning views of technology will not recognize its psycho-social 
effect on the human, let alone mediative technology as a form of interpellation. Instead many 
theorists seem to be worried with commodities replacing human relations or the televisual 
medium fragmenting individuals’ capacity for responsible attentiveness to others, which are age-
old problems of consumer society and the culture industry. Barber’s condemnation of marketing 
imbeddedness in the production of consumer culture (2008) is an example of this latter popular 
stance in critique. Turkle’s (2013) work represents this popular trend in what has been called 
“digital humanities.” Turkle’s primary focus is on the changing cultural landscape in which 
human relations are replaced by commodity relations—robots taking the place of humans to 
produce the feelings of safety and comfort. Turkle’s critique of this trend is primarily that the 
ease and simplicity of relations with objects diminishes people’s ability to empathize with others, 
and makes individuals less able to tolerate their own emotional situations.  
 On the occasions that play appears non-ideologically, play is treated as a piece of real 
estate in the geopolitics of the psyche even though the theorists are capable of recognizing the 
role of play in the psychology of subject-formation (Stiegler 2010). The problem with Stiegler’s 
(2010) argument is that despite his operationalizing of the term “psycho-technology” to 
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deconstruct the socialization apparatus, in the end, he does not de-naturalize the process of 
socialization. Instead, Stiegler argues that what is necessary is a socialization of socializing-
institutions, that is, a deliberate social policy to create and protect social institutions for “caring” 
for the human.  
 For my work play is important as interactivity, because it remains under-theorized in 
critical theory even though it is readily deployed as the panacea against the maladies of 
consumerized populations. Playing as interactivity brings it in the realm of laboring for a 
purpose. After all according to Winnicott (1971), play is a part of the general therapeutic drive to 
cope with the repression of the reality principle—in Freud’s classic example of a child playing 
with a ball while saying “Fort-da,” the child is thought to be working on libidinally transforming 
his reaction to separation from his sources of satisfaction. Games could be one site of 
desublimation of such processes, but the problem arises with the profit making interest of 
commodification which by anticipating a desublimatory role makes the process not liberatory but 
repressive, not therapeutic but addictive. Marcuse’s (1972) return of the repressed makes for a 
clear warning: people still want a life free of dehumanizing labor and capitalism; knowing this 
appropriates and commodifies the fantasy, which is then sold back to its producer, the people. 
Games fulfill the fantasy of a life earned another way than by labor; the real cost is that instead 
of self-determination what they get is an alternative libidinal relation to labor under a guise of 
guided agency (30). 
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Returning to Valorization for A Working Theory of Psychic Labor 
I seek the conceptual means for concrete political application of a synthesized theory of 
psychic value. In my preliminary reading, the concept of psychic value goes through a number of 
developments in the course of the 20th century—from stimulus/reflex parallel of libido-cathexis 
(Freud 1997), to desire as a mobilizing lack (Freud 1966), to object-relations (Klein 1984; Bion 
1963), to primary-identification and the unconscious as its imprint (Lacan 1977), to the desiring-
machine (Laing 1968; Deleuze and Guattari 1983). For this reason I find it necessary to consider 
where the political economy meets the experience of subjectivity—the terms of subjective 
valorization. The rationale for the choice of political economic lenses lies in commodification, 
which is the advanced capitalism equivalent of commodity fetishism in Marx (which is the 
kernel of reification, alienation, and thus consciousness), and the critique of historical society (or 
regulation for the purpose of building expectation and excitation for commodification). Labor is 
the economization of activity. In other words, in order to become historically-applicable, a theory 
of psychic value needs a theory of psychic labor—an immaterial corollary to labor as an 
economized, extractive activity, which is still in concrete reality, but much more dynamic than a 
single stream of activity like cognition. 
I have tried to gather up the substantive from the theories of ideational (Lacan 1977; 
Freud 1966), emotional (Freud 1963; Klein 1984), and relational investment (Bion 1963; 
Althusser 1996). My rationale has been that these three dimension align with those of immaterial 
labor theories; they capture the qualitative basis of value-adding in embodied dimensions of 
thought (or representation), feeling (or affect), and social-relations (or intersubjectivity). The 
main purpose of looking for a theory of psychic labor is because it puts contemporary structural 
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conditions of youth in question. Adolescent development and socialization happen in historical, 
political context. This has been usually theorized broadly as ever-changing, but always a version 
of industrial, socially-productive historical processes ‘cooperating’ with personal interests (Freud 
1997; Castoriadis 1987; Foucault 1988). It implies a timeless, arguably depoliticizing spectrum 
marked by exploitation and support. But, the case of youth demands a more explicit conception 
of the historical form of these ‘processes of cooperation’ (see Friedenberg 1970; Fromm 1961), 
because the terms of the relations between a person and a social system are not only interested or 
historically determined (Arendt 1958), but, in our specific context, political, and profit-
(accumulation and domination)-driven. 
 I want to focus on laboring as a container for the psychological process of valorization. 
Marx (1975) offers a basic definition of valorization; it is a humanist definition of value-adding: 
human beings engage in the process of investing themselves into the objects of their concrete 
reality. This activity of valorizing is emotional, ideational, and practical. What allows Marx to 
conceive of these complex dimensions of valorization is the fact that he approaches it from a 
post-capitalist perspective (which avoids defining these internal human processes of value-
adding according to the commodity) and the necessary means for autonomy (see Althusser 1969; 
Jim 2006). 
 Valorization’s libidinal affective value is in deploying repetition and disciplining it with 
desublimation to make work pleasurable. There is a loss of self in the repetition of work; this 
process also employs a directing of desire towards non-presence (alleviation of presence, 
immediate cognitive attentiveness, or consciousness). In other words, valorization consists of a 
combination of laboring and non-presence of desire as they operate on the same level.  In fact it 
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could be argued that non-presence is the libidinal benefactor of laboring (why an activity is 
valorizing, significant on its own). In consumer society the institutions of socialization (TV, 
social media, video games and gamification) each take a piece of the valorizing process. 
Television (or its replacement, Netflix and other video-streaming services) take care of 
identification; social media takes care of tweaking the performativity; gaming incorporates 
investment, valorizing and laboring. In this way, a consumer subject attains a consumer libidinal 
economy. 
What I want to call psychic labor is a stand-in for what results in the following sequence: 
play is subjectively valuable, because one independently and libidinally valorizes through 
narrativizing, recognizing, objectifying. Play is also socially-manipulatable, and in consumer 
society, it is highly profitable, because everyone wants to play. Technology enables attention-
direction via the televisual gadgetry. And gaming captures play, using the technology of 
identification to secure its link to what satisfies the subjective. In the end, the person works to 
sustain the link of valorization in gaming, because it is pleasurable, which result in the inevitable 
shift in terms of profitability. Looking at this amalgamation, interpellation offers a way to deepen 
the analysis as it suggests the nature of the underlying psychic surplus. Interpellation is an 
activity of self-projection and identification, which carries on an activity very much paralleling 
the kind of valorizing that becomes labor. In the context of the historical subject, the activity of 
interpellating is the repetition of the act that had led to the satisfying valorization in the historical 
moment; what seems to be happening in gaming is that the pleasure of play is replaced by the 
satisfaction of interpellation—which is a repetition of an earlier valorization, and as such, is 
repressive. 
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In the following chapter, I will explore what kind of surplus repressive interpellation 
extracts. This task requires synthesizing the whole array of concepts developed throughout this 
project. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: GAMING AND THE ECONOMY OF PSYCHIC SURPLUS 
Introduction 
The critical edge of this chapter addresses the structural and material grounds of 
contemporary youth studies, in which it seems that the question of consumer-socialization is 
withheld by a dominant (market-friendly) ideology in which commercial technology is readily 
normalized to secure exploitation and surplus extraction. In such a climate social control readily 
masquerades as banal reality (Boyd’s popular work (2006) is a case and point), forestalling 
critical questions about the historically-concrete quality of younger generations’ object relations 
as a marker of how political self-awareness is qualitatively shaped.  
There are predecessors to this line of thinking; a contingent of theorists, who have come 
as close as affective theory; as I discussed in the previous chapters, these are the digital-capital 
theorists (Simondon 2012; Betancourt 2007; Hardt and Negri 2004; Stiegler 2010). The 
limitation of these works seems to be a common one: they lay out what they view as symptoms 
of ‘something gone wrong.’ Then, instead of elaborating their general critique through their 
initial analytic concepts, they retreat to traditional European tropes of Enlightenment values. For 
example, Simondon (2012) begins with an ontological critique of behavioral psychology by 
pointing to the misrecognition at the point of ‘ontogenesis,’ but then goes off to his own version 
of a metaphysical pseudo-science; Bentacourt (2007) situates distraction, but then turns to state-
level politics for an argument about responsibility; Stiegler (2010) theorizes fragmentation of 
attention as a problem for intergenerational psycho-social relations, but then collapses the 
fragmentation as a problem of “classic” personality.  
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Instead, for the specific case of metropolitan youth, I think that psycho-social theory can 
provide the much needed spirit of mobilization to politicize the critical theory of advanced 
capitalism. The theoretical approach that I have been trying to lay out (crossing the psycho-social 
with politics of autonomy and self-determination) can re-energize the relevance of critical theory 
in the contemporary world, because it puts focus on the substance, the concreteness or the 
materiality of psycho-social experience (or at least, what seems to be the formative psycho-social 
dynamics, which envelope it). Althusser (2008) offers a fitting point to support this idea of 
concreteness: 
Of course, the material existence of the ideology in an apparatus and its practices does 
not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving-stone or a rifle. But, at 
the risk of being taken for a Neo-Aristotelian (NB Marx had a very high regard for 
Aristotle), I shall say that ‘matter is discussed in many senses’, or rather that it exists in 
different modalities, all rooted in the last instance in ‘physical’ matter. 
Having said this, let me move straight on and see what happens to the 
‘individuals’ who live in ideology, i.e. in a determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) 
representation of the world whose imaginary distortion depends on their imaginary 
relation to their conditions of existence, in other words, in the last instance, to the 
relations of production and to class relations (ideology = an imaginary relation to real 
relations). I shall say that this imaginary relation is itself endowed with a material 
existence (40). As suggested in previous chapters, this occurring needs to be theorized as 
new labor or under new surplus-extraction. Deleuze and Guattari’s work (1983; 1988) 
exemplifies the way in which a libidinal-economic narrative of the historical-material 
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human condition can enable immanent critique of capitalist society. I see my thesis as 
contributing to their consideration of psycho-social activity—desire, or the relating in 
object-relations—as the source of production (instead of accepting the assumption of an 
‘orienting-lack’ as in Lacan (1977)), as I argue that the psycho-social is becoming 
employed towards extraction prior to finding its way into consciousness or material 
representations. 
 Political economic understanding of labor and surplus, and psychoanalytic understanding 
of psycho-social development require a historically-specific supplement that speaks to the 
historical subject-condition of contemporary youth. This is because he psychoanalytic tradition 
addresses the question of quality in terms of personhood (Klein 1984; Lacan 1877; Laing 1968), 
the major fault lines of psycho-social reality (Freud 1997; Klein 1963; Erikson 1963), and the 
toll (or compromise) of socialization (Freud 1963; Freud 1966; Bion 1970). As Aichhorn (1932) 
points out, psychological theory is, by its clinical nature, fixated on the historical 
intergenerational and interpersonal (historically-specific) values. Additionally, the well-
documented tendency in youth studies has been to misrecognize a structural identity as the 
definitive youth identity (Willis 1981; Hall 1993; Yon 2000; Young-Bruehl, 2012), and view 
them already as the offspring, clients, or patients (Griffin 1993; McRobbie 1988) in need of 
‘correction.’ This is why I have tried to argue that the reality of psycho-technology can serve as 
the historical bridge between psychic value theory and psychic labor theory.  
 At the precipice of the two, psycho-technology addresses the consumerist-extractive 
intent of contemporary consumer economy in the form of technology-enabled, micro-
management of ideas, but more importantly that of managing the quality of experience. The 
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theory of psycho-technology points to techniques that regulate the qualitative experience as a 
person uses consumer technology for social and economic mediation. Because it affects the 
attention processes in the structural dimension of the psyche, the theory questions the qualitative 
impact of psycho-pharmacological and attention-micro-management processes of being 
‘plugged-in’ (Stiegler 2010). In other words, it offers a framework to approach the psycho-social, 
already the grounds of socialization and social-reproductive processes, which have arguably been 
outside the extractive scope of capitalism until this point. In this chapter I will focus on the 
question of the surplus, which has been waiting since the first chapter. Considering what kind of 
surplus value interpellative extraction siphons will not only clarify the ways in which 
metropolitan adolescent consumer subjectivity is affectively governed, but also point towards the 
ways of grasping the whole of liberatory psycho-politics. 
On Adolescent Addiction 
 The political intervention I would like to make concerns the concept of presence. 
Presence is best described as own-ness, an existential kind of presence—self-consciousness in 
which the libidinal and existential concerns of a person are within reach for himself or herself—
presence is the present instance of consciousness. What makes a person self-determining is that 
this person can (through his many subjects) take over the role of regulating himself towards his 
own goals; self-consciousness means that one takes a role in establishing the means of secondary 
(de)sublimation and repression—a goal alluded to in the works of Laing (1968) and Cooper 
(1971) as well as Reich (1983), Althusser (1984) and Marcuse (1972). Given the problem of 
conception, I will only define the critical pivot of this chapter, self-determination, negatively: it 
is not a repressively desublimated experience of formative and operative subjectivity, in which 
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the libidinal connections (that is, the object relations) are affectively micro-managed for 
extractive or other guises of social-productive purposes (see Marcuse 1972). Presence and self-
determination are important concepts as they remind that the larger quality of subjectivity is 
structured by processes of subject formation—a process which happens through moment-to-
moment affecting, that is, through socialization, habituation, and repetition (within the bounds of 
a person’s self-regulative capacity as well as the various parties with the power for affective 
stimulation). 
 Now to turn to the topic of addiction, and more specifically that of adolescent addiction. 
Social science tends to treat addiction as a normative problem, whereas I would like to treat 
addiction as an ideological concept that signals the affective tying of the person’s habits to a 
particular libidinal economic machine. Consumer object relations hide the fact that the 
behavioral relational pattern is nothing but addictive (or speaking to addiction as the normative). 
It is the psychology of addiction, which defines the mechanism used by consumer socialization, 
or the experience and direction of socialization in an increasingly privatized commodity-object 
world. Addiction means something important in terms of self-determination—qualitatively it 
means non-presence, or being transfixed into a hypnotic state of timeless immersion. In this 
context, presence serves to critique immersion, because immersion is an attempt to affect the 
economic compromise being performed through technology to replace self-consciousness with 
encapsulating, phantasmagoric, immersive stimulation (encroaching on the traditionally held 
social as exterior definition). Because my concern is about the consumer-technological subject-
formation (of one who self-commodifies), I hold on to the value of self-determination as an 
orienting concept. With autonomy as a point of reference, what is happening in the socialization 
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of the young is very much a process of affective incorporation through guidance of object 
relations. 
 I have collated a decade of social scientific research on the question of youth and 
addiction. According to the various discourses, adolescents become addicted because: they are 
prone to becoming maladjusted narcissists (where the definition of maladjustment invariably 
rests on social productivity, and not self-self relationality) (Nabi and John 2014); they have a 
history of lacking experience in social relations, which makes them prone to further alienation 
(Newcomb and Harlowe 1986); they have grown up with television, which makes them 
predictable subjects of culture (Nije Bijvank, Konijn and Bushman 2012). These same 
adolescents are: emotionally immature (Larson, Csikszentmihalyi and Graef 1980), and have an 
overt need for audiovisual stimulation (Siomos 2012; Smolak 2004). They are depressives; 
substance users; ADHD kids (Tejeiro 2012; Usmiani and Daniluk 1997; van Holst 2012). Their 
sociality is being formed in gaming space, and because of this they come to depend on the 
medium (Subrahmanyam and Greenfield 2008).  They play with gender and sexuality but mostly 
reproduce existing gender regimes (Yeh 2008; Hjorth and Richardson 2009).  They use internet 
games to fight off boredom (Hirsh 2013). They are motivated to stay immersed because of the 
feelings attached to gaming competition (Schiebener 2006); this immersion satisfies a craving for 
social recognition (Christou 2013). Adolescents are also drawn to gaming like gambling 
(Delfabbro and King 2013); they exhibit physical symptoms of addiction (Elliot 2012). Partly 
why they are prone to addictive behavior stems from their not yet knowing how to think, to be 
logical (Karapetsas 2014). They are predominantly located in the American middle class or at 
least ones that can afford that consumptive lifestyle (Boyd 2014; Gardner 2013). These are 
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medical diagnoses with social good always already a stable given. This is all fine and well, but it 
is curious that in none of these cases, the social structural is problematized in any concrete 
manner. How does this amalgamation of symptoms and locations make sense in light of the 
libidinal economies metropolitan adolescents are subjected to?   
 As things stand, the conciliatory thought is that the maladies of this ideological 
subjecthood are resolved in gaming subjectivity and the extension of the subject-avatar 
interaction into the wider world through gamification of social-productive practices (see Arenas 
and Stricker 2009). The video game operationalizes interpellation to the effect of horizontalizing 
the view of the political economic (recall the reality-TV competition show). In gaming, the 
sociality of competition and the labor/reward algorithms resolve the problem of compensation 
for subjecting oneself to institutionalized repression/desublimation—effectively all instances 
where repression could lead to unwanted alienation are inoculated against. In instances that I 
encountered researchers who consider the reasons for which people find solace in games, it was 
especially interesting when this rationalization came up in the context of the game called 
Minecraft (Mojang 2009). This is a game for which there is a dearth of academic research even 
though the game has become a part of the everyday economies of middle-class (and still 
aspiring) households. Minecraft successfully captures free-flowing attention, and dispenses an 
affect of satisfying calm as it enables control over building blocks unparalleled by any such 
attempt in reality—the closest to which could be considered playing with building blocks or 
Legos. I would tie the playing with building blocks to the problem of material accumulation and 
clutter in consumer society. Clutter is a consequence of consumerization because of its dictum of 
endless consumption. In such an economy, the person as an individual consumer must find ways 
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of disciplining himself into caring for the vastness of the consumption, and this shows up in the 
quality of the feelings attached to the sight of clutter (see Bogost 2007).  
 In Minecraft a player can see all of his creations in one place; there is a calming effect of 
this sort of deterioration-free preservation; there is no dust, no discoloring, no sign of 
deterioration because of repetitive use. In this sense, in gaming, there is no experience of the 
Other—we do not have to be human (that is, bodily, natured, self-reflexive and ethical) with the 
elements, let alone each other (see Hou 2011). And this is also connected to the larger loss of 
qualitative depth of experience as it is reduced in perspective to singularity, interestedness, 
playerness (see Bulut 2009). This reduction becomes a problem the more it swallows the social 
world outside itself. Immersion into video games and their own cultures thus results in further 
misdevelopment in terms of traditional sociality—his self, body, subject are misshaped, 
affectively-molded, consciously misrecognized, repeatedly interpellated, self-aware but limitedly 
so. 
The Interpellation of A Gamer As A Young Man  55
 As capitalism continues to discipline social relations, the global West is bound to become 
a place where social structures micromanage and dictate consciousness as the exclusive domain 
of political economic directive. In Marcuse’s words:  
The means of communication, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information 
industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and 
emotional reactions which bind the consumers to the producers and, through the latter to 
 I wanted to keep it “a young man” only for the sake of gender pronoun consistency in the overall project. 55
Instead, I would have liked to make a larger sign towards the “young girl” as laid out in Tiqqun’s the Preliminary 
Materials for the Theory of the Young-Girl (2012).
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the whole social system. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false 
consciousness which is immune against its falsehood…Thus emerges a pattern of one-
dimensional thought and behavior (1967: 12). 
In other words, it can be sensible how gaming resolves for capitalism the problem of class 
consciousness: middle class as consumer class does not need a consciousness of itself (even 
more than the threat of working class consciousness) as long as larger economic apparatuses can 
supply directives for its individuated drive.  
 Gaming as a repressive means for regulating the political economy of presence (read: 
consciousness) is deployed according to different class ideologies, because the differentiation is 
based on the range of needs from interpellation. The gamer needs to be theorized as being a 
member of a very specific group, which has identified with mediated (repressive) interpellation. 
This is a subject that already accepts the very peculiar terms of commodified emotional 
engagement—he desires tuning out, logging off from his own life while still being affectively 
present. The Wall St. day-trader, who comes home wired from cognitive labor and its 
commodified attention, games to deal with his own alienation, not to see his mental activity as 
laboring any longer, and instead perceive it as leisuring. This is his ultimate expression of 
hedonism (coupled with its own cocktail of psychotropic chemicals) in a world in which the 
libidinal life of the subject has become more and more ideologically and symbolically satisfied. 
And then there is the case of the unemployed reserve army of middle class laborers, who must 
stand by, and thus whose only consoling thought as to their future job aspirations lie within a 
gamified ethic (see Jeffrey 2010). In both cases, the subjects’ desire for immediacy and 
objectification overrides the impetus for politicizing subjectification. All the while beyond the 
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walls of the imperial metropole’s furthest borders, other youth see gaming for what it is as they 
engage in the cerebral repetitions for in-game gold, yet in their case the problem of unanticipated 
critical consciousness also comes to be resolved through radically splitting alienation 
(Mackenzie 2007). 
 I would like to specify the subject ideologically. In the metropolitan context, video games 
hail adolescent subjectivity as the adolescent is a subject of techno-capitalism (see Tiqqun 2012). 
This is the subject hailed through social media paradigms, gamification, video games, and 
audience-identification. This adolescent is not a young person. It is the sign for the ideologically 
co-opted subject, whose state of political consciousness is characterized by limited self-
awareness, narcissism, possessiveness, submission to totalized authority, and a latent but 
unrealizable androgynous sexuality. Adolescence is ideological subjectivity—a historical 
instance of naturalization of ideological consciousness. In this sense, adolescence is a sign of 
primary political subjectification as ideology forms and limits consciousness. That is, to be an 
adolescent is to be a de-historicized subject, overdetermined by periodization and 
institutionalization. This definition of adolescence stems from where the psychical meets 
ideology in the instance of what Kristeva (2007) calls "the ideality syndrome”—the belief in the 
reality of an essentially pure idea, an ideology. Kristeva’s notion of adolescence as ideology is 
interesting because it underscores that what is gratifying to the person for undertaking this sort of 
interpellation is in his own self-sacrifice to the idea. Nonetheless, the term adolescent socially 
locates a subject. As such it is deployed under the developmental conception of humanity 
(strictly apolitical), in which adolescence only pertains to an ahistorical developmental stage. I 
treat this structure as an ideology. One is hailed as an adolescent affectively. That is, particularly 
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in the context of transgenerational communication of necessary social participation, affect (the 
materiality of object relations) guarantees the transmission of what is essential for social 
(ideological) reproduction. 
 It is crucial to keep in mind that the adolescent is a discursively produced figure, an 
empirical composite character. For the typified adolescent (that home-front subject read and 
produced as an adolescent) stuck in the institutions of social reproduction in a typical American 
metropole, social life is highly over-determined, prison-like. He is likely to be overweight, 
malnourished, narcissistically maladjusted (Larson et al. 1980; Ge et al. 2001). At home, his 
parents are in control; in school, adults are in control; at his part-time job, it is his boss; in the 
public, it is the sanctioned state authorities or anyone above his social standing (Leventhal and 
Brooks-Gunn 2000; Barber, Eccles and Stone 2001). He is thirsty for pleasurable social 
allocation of desires for recognition (see Friedenberg 1970; Adamson and Bjorn 1999). He has 
poor self-image, because of the role of popular culture and its misogyny in the formative scenes 
of his social exploration (Usmani and Daniluk 1997; Smolak 2004). He is likely depressed and 
feels alienated. In his leftover self-reflexivity he cannot muster up the energy to take up space 
and partake in social activities that do exist because those are also inscribed into embodied class 
positions (Muris et al. 2001; Newcomb and Harlow 1986). He has cultivated a sense of sexuality 
through televisually mediated pornography and lack of experience with real humanity 
(Haggstrom-Nordin, Hanson and Tyden 2005; Ybarra 2005). In the same vein he has grown up 
with television, which teaches him the ideological speak he has to deploy to connect with others 
(Gerbner et al. 1986; Hoffman and Thomson 2009). Not to mention the problem of 
intergenerational relations and communication that marks the adolescent as not yet valuable, not 
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yet worthy of rights, still a body of complexes transitioning into a subjectivity (Dalhouse and 
Frideres 1996; Vollebergh, Iedema and Raakimakers 2001).  
 All of this alienation prepares the grounds for his feeling the gadget-mediated on-screen 
as the proper choice. In this caricature we can see how his personal inadequacies (or interpellated 
feelings thereof) play into motivating him libidinally to immerse himself into the digital 
mediation. This person might have a social future in an avatar-mediated environment. It is 
reasonable that in his free time, he turns to video games, because this is where he is in control to 
(at least) work for adventure. Gaming is also justified to his commanding social-handlers; the 
choice is sold to his parents as the promise of a productive future, which doubles as harmless fun 
more safe than the real historical alternatives of playing in the street.  
 What is politically important about viewing adolescence in this way becomes clearer in 
the context of contemporary psycho-social studies pertaining to video games (MMOs in 
particular) and social media. Critical theory viewed the dawn of consumer technology, 
particularly the effect of televisuality and mass-production on aesthetics and psychology, as 
problems of capitalist incursion on the subject-formative basis of subject-object mediation. 
Contemporary studies of televisual mediation seem to have made a calculated move away from 
attending to this problematic. And when the same literature that finds space to consider the 
affective states of consumer televisual experience (that is, immersion and addiction), it singles 
out the adolescents as the only subject of social concern. If the same technology affects adults 
and adolescents, and only in the case of the adolescents we have a sense of the darker political 
side of the impact of such technological mediation, then the question is whether the so-called 
adults are not already being unconsciously interpellated as adolescent subjects, since they are 
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also exploited and unconsciously manipulated to align their consumption patterns with the 
guidelines of the reigning consumer capital monopolies (Baudrillard 1998). In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, popular culture reflected on this possibility (at least subconsciously) by claiming 
that consumer industries were engaging in purposeful infantilization of adult subjectivity (see 
Barber 2008; Postman 2011). Initially the introjection suffered from its own ideological 
presumption about adulthood, individualism, and maturity. But I think that an unfortunate 
consequence of this attempt at analysis was that it led to dismissal of such a provocation. It was 
found to be too insulting to presumably autonomous and self-aware adult persons, when in 
reality, it was really just too insultingly obvious to bypass the defenses of the (adolescent) 
narcissistic self-conception of a well-refined consumer subject. 
 After all, the second life is culturally valued because it is supposed to be the life without 
real life prices as much as play is supposed to be a dialectic partner to work. Ideally mediative 
technology could allow persons to control their own flow of affectation by being the ones 
determining the sources. This would be my utopian fantasy for mediative technology. But, such a 
subjectivity requires education in self-conception (see Marcuse 1972). This could be the 
salvageable part of Rousseauan education of Emile: setting up the goal of socialization to be self-
determinacy. But, in the historical present, it is not the case that technology supports adolescents’ 
self-determination. Instead, adolescents are trained for the political economy despite their own 
subjecthoods.  
 What happens when interpellation as subject-formative technology is commodified? The 
privatization of the ideological state apparatus that is interpellation, enables the deployment of 
ideology as a means of socializing political economically necessary subjects (Althusser 1984). 
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Gaming functions on this level of institutionalization. People struggle to cope with the different 
values of gaming and real life. One is affective and deeply interpellative, and the other is a 
complex that necessitates very deep self-conceptions (repression, realization, liberation). 
Ideology becomes a tool of technology of social reproduction from the moment that technology 
becomes a mediating structure between individuals and social relationality. In this sense, gaming 
enables the experience of both limited and unleashed interpellations as a person participates in 
the construction of interpellation (see Li, Kien and Khoo 2013). Affectively, gaming uses 
interpellation and other (smaller) affective techniques of auto-stimulation, to shape and 
operationalize its necessary subjects. Social research has only pointed out how this takes the 
form of addiction.  
 The direction in which I would like to take this discussion will become clearer with the 
following example of Disney Corporation's entry into the MMO business: Disney Infinity 
(Avalanche 2013).  Here is how commodification of habituated interpellation is conceived in 
Disney Infinity: first, a child (Disney knows!) has already been habituated to internal realization 
of value of televisual affect—chances are he has been watching his favorite heroes (of 
identification) on the Disney Channel. In this personal history, advertisements were already 
regularly interrupting his cartoon-time; in a moment an ad introduces the already gaze-fixed 
child to a gaming console that extends the mediation of the televisually-guided experience by 
promising a “live-action” experience of the previously audienced. This is a gaming console 
which will utilize his toy action-figure of his favorite hero. In the commercial, the child is 
interpellated with an actor instructing him to physically insert the favorite figurine into a 
platform in the game console, which makes the figurine first appear on the screen, and then 
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become visually immersed into the virtual world of Disney Infinity on the screen. Thus, from the 
toy to the avatar, the child has been led from commodified identification (with the hero-toy) to 
the realm of commodified interpellation (with the hero-toyyed-avatar). 
 In this example, the psychological process of synchronization serves the capitalist 
objective of attempting to provide more efficient (productive) consumption. The process is 
punctuated by a physical act of confirmation: real-world play is transitioned into digital “play” as 
the child physically places the totem of his fantasy into the game console. Not only is an avatar 
version of a (toy) subject (that the child has already identified with) submerged into a virtual 
world, but the child is not allowed to actually satisfy his basic fantasy of becoming that particular 
favored cartoon hero—which until this new relation was in fact something that the child was able 
to do for himself through imaginative projection of his private (unmediated) role-play (see 
Winnicott 1971). Instead, even in the virtual world, which comes after so much physical 
preparation, the child only gets to “become” the toy version of his on-screen hero. At once 
confirming and repressive, this is a telling development in the context of consumer interpellation. 
It offers an ideological resolution to the reproduction-value problem of consumer capitalism in a 
way that ultimately sacrifices the experience of the subject. Reproducibility contradicts capitalist 
value (which is based on a psychology of scarcity), but here the child comes to experientially 
learn that he can never be his beloved Captain Buzz Lightyear, but that he can get as close to 
being “him” as possible by buying the figurine, setting it into the game console, and renting out a 
duration of interpellation which satisfies by being immersive. 
 In order to make sense of what might be going on in the apparatus of Disney Infinity, we 
need to take a few steps back to consider the concrete technics involved in the process. In this 
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example, we have a young child interacting with the machine, and his ways of imagining and 
play carefully channeled towards the commodity mediation. But, imagining also plays a large 
role in the child’s development of self-conception, his development of subjectivity and 
consciousness. And furthermore, imagination as such serves a role in the psycho-social 
development of the child into an autonomous individual. There is an overlaying of intentions 
here: on the one hand consumer capital intervenes in the child’s play by introducing a mediation 
that will train him to find a mediating commodity (that is, a toy) in order to play with his own 
imagination. On the other hand, play and imagining-through-objects have a developmental role 
in the child’s life, where their immediate consideration within the socius makes them agents of 
socialization (see Winnicott 1971; Piaget 2013; Vygotsky 2012). In order to make sense of what 
might be going on here, we need to see the political economic dimension of the psycho-social 
developmental processes. I have tried to argue that overlaying technology over socialization does 
not support the popular view that this is a benevolent process, but in fact the opposite; as it is 
realized within the age of consumer capitalism, digital technology is not a neutral tool, but in its 
very structure, embodies its historical political economic role reaching back to the television and 
audience labor at the dawn of the postwar culture industry. Economic value on this level is basic: 
self-determination, or not.  
 I want to argue that perhaps it is not hyperbolic to suggest that gaming is the realization 
of the Hayekian fantasy, the realization of an autonomous regulative system based on 
competition and performance maximization—to which, one still must voluntarily find his own 
way. It is interesting to note that just like its traditionally conservative liberal capitalistic 
ideology, the Hayekian fantasy only applies to the managerial and the owning classes in the 
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global political economy, which makes for some interesting suggestions: the ideology of perfect 
competition is meant to discipline the middle class in keeping their political economic positions 
in the general exploitative processes of the capitalist economy. The autonomy it realizes is only 
ideological in the same vein that the system is purposed by the demands of consumption. When 
capitalism defines the modes and operative goals of socialization, the operation of its processes 
look like those of video games (and gamification more broadly). Gamification of socialization 
gets set to occur as all generations (and their corresponding milieus) beget their own version of 
the general consumer affect. This affect is structurally identical so as to prolong and desensitize, 
to naturalize by composition. We can easily observe how this regime takes over from within the 
confines of the middle class family. Auto-stimulating, children are kept busy (and perhaps do not 
even need a exchange-value costing baby-sitter); auto-stimulation technology enables adults to 
have space for their own interpellative narcissism as children are libidinally regulated by 
consumer gadgets.  
 The processes are subliminal, microscopic fragments of psycho-social relations. They 
fully bypass the person, focusing on training for economic reproduction despite their presence. 
Viewed in this way, what is gaming but an alternative to therapy where the goal of social 
cohesion is the same but the means are different—in other words the subject is left out of the 
process. Because it works so well, and because its goal of profit extraction is too sacred to be left 
to subjects, gaming provides consumer capitalism’s institutionalized idea of subjectivity. The 
structures provide agency without a real consequence; it provides the illusion of freedom; it 
simulates subjectively meaningful stimulation (i.e. auto-stimulation). It provides a subjectivity 
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within an unsurmountable totality in the overdetermined social world, in which a perpetual anti-
presence becomes desirable—where rationality exists to perpetuate the avoidance of presence. 
 In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that the game reasserts the ideologically 
material existence of invisible authority, coherence, and totality. It conditions or perpetuates the 
commodity-identification on the libidinal level by satisfying the desire of lack, that is, 
immersion, non-presence, libidinal stimulation into timelessness. Here it only has limited 
capacity for exploitation; it is good and sounds stable as long as there are territories to take over. 
Effectively the consumer subject interpellated as a gamer becomes immersively incapable (more 
so, uninterested) in political self-awareness. This is because a libidinal economy of repetition of 
auto-stimulation immersed in commodity fetishism can only result in a pornographic relation to 
objects and experience (see Shaughenessy 2013 as example of recent research that ties autism as 
pleasure of repetition and object relations of the digital realm). Emotionality has a materiality, in 
which extensive suspension of self-consciousness leads to sensually pleasurable subjugation. The 
site of reproduction is in the subject; the commodity is the object in this relationship, so only the 
subject can produce, by laboring, the origins of what becomes a commodity affect—this is the 
auto of auto-stimulation. In gaming, through personalized interpellation of identifying with an 
avatar and its accompanying audiovisual structuring, a gamer accepts to work in order to get the 
feeling (that of a desired object) through the satisfaction of watching and hearing. In this 
mediation, in this watching, there is a materiality to this gaming-consumer political economy, 
and it is tied up with affect, as it is the feel of labor that valorizes the repetitive task. 
 In what follows I argue that through re-reading the documented affective states tied to the 
experience of televisual mediation, particularly in gaming, we can grasp the new terms of 
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consumer interpellation that serve as the basis of consumer socialization. By reflecting on the 
existing literature on digital gadgets, addiction, video-game-play motivation, self-portrayal, and 
politics, we can also see how affect is weaponized in the realm of psycho-sociality. 
Interpellative Commodification of the Subject on the Metropolitan Home Front 
 In the contemporary picture of capitalist socialization, the psycho-social effect (and 
affect) of video games emerges in terms of mediative gadgetization, interpellative technology, 
and socializing experience. It can be observed in the normative discourses around the problem of 
adolescents and their social and mental health—the discourse of adolescent addiction and anti-
sociality. Cultural studies movement in Britain widely documented the extent to which the social 
preoccupation with adolescents in public discourse was mainly to discipline and act out on the 
black inner city teenager, the politically deemed public enemy (see Griffin 1993). 
Commodification of socialization becomes particularly observable in the biomedicalized 
discourse of addiction to gadgets, video games, and particularly the MMOs. When this theme is 
contextualized around the adolescent home front subject, we are enabled to view a subject both 
in the context of losing oneself in consumerist nomadism and the commodification of 
socialization mechanism. 
 In some cases, WoW has been conceptualized as an important new domain of youth 
culture by a number of theorists (see Ess 2011; Galloway 2006; Houtman 2011). Their shared 
concern is that the more space WoW takes up in the lives of adolescent subjects, the more the 
medium might encroach onto the territory of the subject-formative processes dominated by 
traditional authority figures and institutions (that is, the family, the peer group, and the school). 
But, the limits of this research are clear: they suppose that the old models of socialization are 
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superior to the new consumer-driven mode; that in opposition to traditional (read: natural) and 
banal forms of authority and social organization, youth are now subjected to interested, 
economically driven, and corrupting modes of socialization. Instead of treating video game and 
various digital addictions as margins of otherwise normal (harmless) experience with televisual 
mediation, I argue that the affective states that are hailed by these mental and social “health” 
discourses are in fact describing the forms that socialization (defined as subject formation both 
socially and self-relatedly) takes when capitalism specializes a class population to the role of 
consumers and ideological reproducers. 
 In part, commodification is able to appropriate the means of socialization, because 
socialization justifies its subjugation of the human by claiming authorship of the process of 
becoming a person—becoming a subject, a person who speaks for himself. It would not be far-
fetched at this point to suggest that the gaming technology allows a person to have a virtual  56
experience of the reigning (prescribed, engineered, tailored) ideological conceptions of the 
dominant political economy. Commodification, since it is essentially a profit-extraction-oriented 
exploitative process, creates a problem for social reproduction, because its exploitative mandate 
rationalizes a careless approach to the well-being of the subject under its reign, his agency and 
means for self-perpetuation.  
 It is when primary socializing lessons are experienced in a conditioned environment like 
an MMO that commodification as socialization rears its head. In one sense the basic 
psychological technology operationalized by consumer socialization is repetition (that all-too-
familiar magic of habituation). Here, the elaboration is hidden in the minute elements of the total 
 That is, an aesthetic, mentally-constituted affect without the real-world materiality behind its value 56
originating in representation.
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phenomenology of engaging with an MMO. Every microscopic mapping contributes to the 
composite that will become how sociality is contained and redeployed and commodified in an 
MMO. Does the gamer constantly engage with the medium, or does he set up a semi-automated 
system for involvement that needs less constant attention (does the participant use a mouse to 
point-click movements, or does he engage in constant identification with his avatar and uses the 
keyboard to direct movements)? Does the MMO become a simulation or does it qualitatively 
replace that which would have taken place in the real world? I think that these are the questions 
that, when subjected to WoW, for example, would determine the nature of commodification, its 
impact on subject and ideology-formations, and disciplining self-consciousness within the 
consumerizing gaming environment. 
 Taking the discourse of MMO addiction as an example, what emerges is a treatment of an 
extractive machine as if it were an unchallenged force, an endless repetition of limited, stock 
conclusions. Yes, habituation of MMO-immersion takes time away from the social (see Snodgras 
2013). And, yes, this has wide-ranging, reasonable consequences from physiological to 
psychological and social “health” concerns (Wan and Wen-bin 2006). What is missing is a wider, 
political recognition—something akin to considering that what is engendered as addiction is a 
process of libidinal integration by means of aesthetic lure to identify with a process that 
habituates—a process or relation that increasingly mirrors the process otherwisely relegated 
for socialization. 
 After all, commodification stems from capitalist colonization of socialization’s processes 
such as object-relations. For the effort of crudely demarcating the difference, socialization is a 
process of becoming a subject for a given community (for membership and for others), and at the 
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same time, a process of being educated to become a subject for oneself. In this sense, 
socialization has an element of taking-care, or responsibility for, historical sociality (see Stiegler 
2010). As I mentioned earlier, Stiegler argues that the cultivation of responsibility in 
intergenerational (reproductive) relations is the process to critically attend to in socialization. 
According to Stiegler, reigns of attention-formation, grounded and operationalized by a society's 
communications technology (in his example, books), function to dictate the way in which 
essential socially-reproductive attention will be cultivated in intergenerational relations under the 
banner of "maturity," deeming the persons living through a subjection to the process as 
responsible enough to oversee social reproduction (2008: 13). In fact the radical margins of 
psychoanalytic theory proposed this precise argument. Both Reich (1967) and Rank (1938) 
spoke of child-rearing as a habituation to social dependence, which sacrifices the (arguably 
idealistic) well-being of the child to the perpetuation of social-necessity. Later on, Laing (1954) 
and Cooper (1970) also singled out the process of social reproduction as the cause of mental 
distress. In contrast, commodification characterizes the process of how the human (always 
wrapped in its potential sociality) is objectified, and becomes regulated by the power of capitalist 
operationalization (Baudrillard 1981: 140). And most importantly its goal is profit. Therefore, 
commodification, by default, seeks to steal, replace, and then guide subjective choice-making 
towards motivating production, but also creating circuits of demand-production by augmenting 
desire. 
 What makes the establishment of the exploitative socialization most effective is its cover 
that “these are merely games” and that “games are harmless.” Films become propaganda by how 
they deploy audience and on-screen identification and to what purposes; when it comes to the 
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question, how is it exactly that televisual technology interacts with ideology, we need not look 
beyond the immediate fact that identification is sanctified in film by controlling the location of 
“I”-perspectives—which on-screen character deploys “I”-statements (see Hoffman, Tiffany and 
Thomson 2009). Similarly video games can and do function to influence and direct participants' 
involvement. Only they do not do it for traditional ideological reasons such as fatherland/
motherland nationalism for the sake of military industrial apparatus support, but for much more 
immediate and short-sighted intentions of extraction and exploitation in the form of attention-
formation and consciousness-direction. 
 Technology enables the economic redirection of psycho-social processes while self-
conception remains dependent on the forms of existing technology. What makes digital 
technology different from its psycho-social predecessors (say, the concept, or the book) is that it 
expands mediative capture by a centralized televisual experience (Mander 2001). It enables 
interactivity with this televisual representation, which means that it captures the socializing 
process of play, and other forms of interpellative interaction. We also have to contend with the 
added dimension of commodity-mediation, and particularly, televisual mediation as a form of 
consumer-commodity mediation, while keeping in mind the problem of profit-orientation within 
the capitalist political economy. And this was consolidated within an industrial capitalist mode of 
production long ago! Born out of the idealistic protection and defense of imperialism, guarding 
industrial capitalism from within its base of the military industrial complex, today's technology is 
far from being neutral. It is propelled by the needs of capitalism to counter the falling rate of 
profit. What I am after here is to argue the importance of having a political and psychological 
theory of the consumer (capitalist) society—and not just the economy. Consumer capitalism as 
!182
we know it is multi-stratified, geographically organized, and highly specialized. And ever since 
its industrial beginnings, it also rests on applied science to maximize its yields and anticipate the 
dialectical possibilities of reaction and reversion (Marcuse 1964: 49). In such an economy, the 
libidinal tugs and the calls to the collective unconscious (in terms of familiarity with histories of 
cultural repression) play a determining role in how capital manufactures and reproduces demand 
for what it commodifies. The problems of socializing the young, which much of popular social 
science is predisposed to commenting upon (Gardner 2013; Stiegler 2010), stems from the fact 
that the profit-extraction base, which views a society as an amalgamation of individual 
consumers, reduces the complexity of self-social entanglement to where value and valuation are 
legitimated and justified by the bottom line, that of the exchange value. 
 So far, I have only dealt with a reading of the social-construction of everyday life of a 
person as already involving technologies that secure the reproduction of socially necessary 
subjectivity. Mechanisms relegated to social reproduction, and tasked with guaranteeing the 
continual systemic value of the subject populations take place on the following levels:  
• the emotional (the strictly personal); 
• the social-libidinal (distinguished from the emotional by being socially-
compartmentalized in the form of “object-relations");  
• the cognitive (ideological universalism often corresponding with ideological 
rationality); 
• the existential (ideology as metaphysical conception of life);  
• the economic (ideologues justify their own necessity to suffer and labor);  
• the political (ideologues also justify their own subjection).  
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Stated differently, when we lay out all the potential levels of political-economic subject/object 
relationality, situating ideology in the context of contemporary consumer capitalism enables us to 
recognize the potential for technological mediation on each level, and the role of technology in 
incorporating and consolidating political-economic stability if and when present at each level—a 
mediative mechanism of control and regulation. 
 In consumer-oriented ethics, it is the power-to-buy that structures access and capacity-
building on all levels: within consumer-driven structures, social-necessity is collapsed into 
economic necessity with the ideological mantra—if you can afford it, you can have it. And the 
contemporary academic discourse around the legacy of the consumer-feedback loop serves as an 
interesting example of the way in which commodification can become naturalized (Pariser 
2010). I am thinking of the concept of “prosumption,” appropriately meant to symbolize the 
"productive" consumption. In this universe, only player-controlled avatars are people, all others 
are non-persons (“NPCs”). One is rewarded for every action taken towards the universalized in-
game objectives of growth and accumulation. Labor is inescapable in this world, cheating wholly 
impossible. Collaboration evades the contradiction of self-interestedness; selfishness is the sole 
grounds of sociality. Interestedness and sharing are not mutually exclusive. Intimacy requires 
only the performance and the semblance of presence of an other. Everyone can be beautiful. 
Everyone has the means to reach that next level if they are willing to pay for it. Horizons are just 
a matter of access, and access is relative to time or pay. Interpellation satisfies materially. 
Gamified Libidinal Economy 
 Digital technology, which serves as the medium for immersive gaming, operates by 
manipulating the psycho-social structure of human experience that can only be called ideological 
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(in the sense that Althusser meant it). There is an enormous development lurking in this 
proposition. In the past, the political economy and ideology functioned in sync by means of a 
few social structures and institutions guaranteeing the synchronization, which nonetheless meant 
that the ideal universes and the dominant political economy were meant to be compatible but 
could not be guaranteed to perform in sync. In fact, narratives of revolutionary dissent usually 
fantasize about disillusionment and revolt against the social structures that begins from an 
ideologically prompted subject-position (see Adorno 1998; Marcuse 1972; Illich 1970). In 
comparison, in the MMO era, the game universe allows a person to have a virtual experience of 
the ideological experience—an experience of the world according to the political economy’s self-
justifying narration of the lay of the land. 
 In what is to follow I consider a number of concepts that can be most succinctly 
described as affective states— boredom, immersion, self-presence. Considering gaming within 
consumer capitalism allows us to answer the essential political question of how one becomes 
convinced to treat their life as if it was one of many, or in the least, not as significant and 
valuable and unique as it existentially is. It is only in this way that one can submit to repressively 
desublimated periodization of experience, libidinal economy, and relationality. We can think of 
the libidinal economy as defined by how the subject comes to relate to concepts of labor, 
valorization, habituation, and satisfaction. In its relation to political economy, I will hold that 
there is a correspondence between the libidinal and the political economic: the mode of 
production plays a determining role in superstructural ordering, which takes form as ideology, 
and it is ideology that serves as the ties between the subjective and the structural. 
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 A subject is constructed through libidinal reactions of pleasure or displeasure in the 
process of playing a video game, such as that of an MMO avatar-relational game. The game 
structure conditions the player to its equations of object relations by dispensing satisfaction 
through performance-based rewards, but also through small calculations of luck-simulated 
games. Players attain small bits of pleasure from winning a loot lottery or reaching a further-
empowering level (Karlsen 2011). As such the relation goes to strengthen the formation of the 
subject in the mind of the playing person. This speaks to why a person cannot simply break the 
ties with the game and give it up when it becomes unpleasurable on the conscious level. The 
repetition compulsion is built into what is marketed as enjoyable about the game, where the 
enjoyable is the affective instance (and then the memory of that satisfying linkage) of being 
stimulated by the game. The person is re-interpellated to form attention as a subject every time 
that he responds to another hailing originating from a prior identification with an element of the 
initial interpellation. The paradoxical relation which reconciles the contradiction between 
subjugation and subjection is found here in the consummating act of agency on the part of the 
person in building their own relation to the subject and the interpellation. This is done affectively 
in the form of auto-stimulation precisely in the places where formerly ideology would have made 
up for the limits of possibilities in light of material scarcity. The mention of the affective is 
particularly important. We can begin to get a sense of this in what is signaled by boredom, being 
bored, being boring in contemporary discourses. 
 Boredom is an especially rich phenomenological concept as an affective state 
encapsulating consciousness. Boredom becomes increasingly tied to commodity-regimented 
televisual interpellation and consumer object relations. Boredom is specifically important in the 
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structural context of the politics of presence, where those psycho-social object relations come to 
discipline the conditions for self-consciousness, that is, presence. Boredom can be described as a 
state of consciousness divorced from existential purpose (Hirsh 2012); Phillips (1994) argues 
that boredom is about waiting for oneself. It is a waiting for the confirming interpellation, that is, 
an authority that authorizes self-satisfaction. In earlier eras boredom has even been treated as a 
critical refusal, even if only latently so (Freud 1997; Winnicott 1971; Phillips 1994). Some 
theorists have even treated it as a mark of alienation and even commodification (see Adorno 
1998), building upon a sense that boredom also signals a loneliness, a substitute for the missing 
‘real.’ Yet others have even treated boredom as a marker of time outside of stimulation. In the 
case of Hirsh (2012), the sheer way that this research finding is articulated implies an assumption 
that the marker is on the level of auto-stimulation already—that in the case of auto-stimulation, 
there exists no possible cognitive competitor precisely because auto-stimulation negates 
consciousness in its present. 
 The affective enclosure that boredom signals over consciousness fits well with the 
structural terms of a video game: the game is not about having or not having, but about the world 
of rules that surrounds material scarcity. After all, in the context of consumer socialization, 
(thanks to habituated gadgetized mediation) all of the regulative roles need to be prefigured since 
capitalism reproduces them for the sake of profit-extraction (Marcuse 1972; Baudrillard 1998). It 
is here that the subject could be said to be reduced to a libidinal object-subject, an avatar subject. 
Boredom comes to symbolize the regiment of commodification or alienation of fantasy to the 
extent that one begins to view attention, presence, and self-consciousness as laborious (even 
elective) tasks. 
!187
 Boredom as an organizing principle is dormant in many pathological discourses 
surrounding adolescent psycho-sociality. According to the researchers, in one instance, 
drunkenness and immersion have the same root cause in the minds of the interpellated adolescent 
subjects (Griffin 2009). It stands for a particular nihilism, a desire to refuse the regime of 
commodification and recording by immersion into non-presence—subjectlessness through 
attentionally fixed projective syncing of identificatory processes (cf. Kroker 2004). The side 
effect of this regime is perpetual depression when recognition and satisfaction are rolled into one 
reward for winning or being the best (see Lanningham-Foster 2009). But this is an economically 
productive affective position of the subject, since depressive positions in object relations are still 
suitable to consumerism's needs for a subject population. In the second world, you can satisfy 
your (manufactured) desire to embody a kind of personality. 
 In ethnographic research that touches on the lives of home front youth, where boredom as 
a theme surfaces, it is in relation to the question of how youth organize their libidinal economies
—how they navigate being tired after school and outside of their institutionally required 
attention-formation and participations (see Iso-Ahola, Seppo and Crowley 1991; Hirsh 2012). 
Adolescents are observed filling up their free time with binging on Netflix, social media, and 
video games; they are quickly associated to the historical desire of the gambler, which is to say 
they develop emotional and therapeutic relations to experience and objects (Ito 2009). But even 
in the example of “chasing the nomadic self,” there is an instance in which commodification can 
be seen to manipulate the reproductive power of habituation and repetition in socialization of a 
given process. The nomad-self is similar to the not-yet-self traumatized into subjectivity, the 
recording surface in Deleuze and Guattari (1983). But, my critique would be that there is a 
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romanticization; the nomad-self covers up the fact that what is being tugged at is a desire to not 
be present. The nomad is an affectively regularized subject, deployed for consumer reproductive 
ends through processes of interpellation and its related object-relational psycho-social processes. 
The nomad captures a desire, a longing for the kind of reconciled or non-oppositional 
subjectivity, a sync between consciousness and being without contradiction, static, residue, or 
feedback. This is really a desire to have a consciously reduced affective subjectivity and 
instrumental rationality (see Livingstone and Woolley 2007). 
 What is being played out is a generational foregone conclusion:  one cannot escape 57
institutional regulation or repressive domination, so the best course is to use technology as a 
means to ‘log out’ of one’s own life. There is a politics of psycho-sociality lying dormant in the 
vicissitudes of this cultivated capacity to zone out and choose non-presence. There is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with people wanting to live out their deepest fantasies of becoming and 
recognition. The problem comes into focus when we ask about the quality of what is meant by 
consumerising socialization, or, the socialization and condition for self-reproducing 
consumerism: you can enjoy and embody as long as you can sustain the mediation which is 
directly plugged into the already existing political economy. The question that orients the rest of 
the discussion is this: what is the surplus here? I will venture to suggest that it is the existent, the 
self-determined being, suppressed for the sake of profit. 
Affective Terms of Gaming Surplus-Extraction 
 What comes to mind is Marcuse’s (1974) cautionary speculations in Counterrevolution and Revolt that the 57
consumer capitalist industrial military complex will organize its own structural response to the rising tide of 
subjective protest at the dissatisfying quality of postindustrial life.
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 The grounds of reading interpellative technology as a psycho-socially commodifying 
apparatus lies in instances when social relational problems are resolved through gaming, social 
media, and gadgetization—under a regime of repressive interpellation. In video games, ideology 
is deployed by political economy, and in this sense the valorization (carried through an 
intermediary of an avatar) is commodified. In Minecraft the avatar is a reduction of you, the 
player, reduced to the economy of the game with proportional agency. Sandbox games like 
Minecraft do not have a story line they impose on the player. The player is himself, and this lack 
opens up to identification, which is then guided towards valued ends (hidden beneath 
achievements and rewards). Since people within the walls of the empire must identify with the 
position of consumers as their primary mode of economic participation, and also, that of imperial 
agents, being a gamer or more specifically an avatar-subject allows them to assume their political 
economically necessary role with pleasure. Dedication has a weight of its own, which is guided 
by a loyal identification with the object as a continual source of subject stability. It is as if the 
avatar subject dictates by its being what is good, what is valuable, what is important to continue 
to chase, and what are the points of bodily exhaustion that need to be repressed. Gaming 
becomes a political economic project in social engineered control of agency and subjectivity, 
because it creates subjectivity around ideological role-playing: ideology says it could be you, 
even though society today does not ask that we reconcile the positions of domination but only 
that we tolerate and live with each other. In this idea class and role are reduced to signifying the 
same value. 
 Technology can provide a simulation of genuineness. More specifically, in what it lacks 
(that is, genuine human affect), it simplifies, reifies, lending to commodification. This is where 
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the failures and complexities of interpersonal relations on the familial and otherwise institutional 
level are exploited by commodification. It is an alternative to therapy in the same way that 
interpellation is an alternative to self-consciousness. Construction of ideological materiality is 
what creates consciousness. This materiality is class-based, but immanently it is also affective, 
gendering, subjectivizing. Avatar-interpellation is not so much a vehicle for historical 
conciliation as much as it is one for libidinal and cultural extension. Interpellation provides the 
script for the acting subject. Digital technology, by means of mediation control, is able to offer a 
customized experience of interpellation. In this view, gaming becomes a repressive means for the 
regulation of deployed interpellations. Individually we all have subject positions which are 
irreconcilable with the dominant machines because of class ideological contradictions on the 
level of subjective experience. This misfitting is resolved by the materiality of interpellation (that 
is, the embodied affect and consciousness of experience): in the end we end up producing the 
order that represses all of us because we cannot let go of all own narcissism—or, ‘in the end I 
will end up doing what will be best for me.’ 
 Repetition, alienation and valorization are intimately important processes for social 
reproduction. Each one is put to purpose in socialization and political economy. Socialization 
provides an affective (material) primer for ideological syncing of present historical materiality 
with the symbolic, thus tying the subject to the economy; the political economy secures the 
suitable (socially productive) exploitation. In order to deprive the human of its naturalized 
sociality and socially created capacity, the human needs to be convinced to become subject to an 
extractive interpellation—an interpellation that in its fiction makes the subject predictable, thus 
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regularizable or directable. The way to sustain a predictable relation would be to zero in on the 
predictable or moldable structure and maximize its course-directive value (see Kohlberg 1994). 
 Labor is dependent on the reification of humanity into an economically viewed value. 
Ideology defines that territory of symbolic meaning, because it mediates between those symbolic 
orders and the libidinal realm of the human materiality. That materiality, in turn, affects the self 
to create consciousness ordinarily perpendicular. On the subjective level, alienation enables 
repetition, which makes the valorization of laboring commodifiable as political economic labor. 
That alienation stems from the difference between the first time one does an activity 
(inexperience, newness) and how one does the same activity after however much it takes to have 
"learned" the activities in the experience. At this latter point the original experience has become a 
source of value, a raw resource in the repetitive mining for what it can (or, is perceived to be able 
to) provide. 
 In an equation of play being commodified through games for surplus-value, where 
surplus value is not directly the source of exchange value but the perpetuation of the object 
relation practice (read: self-commodification), the substance is not a material commodity but is 
psychic and deeply subject-formative in nature. Interpellation is deeply intertwined with the kind 
of surplus-value it is posed to extract. The former defines the form and extent of the latter, and by 
co-composition, makes the initially existing as both valued, and then transformed (or value-
loaded) as capital (see Kordela 2012). This means that every time the surplus is defined, the 
territory of the original shrinks proportionately. What shrinks every time is what increasingly 
comes to be defined as “being able to do for oneself” as it is excised from “having to pay to get it 
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done by someone else” (see Gardner 2013). This is what the commodification means in the 
psychic realm when read through interpellation. 
 Interpellation turns the person (more so the persona that the person accepts as subject in 
interpellation) into capital. It dehumanizes materially by turning the constitutively psycho-
socially human into a cog of exploitation (cf. Stiegler 2010). The televisual enables the 
commodification of signs and signification, and then the interactive technology enables the 
deployment of interpellation, which builds its edifices upon the affective apparatuses of the 
televisual—in case of consumerization this means that you continue to have a profitable 
consumer synced up between the presumably different realms of consumer experience. 
 On this level the surplus is self-conception and future capacity for that sort of valiance or 
dimension or form of self-conception. It is wrapped up with self determination, agency, all 
through the self-conceptualizing production of subject and concept, persona, idealization and 
identification, mirroring and mimesis, imitation, and avatarization. In this sense the person's 
potential self consciousness is continually decreased for the continual extraction of surplus value. 
Surplus is where consciousness could have been; the constitutive part of the political economy of 
attention formation. This is surplus value in psychic economy. The realm of materiality of 
domination in its most vulgar and basic terms. 
 Accounting for the surplus happens through regulating and controlling the larger 
processes of subject/object relations. Each partial gamer-interpellation is able to define a surplus
—that is its techne. And each surplus is layered on a previous in terms of replacing the originary 
with a persona that suits the system and also can simulate that which was excised to be turned 
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into surplus value. Simplification or reduction is a byproduct and not a direct intent of the 
process of commodification precisely because surplus extraction is profit driven. 
 The surplus is equal to the subjective, the qualitative, which is redirected to fuel the 
continual functioning of the mediation that commodifies and simplifies (in the least, the 
mediation offers only a partial mirroring and circulation). But, almost immediately, there is the 
problem of qualitative repression as this initially identified and this subject-re-constitutive 
surplus is recirculated. What is the impact of a continual recirculation of the initial human 
surplus-value? Recall the Adorno (1998) side of the experience: mimesis in being subjective 
affects the subject towards a conception, but that being is singular, and not a one-to-one copy of 
an already exiting; in this way it is a ground for politics of sustaining self-determination amidst 
all the processes that would fall under the culture industry. 
 The political economy in which psychic surplus is the primary value is arguably still 
around the corner. But, games do come before the laborization of digital technology—they are a 
primer just like play is a primer in laboring in society. So, what does it mean that games prime 
for exploitation? In the banal instances of televisual experience such as the fetishism of high 
definition viewing, we become content to be fascinated by the intricacy of the detailing of the 
televisual objects. What I have called auto-stimulation is given as the drug to null unrestful 
consciousness, as if we were closing an autistic boy into a room and giving him media that will 
simulate talking to him all under the familiar guise of education. Imagine the wider use of this 
phenomena, the way in which this exaggerated idea shows up in every day life. Pleasure (limited 
to self-stimulated kind) becomes the conciliatory object traded for unconsciousness/
agentlessness ( or ideological consciousness). This is one-dimensionality. And in a different 
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realm, that of the primary, in our historical moment, for this specific historical group of youth, it 
is being further defined, reified, and commodified in the sense of physical, most material form of 
consciousness, that of attention-formation and identification. Get high, feel distracted, avoid 
paying attention—all parts of a complex form of pleasure. This is a catastrophe in the historical 
material reality of the consumer-youth-class libidinal economy. Gaming ultimately displaces the 
problem of reification in labor, where consciousness is compromised to underwrite production 
and consumption, by substituting attention (that is, fixation, identification, and focus) for 
consciousness. 
 This is an act of sacrifice on the part of consumer capitalism—the desperate attempt to 
prolong the life of a system of valorization, reproduction and redistribution; justification for the 
subjugation of humanity for just a bit longer, for extending survival of the system of consumerist 
repression day in and day out. Give up the spirit, and replace it with bodily satisfaction and 
ideological consciousness. As such, the metropolitan society is a self-devouring society—
ouroboros. This is reminiscent of the role of gaming in the ideological lives of the metropolitan 
adolescents. They are ideologically sacrificed and raised on a deficit of consciousness. Gaming, 
the preoccupying of the conscious by stimulating attention formation through ideological 
identification (projection and introjection), takes form as prescribed fantasy, and replaces the 
possibility of pre-standardized, uninstitutionalized subjecthood. The surplus which would have 
informed their self-consciousness is thus turned into an already surplus, accounted for in the 
circuits of consumerization. 
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CONCLUSION
The intervention of my project is largely borne out of a reoccurring puzzlement about a 
seeming disconnect between the quality of the research and the phenomenological and political 
economic  readings  of  historically  specific  sites  of  commodification,  institutionalization,  or 
socialization of the consumer side of advanced capitalism such as that of gaming. Gaming is 
important, because in its interactivity, its phenomenological terms of experience, it contributes to 
commodifying some processes of  ideological  identification and auto-stimulation (which,  as  I 
argued in Chapter 2, simply belong to the concept of interpellation). A reading of gadgetized 
techno-interpellation enables us to critically consider gaming as a machine that enables surplus-
extraction to traverse and exploit across the domains of ideology (imagination and Phantasy), the 
mechanical psyche (its neural and cognitive behaviorized structures and patterns), the emotional 
life as interconnected to both real and imagined stimulus, and the world of semiotic reproduction 
(that is, the world of symbols, displaced and/or deterritorialized objects and ideological place-
holders).  In  this  closing  chapter,  I  hope  to  weave  all  of  these  dimensions  towards  an 
understanding of the requisite political discourse.
Of course, my presentation suffers from exaggeration, but in the least, as it regards the 
political  complicity  of  gaming,  whether  gaming  studies  could  ever  become self-critical  and 
deeply political in the sense of asking questions of its own conceiving technology, I attempted to 
raise questions that try to create critical potential by crossing ideological, material, and psycho-
social realms for its idea of politics—that of human autonomy, self-determination, and ethics that 
arise from considering surplus-extraction as a definitive site in the course of this determination.
In the course of my study I learned the shape that the exploitative mechanism takes in the 
specific instance of gaming as ideological apparatus. A continually immediately-accessible site of 
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this surplus-extraction is where and when immersion and non-presence show up—at sites such as 
“grinding” in WoW while watching someone else play on YouTube while “binging” on Netflix 
TV shows, the person is hypnotized by the sensational combination of physical and psychical 
stimulation. In light of what is signaled by gaming, what is alarming is that capitalism seems to 
have resolved the problem of singularity and consumption. There is no longer the need for a 
territorializing subject as interpellation is guaranteed by affect and auto-stimulation.
The modulation seems to be still largely done “unconsciously;” even the capitalists are 
largely  concerned  with  immediately-capitalizable  surplus-extraction.  When  the  capitalist 
interests become self-conscious about the nature of the avatar-subject technology which they 
have  been  underutilizing,  the  consumer  classes  in  the  metropoles  will  begin  to  directly 
participate in persona-(re)production, preparing people to sell ever new personas to themselves 
and their other counterparts. By then, they will all be so alienated from their labor, that they will 
not recognize what is happening. In the few instances that the consciousness arises, it gets swept 
up by the exploitative value; this is a way of saying that we are living in a transitional period 
between an old and a new governmentality. As I have discussed in earlier chapters, certainly 
Foucault and Stiegler have already said this, but they have also pointed to the already existing as 
the new limit. I think that their notion of the politically-feasible is limited. The problem seems to 
be  with  surplus-extraction,  and  not  one  that  somehow  evades  clarity  and  easily  slips  into 
mythologizing. 
In the remainder of this first section, I want to offer a summary of how the dissertation 
project brings together the disjointed theories relevant to the study—I was able to synthesize the 
theories by territorializing them to the same scope, addressing the same historically-constituted 
subject  experience  and  ideology,  that  of  an  adolescent  metropolitan  self-proclaimed  gamer 
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subject. I hope that my dissertation has proven that critical theory, psychoanalytic theory, and 
various  other  cultural  theory traditions  offer  politically  relevant  theoretical  innovations.  But, 
these theoretical discourses are often incomplete, partial, and disjointed, which is why I have 
wanted  to  offer  to  synthesize  them  anew  around  an  established  ideological  subject  (the 
metropolitan  adolescent),  and follow out  the  implications  into  the  political  realm.  I  want  to 
reinvigorate critical theory by disrupting the direction of its analysis.
In the Domain of Ideology, Imagination and Phantasy
This direct industrial use of interpellation is novel. For one, the apparatus differs from 
Althusser's  conception  primarily  in  being  directly  industrially  conceived.  In  the  case  of 
Althusser’s theory, since he did not have a theory of technology, interpellation serves to locate a 
subject-constitutive  historical  material  regime  of  object  relations  in  a  political  economy.  I 
thought  the  theory  of  interpellation  needed  to  be  extended  to  be  relevant  to  the  everyday 
experience of and within consumer culture. My contribution was to add to the mix the fact of 
gadgets  that  can  mediate  and  thus  contain  bits  informing  interpellation.  This  resulted  in  a 
sharpening of  the  political  discourse  surrounding the avatar-subject  relation as  real  not  only 
within  the  self-formative  object  relations  discourse  but  also  the  consumer-creating  psycho-
technological ones. 
When gaming is read as an instrumentalization of already existing psycho-social patterns 
of relations open to politically structuring manipulation, what we begin to see is how technology 
can  enable  the  exploitation  of  such  standards.  Consumer  technology,  that  is  the  means  of 
televisuality  (communicative  and  otherwise),  serves  the  structural  role  of  positioning  the 
metropolitan  publics  to  increasingly  specialized  forms  of  ideological  reproduction.  This 
subjugation serves to perpetuate consumption by commodifiable-object dependence. 
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In the chapter I address affective, audience, and cognitive labor (Chapter Four), I also 
suggested that we politicize the potential others that might fall under the banner of immaterial 
labor,  that  of  investment,  or  valorization  of  relation  or  object.  Audiences  work  to  construct 
themselves as audiences, which works to both perpetuate consumption as well as guarantee to 
prolong engagement with commodity. Audiences actively participate in constructing themselves 
as audiences, because of their labors of valorization, which secure the consumptive practice—the 
fact that people are invested by having worked to represent themselves.
In the Domain of the Mechanical Psyche
Read in the context  of  object  relations,  because of  its  consideration of  the particular 
experience of material-imaginary relations (and the role of subjectivity in consciousness and 
historical-subject-formation),  the  ideological  reproduction  that  takes  place  does  so  on  a 
substantive, qualitative, or material level. That is its allure for persons to participate in their own 
commodification.  In  this  view  smart  phones,  gaming  consoles,  computers,  laptops,  tablets, 
televisions, radios, all fit on a medium as technologies to liberalize  object relations; the more 58
that the televisual technologies mediate and gadgetize  social and self-relationalities, the more 
that that technology enables potentially commodifiable exploitation. 
A critical insight into the functioning of consumer libidinal economy in gaming is its 
bodily, substantive psycho-social basis. The substitute satisfaction that gaming provides does so 
through bodily stimulation being habituated to align with a constructed ideology of sociality. In 
other  words,  the  substitutive satisfaction satisfies  mechanically;  it  can do it  consciously and 
unconsciously  (both  affectively  or  interpellatively).  After  all  ideology  is  the  complex  of 
imaginary relations to real relations.
 Meant in the neoliberal sense, to deregulate, to disinvest public interest on the subject, to allow capitalism to 58
commodify and marketize
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In the Domain of Semiotic Reproduction
Immediately,  as  concerns  the  stability  of  archetypal  reproductions,   as  technology 
interrupts the social reproduction within families under technological capitalism, what happens is 
that the younger generations, who are meant to be subjects to the transference and identification 
of the parents towards an idealized idea of adult future, are exposed to increasingly larger sets of 
images  and  icons  that  refract  off  of  the  familially  established  regiment  of  object  relations, 
drawing its directive or pedagogical power from the fact of the structure of relationality and 
securing surplus extraction from thereabouts. The problem rests with the fact that these other-
worldly  experiences  do  not  come disinterested  or  naively—the  very  means  of  its  combined 
spectacle come drenched in various ideologies of efficiency, productivity, futurity, individualism, 
aesthetization, apolitics; as such this is a sighting of a real structure of ideological reproduction 
on the central (metropolitan) circle of the consumption-tasked classes of global capitalism.
In the Domain of Emotional Life
I chose to politicize object-relations as a discourse on socialization through an excavation 
of the kind of surplus that is being directed away from the immediate life of the person towards 
some profitability and reproduction.  This is  where the initial  consideration of youth as class 
returns; when object relations are politicized, and addiction to gadgetized mediations is shown to 
be just the very visible tip of a seriously exploitative economic tool for perpetuating consumption 
with direct implications for a person’s capacity to cultivate self-consciousness as it leads to self-
determination, the situation of metropolitan adolescents (both young and adult) becomes one of a 
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particular ideological subjectivity, which carries many of the structural imprints of its economic 
necessity, and interestingly enough only remains inert as long as it is medically  treated.59
Psycho-Politics
When the four domains are crossed, what becomes clear is the necessity of youth politics 
of  social  reproduction,  because  the  commodification  of  ideology  and  its  psycho-technical 
apparatuses only bring about economization without regards for the fate of the subjugated. A 
politics of socialization or social reproduction requires that we ask questions such as what is the 
point of subjugation, of the choices made in particular subject-formation. How is it that alien 
young generations are usurped and neutralized into becoming agents of reproduction themselves 
regardless of the historical material political economy? How is it that this keeps happening even 
in light of arguably most extensive commodification-geared liberalization of object relations? To 
put it another way, the task requires considering that the following might be true; that people 
have  been  deliberately  subjected  to  the  socializing  by  technology  with  the  assumption  that 
commodity fetishism is a productive, social good; that capitalist colonization of the semiotic and 
techno-libidinal is  agreeable—in fact  a productive good; that  some might even have utopian 
aspirations—even though it  actually turns out  that  those apologists  often mean that  they are 
trying  to  create  perfect  intelligent  machines  (see  Cohen  and  Schmidt  2013),  which  in  turn 
confirms  all  other  ideological  convictions  (such  as  self-interestedness  and  the  gain/loss 
algorithmization) necessary to perpetuate the misrecognition of psycho-technology, and enable 
unconscious social reproduction of the classes of metropolitan consumer society.
 This term is meant to allude to major critique of critical theory over psychoanalytic conclusions—that the 59
resolution to the subject’s embodiment of modern capitalism’s contradictions comes in the form of individual 
therapy, and not a transformation of social relations (see Adorno 1974: 60-65).
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This  is  where  I  have  tried  to  define  a  perspective  of  psycho-politics  as  a  political 
consideration  of  object-relations  reproduction  or  transmission  with  specific  ideological  and 
political-economically  relevant  consistencies—politics  of  social  reproduction  from  the 
perspective of the person with all  his  potential  for  consciousness and autonomy. What I  am 
talking  about  is  processes  such  as  gaming-interpellation  that  contribute  to  the  upholding  of 
particular  ideological  structuring—generationalization  of  political  economic  participation  or 
reproduction, sedimentation of laboring types and characters—or streamlining of the libidinal 
economies into the larger political economies. 
In  the  case  of  metropolitan  youth,  we  can  see  that  particular  neurotic-alignment  to 
economy happens in institutional space and time; that, habituation, that is traumatization and 
repetition, is how the reproduction comes about. This amounts to a particular institutionalization 
of  a  self-interpellating  subject  in  the  gadgetized  mediation  of  the  adolescent  gamer's  object 
relations. After all the only thing that the player wants, what he ultimately accepts subjugation 
and mediation for, is captured in the time-control of games—pause, fail, try again, know what is 
coming,  exploit  the  seeming  predictabilities  of  the  game  engine.  In  the  age  of  digital 
technologies which should be liberating humanity beyond the confines of immediacy and strict 
conventional materiality, what we get instead is the replacement of the territory with a simulated 
one,  in  which perfect  freedom is  actually  its  complete  opposite.  In  this  way,  these  isolated, 
kinetic-stimulation-based ideological supplants satisfy and thus justify what essentially amounts 
to a displacement of consciousness. Gaming, via televisual valorization practices, creates and 
satisfies the lack of consciousness. It sublimates the desire for recognition, and desublimates it as 
an opportunity for attention capturing identification. Further, this interpellation remains highly 
political, because as interpellation, it makes up for something crucially missing in the lives of 
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people  who habituated  gaming as  part  of  their  everyday libidinal  diets.  As  it  turns  out,  the 
affective terms of consumer libidinal economy are the materialization of ideological value in the 
life of the producer/consumer.
What  emerges  is  a  picture  of  a  carefully  attuned socially-constructed  subjectivity.  In 
gaming, autonomy and self-determination, guided by healthy primary narcissism, come to be 
slowly  but  surely  subsumed and  replaced  by  subjection  and  subjugation.  This  is  where  the 
libidinal economy is tied to the political economy via lessons of ideological logic, which utilizes 
lessons traced from the development of personhood and various subjectivities, the formation of 
the subject and the development of self-awareness. Most critically, perhaps, are the sites where 
this redirection is set to occur—sites where the person’s sense of self and the world is mediated, 
such as the body and idea, the affect and symbol.
In short, the liberalization of object relations leads to the re-appropriation of the means of 
socialization as political institutionalization to train consciousness via ideology (as both bodily 
technology and attention-gathering psycho-technology) to motivate the person into cultivating 
consumption-friendly presence in the world. How is it possible for the unanticipated overflow of 
surplus to still occur? How do we hold onto a theory of human liberation in light of this complex 
of  subjugation?  In  light  of  this  complex  of  ideological  technology  in  mass-cultivations  of 
economically necessary subjectivities, in the concluding section, I would like to explore what  an 
addressing politics might look like.
On Youth Liberation and Generational Revolt
I have worked to describe the problem in the most consequential and extensive terms 
against either theory that self-idolizes (and thus loses sight of its politics), or social research that 
pretends it is not political (addiction studies, health studies, ethnographies in gaming studies) in 
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what seem to be paralleling self-interest. But, I think that the work of critical description and 
explanation  of  the  structures  and  relations  (ideological,  object,  and  social)  to  be  lacking  in 
contemporary critical theory. The case of gaming studies is exemplary, with the added clarity 
about this being the case precisely because to treat the matter of addiction in gaming in terms of 
its effects on psychosocial development (and by extension the formation of consciousness and 
politics of self and desire) would be to demystify the consequences of this particular kind of 
object-relational or meta-psychological commodification. Anything as such would result in the 
substantiation of what "the war of youth" really means. This would hurt industry interests, so the 
dots  remain unconnected.  There is  already too much unprocessed,  fragmented understanding 
about our condition.
What  happens  to  children  in  the  process  of  socialization,  especially  its  primary 
(childhood and adolescent) stages, is a perpetually proto-political site that has been waiting for 
critical recognition. After all it is a formative treatment that decides a person’s future possibilities 
and directions. It would be one thing to dismiss the pains of primary socialization as the cost of 
social reproduction. But, when the process becomes so overlaid with the needs of the reigning 
political economy that the imaginary must be increasingly prefigured in the reproduction of the 
system, then the costs of that process no longer look so innocent, as just a tragedy of human 
reproduction.  The  kind  of  processes  to  which  we  subject  youth  in  order  to  justify  social 
reproduction have gone politically uncritiqued for too long.
My concern over commodification is specific and explanatory in a way that I believe does 
enable us to think constructively—to enable us to clear the fog towards a political direction. 
Commodification implies exploitation, and in the realm of psycho-politics, the unequal exchange 
of consciousness for ideology. It is not merely thingification or objectification. It is a concrete 
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historical occurrence, and therefore, a basic factor determining political empowerment. I think 
somewhere by implication we can begin to see a new direction for youth rights and substantive 
youth politics. It is a matter of how we conceptualize the relationship between society and youth
—the newcomer, the radical by nature,  the unhabituated, the still-yet,  the unaccustomed, the 
unprepared,  the  unexpecting,  the  surprisable  consciousness.  I  have  tried  to  offer  a  thought 
experiment  capable  of  politically  positioning  the  question  of  how  hospitable  the  society  is 
towards its youth, or more critically put, how youth are treated in the very centers of the global 
capital—what  of  theirs  is  explained  away  in  such  a  way  as  to  justify  unconsciousness, 
subjugation, and sacrifice.  
I also have some serious thoughts about what the other side looks like, but I have also 
encountered serious disagreement with thinkers who have a view on the matter (on topics such as 
what do we do materially, do the older generations needs to sacrifice their class standing in order 
to propel the younger generations into better conditions for self-determination, as well as around 
the question of the place/fate of the existing community). I think the critical, psycho-political 
directive  makes  sense  ultimately  in  terms  of  liberation  of  youth  from  the  conditions  of 
unconscious identification and self-objectification towards consciousness and self-determination 
despite what that might mean for the rest of the society. This aspect of my conclusions has been 
hard for many to stomach, especially because it suggests that the only ethical political action on 
the part of the adult world would be self-sacrifice. Not that that has stopped me from following 
through to imagining what real politics of consciousness in the democratic spirit would look like; 
in the end, following through such a stark position has allowed me to push the boundaries of 
existing theories of libidinal economies to realize that what is still lacking is a direct politics of 
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socialization—social  reproduction,  subject-formation,  self-consciousness.  I  hope  that  my 
dissertation work can contribute to advancement in this realm.
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